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This study finds out how the stakeholders of the Yamal LNG project consider it to connect with the energy 
security of Russia, to which climate change mitigation poses a potential threat. Since securitization of 
energy is the result of a social process where political actors contest over the meanings of energy, the 
study also looks at whose interests the Yamal LNG project actually secures as “energy security”, and how 
that concept becomes projected as a general national interest, instead of having energy transition among 
the top objectives of energy policy. Neo-Gramscian analytical approach and frame analysis are used to 
deliver results from a data consisting of 11 research interviews and 40 archival sources. 
 
The stakeholders make sense of Yamal LNG’s relation to energy security and energy transition through 
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to project a “reality” that presents natural gas production as compatible with energy transition and climate 
change mitigation as an inferior interest to energy security. The Yamal LNG case shows that incumbent 
fossil energy regimes can effectively counter attempts to direct energy policy on low-carbon paths by 
pleading to security, which is a topic that research often neglects. 
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Venäjän energiaturvallisuutta määrittää hiilivetyjen vienti. Maan kansantalous ja poliittinen johto ovat 
riippuvaisia energiakaupasta saatavista tuloista. Kiinnostus ilmastonmuutoksen hillintää ja uusiutuvaa 
energiaa kohtaan kansainvälisesti on kuitenkin alkanut haastaa Venäjän energiaturvallisuutta. Erityisesti 
EU, Venäjän tärkein kumppani energiakaupassa, pyrkii vähentämään fossiilisen energian kulutustaan 
ilmastopoliittisista ja energiaturvallisuuteensa liittyvistä syistä. Vuonna 2017 Venäjä ryhtyi siirtämään 
energiamarkkinoittensa painopistettä Itä-Aasian suuntaan arktisen Yamal LNG -kaasuhankkeen avulla. 
Yamal LNG:n tuottama nesteytetty maakaasu (LNG) kuljetetaan markkinoille Koillisväylää hyödyntäen, ja 
hankkeen odotetaan lisäävän energiainfrastruktuurin rakentamista Venäjän arktisella alueella. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy security and energy transition represent two sides of a coin in mainstream energy policy 
(Bridge, 2010: 521; Jewell et al., 2014: 743). While transitioning the energy system to a low-carbon 
one is needed to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC, 2018: 112; Urry, 2014: 16), energy 
security has traditionally focused on securing the fossil fuel-dominated energy base that keeps the 
industrial societies running (see Bridge, 2015: 330–331; Sovacool, 2011: 11; Urry, 2014: 12). 
However, interaction between the two contrary fields of policy remains lacking (Heubaum & 
Biermann, 2015: 229–230). 
 
This study examines the problematic relationship of energy security and energy transition through 
the case of Yamal LNG. Yamal LNG is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, located onshore the 
arctic Kara Sea, in Sabetta, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO), Russia. The joint-stock 
company (JSC) Yamal LNG is owned by Novatek (50.1 %), TOTAL S.A. (20 %), CNPC (20 %), 
and the Silk Road Fund (9.9 %) (Yamal LNG, 2015a). With a development license reaching to 2045, 
JSC Yamal LNG extracts and liquefies natural gas in the 926 bcm Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye gas field 
(Yamal LNG, 2015c). It is the first private company in Russia to export natural gas to foreign 
customers, as it is expected to supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) primarily to Asian markets (Yamal 
LNG, 2015b) via its access to the Northern Searoute (NSR) (Yamal LNG, 2015a). 
 
When Yamal LNG commissioned its first shipment of LNG in 2017 (Putin, 2017c), a long-term plan 
came true. The Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (2010) had set an objective to 
develop LNG production, helping to reduce Russia’s dependence on Europe by export diversification 
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 23). As Russia’s primary gas trade partner, the 
EU, seeks to cut fossil fuel consumption in order to reduce GHG emissions and dependence on foreign 
energy suppliers (Sharples, 2013: 688), Russia responds to the external threat that it considers climate 
policies and energy transition to pose (Orlov & Aaheim, 2017: 466; Sharples, 2013: 688–690; 
Tynkkynen, 2019: 115). 
 
After all, Russia is a significant exporter of hydrocarbons. “Energy extraction has become a means 
for survival for Russia”, Andreassen (2016: 78) claims. Depending on the price of oil, the tax revenue 
of oil and natural gas has accounted for 40–50 % of the country’s federal budget (Simola & Solanko, 
2017: 31). Yet, the question is not only about economics, but carries political and societal implications 
in a society that appears to be critically rooted in fossil energy production (see Tynkkynen, 2019: 1–
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3). Energy entangles to political power, identity, and influence and status in international relations 
(Sharples, 2013: 686; Tynkkynen, 2019: 1). Energy companies take part in a wide range of corporate 
social responsibility activities and media production (see Tynkkynen, 2016: 377–378). This setting 
grounds a condition in which societal stability could be said to rest on hydrocarbons, as the country 
relies on its foreign energy markets (see Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013: 391). Against the conventional 
understanding of energy security as an importer state-centric issue (see Proskuryakova, 2018: 203–
204), Russia depends to a significant degree on the security of hydrocarbon exports, which defines 
its energy security concept (Sharples, 2013: 683). 
 
However, prioritizing a concept of security over other significant energy-related global challenges 
(see Falkner, 2014: 192; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 52) is not the only path Russia could take. 
Despite decades of effort, positivist research has failed to deliver one comprehensive definition for 
energy security (Jewell et al., 2014: 743; Sovacool, 2011: 7). As a discourse, it seems that energy 
security is “a concept considerably more concrete than the object to which it refers” (Bridge, 2015: 
330). Actors with different backgrounds and interests find quite unconverging meanings for security 
that is nested with the patterns of energy production and consumption (see Bridge, 2015: 328; Levy 
& Spicer, 2013: 663; Sovacool, 2011: 7). 
 
Research has pointed out numerous cases in which actions taken in the name of energy security have 
constrained other objectives of energy policy, such as climate change mitigation (see Geels, 2014: 
30; Haas, 2019: 69; Levy & Spicer, 2013: 663; Newell, 2018: 16–17). While Russia, consisting of a 
wide range of actors (Sharples, 2013: 684), could benefit from pursuing a low-carbon energy system 
(see Tynkkynen, 2019: 15–16), it has chosen to “secure” its energy in certain ways that benefit some 
over others (Bridge et al., 2018: 201). Previously, Russia has promoted fuel substitution with natural 
gas as the first step toward a low-carbon energy system in the EU. This remedy for the EU’s will to 
reduce emissions, which has based on a framing of natural gas as the least GHG emission intensive 
fossil fuel (Sharples, 2013: 690), would allow Russia to sustain its gas exports. However, uncertainty 
and overwhelming complexity of empirical evidence characterizes the scientific support for such 
framing (see IPCC, 2014: 527). The total carbon footprint of fueling energy systems with natural gas 
“continue[s] to be a black box” (Tynkkynen, 2019: 19). 
 
The rub of energy security lies in that it allows powerful actors to justify actions, bypassing 
deliberation about the overall purposes of policymaking (Bridge, 2015: 330; Bridge et al., 2018: 201). 
Thus, quite contrarily to consensual “management”, energy policy constitutes a terrain of political 
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contestation for different actors, who pursue various and often disclosing policy objectives (Falkner, 
2014: 192; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 52) – both challenging status quos and seeking to preserve 
their dominant positions in power (Geels, 2014: 25; Newell, 2018: 19–20). Such policies that then 
pass this terrain as “winners” and become accepted as legitimate “realities” beyond political 
deliberation (Szulecki, 2020: 2), are creations of strategic use of power (see Levy, 2008: 952). States, 
by no means, remain politically neutral: Scholars of international political economy (IPE) argue that 
governments tend to support corporate incumbent actors due to mutual dependencies (Geels, 2014: 
26; Levy & Newell, 2002: 94). 
 
The consequence of failing to understand the politics and power embedded in energy security is the 
risk of energy system lock-in to GHG emission intensive pathways (see Newell, 2018: 4). Particularly 
but not only in Russia, energy systems that are subject to securitization have attained significant 
economic and political investments (Phelan et al., 2013: 207) and are as well enforced with 
institutional legacies (Urry, 2014: 8–9). For this reason, some scholars have come to propose that 
truly transformative change, taking place at all system levels, is needed – as the inertia of a market-
led transition, in which social relations are preserved, would be substantial (Fligstein, 2013: 46; 
Newell, 2018: 3–19; Sovacool, 2017: 21). Exceeding the global carbon budget poses a probable risk 
of catastrophic climate change (IPCC, 2018: 112) – a concern that the Paris Agreement seeks to 
prevent by “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels” (United Nations, 2015a: 3). 
 
To empirically analyze the complex political relationship of energy security and energy transition, 
which in part manifests through the Yamal LNG case, this study applies frame analysis and qualitative 
analysis based on the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach to 11 research interviews (conducted in 
2018 and 2019) and 40 archival data sources (dated 2014–2019). Adoption of the neo-Gramscian 
approach allows focusing on the element of power, with a special attention to its strategic and 
structural dimensions (Levy & Scully, 2007: 983), which constitute key parts in the politics of the 
current world energy order (see Mitchell, 2009: 418–421; Newell, 2018: 3–4; Urry, 2014: 9). The 
following research questions are asked: 
 
• How the stakeholders of Yamal LNG consider the project to connect with the energy security of 
Russia? 
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• Whose interests the Yamal LNG project actually secures as energy security and how that concept 
of energy security becomes projected as a general national interest, instead of having energy 
transition among the top objectives of energy policy? 
 
The results reveal that four frames guide the interpretation of the Yamal LNG project’s relation to 
energy security and energy transition. The Yamal LNG project supports the strategic interests of the 
Russian state and the JSC Yamal LNG consortium, who make up a dominant group in the case field. 
Strategically combining different types of power that emerge as a general “meaning of production” 
of the project, this group has established hegemony, which effectively obstructs the opposition of 
contesting actors. It addresses the political threat of energy transition by domesticating dangerous 
ideas and integrating them to the hegemonic agenda according to the group’s own interests. With the 
Yamal LNG project, the hegemonic group has been able to actuate its interest, which serves the 
energy security of Russia as a major hydrocarbon producer. 
 
This study structures as follows: After the introduction section, section 2., Theoretical framework, 
presents the essentially required conceptual tools for understanding and analyzing the relationship of 
energy security and energy transition in international context. Greater weight is given to frame theory 
and the neo-Gramscian approach, which are particularly relevant for the methodological design. 
Section 3., Yamal LNG, describes the case of this study in three dimensions that corresponds with the 
neo-Gramscian approach. Section 4., Methodology, describes the study’s methodological design, 
data, analysis methods, and research ethics. Section 5., Results, first describes four frames drawn 
from the data with frame analysis and then, by applying the neo-Gramscian approach, critically 
examines strategic actions of all major stakeholders of the case. Due to the interpretative nature of 
the analysis methods used in this study, reasoning to support deductions is included in many parts of 
the results. However, theory, methodology, and the results are also examined in a separate Discussion 
section 6. Section 7., Conclusions, summarizes the results and sets agenda for potential future 
research. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section explains the theoretical foundation of this study in critical theory (see Yin, 2016: 79–
80). Section 2.1. presents the three main areas of energy policy at global level, which share 
theoretically exclusive relationships (see Falkner, 2014: 192). As they gather support from varying 
interest groups (see Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 55–60) on a terrain that lacks one unifying 
governance institution, they become subjects to political contestation. The following section 2.2. 
presents common analytical perspectives for structuring energy politics. It proposes that energy 
politics particularly in the Yamal LNG case can be best understood through the concept of field that 
is highly analogous to the concept of historical bloc, found in Gramscian theory. Section 2.2.1. points 
out that discourse is a central element of sensemaking regarding energy issues (Isoaho & Karhunmaa, 
2019: 930) that draws fields together. It also describes the concept of frame. Frames embed power, 
as they are used to both apprehend and communicate the world – that is central to the research 
methodology of this study. Then, section 2.2.2. argues that the neo-Gramscian approach is a fruitful 
analytical approach to examine energy politics and power, as it provides theoretical advantages to 
regime and organizational field theory. Finally, section 2.3. looks closer to one of the three main 
energy policy challenges – energy security (Falkner, 2014: 192; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 52). It 
describes how instrumental use of the concept allows incumbent actors to protect existing status quos 
of energy policy (Bridge, 2015: 330), which fortifies their positions in power and may lock-in energy 
systems to paths that continue to follow the current fossil energy-dominated energy order (see Newell, 
2018: 4). 
 
 
2.1. Politically embedded global energy challenges 
 
Mainstream energy policy literature recognizes three significant global energy challenges, which 
should be addressed: mitigating climate change, ensuring energy security, and reducing energy 
poverty. These are often conceptualized as “the energy trilemma” (Falkner, 2014: 192; Van de Graaf 
& Zelli, 2016: 52). However, critical voices argue that issues related to energy cannot be encapsulated 
like this, as if they were only about energy itself. Instead, energy should be merely considered as a 
lens which refracts broader issues (see Chester, 2010: 893; Sovacool, 2011: 7; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 
2016: 50–51). According to Falkner (2014: 192), “the key question” is that how the dimensions of 
the energy trilemma relate to each other – to what extent and under which conditions do they 
complement and conflict. Coining the meaning of “trilemma”, some highlight that the dimensions are 
 
 6 
mostly exclusionary – addressing one reduces chances to improve the others (see Bridge, 2015: 330; 
Sovacool, 2011: 7; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 53). 
 
Addressing the issues would require collective action at transnational and regional levels, as state 
level energy policy has global impacts. However, no overarching governance institution for energy 
exists. Energy issues are governed by a scattered collection of organizations with varying interests 
and overlapping fields of operation, ranging from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) – let alone states and businesses, which play crucial roles in 
shaping global energy governance (Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 55–60). History too, has left its 
imprint – for example, the whole area of energy governance has developed largely apart from climate 
governance (Falkner, 2014: 194). 
 
Hence, the dispersed institutional structure of international energy governance (Newell, 2018: 14; 
Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 58) makes energy a fit ground for political contestation. There are so-
called “producer clubs” with their member states, such as the Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
(GECF) and Russia, who emphasize the importance of energy security (see Van de Graaf & Westphal, 
2011: 22), while coexisting environmental NGOs and social movements advocate such objectives as 
increasing the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix and addressing historical 
inequalities related to energy production (see Burke & Stephens, 2018: 79). 
 
Nonetheless, social forces that structure around fossil energy, in the modern age that is characterized 
by them, continue to shape power relations in energy governance (Urry, 2014: 9). Despite that energy 
can be nearly invisible to our everyday experience, energy systems and social systems are highly 
interlinked (Urry, 2014: 4). Societal patterns of interactions with energy systems constitute regimes, 
which “comprise networks of actors, routines, principles, and rules, simultaneously constituting and 
disciplining their subjects”, again “constraining and enabling patterns of behavior” (Levy & Newell, 
2002: 85). Incumbent actors possess relatively significant power to these regimes (Geels, 2014: 26), 
which radically shape social reality (see Urry, 2014: 9). Through constitutive power (“power to” 
instead of “power over”) that spans politics, economics, cultural meanings, and discourses (Geels, 
2014: 26) and manifests in ways that go beyond coercion (Balmaceda, 2018: 131), incumbents shape 
relationships between regimes (Balmaceda, 2018: 131). Resistance to destabilizing change is frequent 
(Geels, 2014: 26; Newell, 2018: 3), as their interest is to maintain advantageous positions compared 
to others (see Fligstein, 2013: 41–42). Thus, power is a central element in explaining the current 
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energy order, which indisputably has a political dimension (Balmaceda, 2018: 133; Mitchell, 2009: 
201; Urry, 2014: 9). 
 
 
2.2. Analytical perspectives on energy politics and power 
 
Politics and power in fields that structure over energy issues are subject to research. Fields form 
“around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes” (Hoffman, 
1999: 352). Fligstein (2013: 40) defines field as “a social arena where something is at stake and 
actors come to engage in social action with other actors under a set of common understandings and 
with a set of resources that help define the social positions in the field”. In one sense, fields are also 
areas that collect dialogue and discussion (Hoffman, 1999: 352), which makes discourse a central 
element that constitutes fields (see Levy & Scully, 2007: 973). 
 
Followingly, political contestation over the directions of energy policy can be conceptualized as a 
field. The current fossil fuel-dominated energy order represents a stabilized field, which reflects the 
interests of field incumbents who resists destabilizing change (see Fligstein, 2013: 41–42). 
Challengers, who pursue alternative energy orders, seek to destabilize the field either by reforming it 
through piecemeal change or developing entirely new fields (Fligstein, 2013: 40). 
 
Nevertheless, it is more popular to conceptualize the political processes of energy transitions under 
regime theory, since an influential framework (see IPCC 2018: 148, 150) draws from it. The multi-
level perspective (MLP) conceptualizes the dynamics of socio-technical transitions (see Geels, 2014: 
23). Geels (2014: 23) suggests that “destabilization and decline of fossil fuel-based regimes” is often 
neglected, but “equally important” requirement for energy transition as stimulating innovation in 
environmentally sound technologies and alternative forms of social interaction. Creating space in the 
regime level is required to open “windows of opportunity” for niche innovations to enter the wider 
sociotechnical landscape (see Geels, 2014: 23). 
 
However, the MLP and regime theory have faced critique of being limited. As a structuralist theory 
(Geels, 2014: 26), the MLP places collective actors broadly at the “regime level” (Newell, 2018: 2). 
Simultaneously, it disregards some aspects of power that constitute when ideologic and discursive, 
institutional, and material elements intertwine, as some of the elements situate outside the regime 
level – the locus of politics and power. The MLP comprehends some of these as “landscape” factors 
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(Newell, 2018: 10). Newell (2018: 2) argues that MLP is quite “narrow” framework for 
understanding change in the field of energy, as it “continues to neglect questions of politics and power 
beyond specific management strategies and governance practices”. This precedes the notion of Haas 
(2019: 67), who argues that the MLP “falls short as there is no theoretical basis within the framework 
that allows for it” to analytically account politics and power. As a result, regimes often appear 
“monolithic ‘barriers to be overcome’” (Geels, 2014: 23), even though the reality is more complex. 
Also, the embedded values in regime theory suggest that regime governance is generally “good” 
(Gale, 1998: 262–263), which sheds positive light on the role of the government as a regime manager. 
While this drives research focus on intra-state regimes (Newell, 2018: 2), it also disregards the 
potentially negative outcomes of governments establishing close relationships with incumbent actors 
(Geels, 2014: 26). 
 
Inspired of this critique and long run efforts within multiple disciplines to understand stability and 
change in fields (Fligstein, 2013: 39–40), this study offers a neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective 
on power and political contestation regarding the relationship of energy security and energy transition 
in the Yamal LNG case, which I conceptualize as a field. While section 2.2.2. looks further to the 
topic of field dynamics from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the next section introduces the particularly 
important discursive dimension of this field (see Hoffman, 1999: 352). 
 
 
2.2.1. Frames and discourses 
 
Energy is subject to discursive debates, as views of what constitute the key issues regarding energy 
and how to solve them diverge highly between actors (Burke & Stephens, 2018: 80; Sovacool, 2011: 
7; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 50). This also makes discourse a central element that draws actors 
together in debated energy related fields (Hoffman, 1999: 352). Thus, it is not surprising that such 
analytical approaches that Isoaho and Karhunmaa (2019) place under the category of “discursive”, 
since they draw from frame theory and discourse analysis, have become increasingly common (Isoaho 
& Karhunmaa, 2019: 930). 
 
Following the neo-Gramscian tradition, also this study understands discourse quite broadly as the 
dimension of ideas and sensemaking based on language (see Levy & Newell, 2002: 86–87). However, 
more commonly discourse is defined as “a shared way of apprehending the world” that is “embedded 
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in language”. Discourse “enables subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together 
into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek, 2013: 9–10). 
 
Close to discourse is the concept of frame. However, frame theory pays arguably more emphasis on 
cognitive aspects (see Goffman, 1986: 21–22). A “schemata of interpretation” is a popular definition 
for frame, originally used by Erving Goffman (1986: 21), for whom frame analysis is generally 
attributed. However, Gregory Bateson’s article A Theory of Play and Fantasy (1954) introduced the 
concept as a way to understand linguistic and metalinguistic messages (Bateson, 2000: 175). Ever 
since a variety of definitions and explanations have been provided. Often frames are explained as 
windows, which shape vision of the outer reality, as some parts of the observed subject are included 
and others excluded (Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 394). Another allegory is to think about physical 
frames: “if you were to reframe a picture, you would notice that the very elements previously 
emphasized – colors, patterns, composition – would subsequently be de-emphasized by a new frame“ 
(Kuypers, 2009: 181). Frames encourage to see subjects in certain ways, by making some aspects of 
reality more accessible than others (Kuypers, 2009: 181). 
 
By selection and endorsement of subjects and contexts, frames define problems, causes and solutions, 
and make moral judgements (Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 395; Kuypers, 2009: 182). Frames influence 
action, since solutions to problems are understood through framing (Snow & Benford, 1992: 137–
138). Frames can be found in communicating actors (e.g. personal history), texts (e.g. rhetoric), 
receivers of communication (e.g. educational background), and larger cultural contexts (e.g. customs 
of communication) (Kuypers, 2009: 182). As frames between actors vary, differences in issue framing 
can lead to conflict (Huttunen, 2014: 65). Frames can also indicate distribution of power, as powerful 
actors can make their frames dominant (see Hajer & Laws, 2008: 8). 
 
Discourses and frames may also “institutionalize” as organizational practices or common ways of 
reasoning (Hajer, 1993: 46). In such cases they resemble institutional logics (see Fligstein, 2013: 47) 
and hegemonic rationales (Levy & Newell, 2002: 86–87). However, neo-Gramscian theory often 
refers to the latter with the term “ideology” (Levy, 2008: 952; Levy & Newell, 2002: 86–87), which 
contains coherently structured theoretical assumptions about the social order, builds around 
discourses, and is politically motivated (Levy & Scully, 2007: 977). Followingly, energy policy is 
influenced by frames and discourses, which share elements from central political theories and 
ideologies (see Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 50). Such worldviews or ways of sensemaking that 
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structure over frames and discourses diagnose problems, gives them specific values, and suggest 
action (see Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 395; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 50). 
 
 
2.2.2. Neo-Gramscian approach to energy politics and power 
 
Levy and Scully (2007: 981) propose that stabilization in contested organizational fields that build 
around specific issues can be examined with the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach. The approach 
solves several theoretical issues posited against regime theory and the MLP by a number of IPE 
scholars (see Gale, 1998: 252–253; Haas, 2019: 67; Newell, 2018: 10), as it allows expanded 
examination of power, which spans beyond socio-technical regimes (see Geels, 2014: 23; Newell, 
2018: 2). According to Levy and Newell (2002: 86), the approach ”promises considerable value in 
understanding the processes of contestation, resistance, and accommodation at the regime level, as 
well as the relationship between regimes and broader relations of power”, since it provides analytical 
tools to do so. In contrast to the MLP, it also leaves scope for actors (see Geels, 2014: 26; Haas, 2019: 
67). In addition, the neo-Gramscian approach pays attention to non-state actors (see Levy & Newell, 
2002: 85–86), dissociates from state-centricity by accounting networks and international relations 
(Gale, 1998: 277), and allows to consider the government both as transformative and a stabilizing 
actor in fields.1 
 
The neo-Gramscian approach has its origin is in the writings of the Marxist philosopher and politician 
Antonio Gramsci. Likely because his works have been published only in the form of notebooks, as 
he was imprisoned during the fascist regime in 1920’s Italy (Levy, 2008: 951), Gramscian thought 
has not quite gained the label of “theory” (Levy & Newell, 2002: 86). However, later it has been 
adapted to political science under IPE, which has resulted in a critical theory approach (see Phelan et 
al., 2013: 203). To distinguish further theoretical developments from the original writings of Gramsci, 
the prefix “neo” is used (Levy & Newell, 2002: 86). Different authors provide slightly varying 
approaches (see Cox, 1987; Gill, 1993). 
 
Apart from other subjects of research in IPE, which studies international issues and combines 
perspectives from international relations (IR), economics, history, and geography – to name a few 
fields (O’Brien & Williams, 2010: 14), the neo-Gramscian approach has been used in studies of 
                                               
1 This is particularly visible in the concept of core alliance, which ties governments to incumbent businesses (see Geels, 
2014: 26) while they also simultaneously govern socio-technical transitions through environmental policies. 
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energy and climate politics – particularly in energy transition research (see Dietz, 2019; Evans & 
Phelan, 2016; Haas, 2019; Newell, 2018). In this study, I adapt my neo-Gramscian theoretical 
approach from this field, basing it majorly on the works of Levy and Newell (2002), Levy (2008), 
Newell (2018), and Haas (2019). 
 
In the neo-Gramscian approach, strategy and social dynamics are conceived very similarly to field 
theory (see Fligstein, 2013: 39). This has led Levy and Scully (2007) to seek for an integrated 
framework. The neo-Gramscian approach considers that society is a complex and dynamic system, 
in which structures exist and forces operate in three dimensions (Levy, 2008: 951): material, 
organizational (or institutional), and discursive (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87; Newell, 2018: 6). Beside 
these dimensions, the society can be divided into three different realms: the state, the civil society, 
and the economic realm (Levy, 2008: 951). This concept of societal structure grounds the neo-
Gramscian understanding of a field (Levy & Scully, 2007: 973), in which actors fundamentally pursue 
their own interests (see Gramsci, 1999: 406). 
 
The concept of hegemony brings the neo-Gramscian approach even closer to the organizational field 
theory. Hegemony is a condition in which a mutually shared rationale systematically benefits certain 
groups over others (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87; Newell, 2018: 3), granting advantage to groups whose 
interests are best served. Hegemony constitutes an emergent “historical bloc”, which is a hierarchical 
structure (Levy, 2008: 951–952) resembling a stabile organizational field (Levy & Scully, 2007: 979). 
It consists of stakeholders, usually in groups, who have agency in the historical bloc and choose to 
consent to the shared rationale of the hegemony and thus reproduce it (Haas, 2019: 68), even though 
they may fundamentally have varying and disparate interests (Levy, 2008: 951–952; Levy & Newell, 
2002: 87). Geels (2014: 26), who seeks to “enrich” the MLP by drawing “insights” from neo-
Gramscian theory, describes that the most advantageous groups form a “core alliance”. Core alliances 
often build upon mutual dependencies between state and corporate actors. While such collective 
coalitions strive to maintain hegemony (Geels, 2014: 26), subgroups, who are in the “subaltern”, 
consent either actively or passively (Haas, 2019: 68). 
 
The power of hegemony derives from coercion and ideological control of the subgroups (Haas, 2019: 
67). According to Levy (2008: 951), the “historical bloc sustains its position through the coercive 
authority of the state, dominance in the economic realm, and the consensual legitimacy of civil 
society”. In other words, the historical bloc is supported by the state, which provides institutional 
stability and other benefits (see Lindblom, 2001: 42). Adapting to state regulations provides authority 
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for the historical bloc. Simultaneously, the historical bloc possesses power over the state, as it 
dominates the economic realm, whose production and tax revenue the state depends on (Geels, 2014: 
26). Economic domination is achieved with power that the historical bloc possesses, enforcing others 
to stick to the economic condition (e.g. keeping the state dependent on tax revenue generated by 
business actors and the civil society on public funding) (see Strange, 1987: 554–555). Since the civil 
society holds intellectual and moral leadership in a society, it projects hegemonic interests as general 
when it accommodates into the historical bloc. Thus, the civil society provides legitimacy for the 
hegemony (Levy & Newell, 2002: 86–87). 
 
The mechanism that keeps the historical bloc integrated – and forces the subgroups to consent – 
functions through careful alignment of arrangements in the three societal dimensions (Levy, 2008: 
952). These arrangements can be created and modified by deploying resources and various strategies, 
which utilize discursive, organizational, and material elements (Geels, 2014: 28). 
 
In discursive strategies, specific frames and discourses can be adopted and used in new contexts to 
manipulate original meanings and reframe contexts (see Geels, 2014: 29). For example, 
environmentalist language can be utilized to portray harmful behavior as environmentally friendly 
(Levy & Newell, 2002: 96). With early introduction of new perspectives and linkages from a subject 
to another, actors utilize agenda-setting power to set frames in which subjects are discussed (Geels, 
2014: 29). Building organizational alliances with discourse is also possible. This can be seen in 
discourse coalitions that policymakers and incumbent corporate actors tend to form, which  organize 
around similar perceptions of reality and interlinked storylines (Hajer, 1993: 47). 
 
Organizations and institutions are subject to strategic action, as arrangements in the very dimension 
can privilege certain actors over others. Geels (2014: 34) provides an example of how governance 
principles and exercised ideologies in the United Kingdom have favored fossil energy-based 
incumbent actors with dominant market positions, superior resources, and broad capabilities, by 
choosing a market-based regulatory framework for energy governance instead of “picking winners”, 
as the role of the state is limited to “rule-setting” and “coordination of activities occurs mainly via 
market competition”. Swyngedouw (2010: 225–228) argues that climate change mitigation is widely 
presented as a “post-political” techno-economic policy challenge for administrators and therefore 
conceals and obstructs imaginaries of alternative social orders and political contestation. Newell 
(2018: 11) posits that the desire for a market-led energy transition instead of more transformative 
alternatives has been enforced by state elites and financial actors. Under a neoliberal capitalist 
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political order, such settings may at first hand appear nonpolitical (see Geels, 2014: 34), but however, 
governance structures, ideology, and political cultures embody organizational power.2 Conclusively, 
the ability to shape organization provides an actor organizational power (Geels, 2014: 34). 
 
Material strategies base on shaping the material dimension according to an actor’s strategic interests, 
which often supports arrangements in the other two dimensions (see Levy & Newell, 2002: 93). An 
example can be drawn from incumbent resistance to destabilizing change, which often relies on 
technical improvements in socio-technical regimes, such as product development to secure existing 
market positions (Levy & Newell, 2002: 96): Public discussion on the climate impacts of using 
natural gas focuses mostly on GHG emissions measured from the end-use in combustion – which 
may reflect emission inventory accounting by country in the UNFCCC (see United Nations, 2015b). 
However, a lifecycle perspective on the issue reveals high uncertainty on using natural gas to reduce 
GHG emissions by displacing other fossil fuels, as fugitive methane (CH4) emissions released during 
the total value chain are counted in (see IPCC, 2014: 527). As a response to the debate, The Oil and 
Gas Climate Initiative (2018) – an industry organization, which has many of the largest oil and gas 
producer companies as members – has laid out targets of fugitive emission reduction3, thus making 
natural gas a “better” tool for reducing GHG emissions. 
 
However, the peculiarity of Gramscianism lays in the relational aspect of arrangements (Levy & 
Newell, 2002: 93). Alignments of discursive, organizational, and material elements constitute the 
subjective reality for societal actors, allowing for an ideology to emerge, which then legitimates the 
outcomes of the hegemonic system (Levy, 2008: 952). Such a projection of reality appears coherently 
argued, as it reflects in all dimensions. However, ideology that is adapted in consent does not 
necessarily reflect the fundamental values or interests that actors would express in an ideal situation. 
Nevertheless, when the hegemonic ideology properly mirrors the subgroups’ perceptions of reality 
and interests that have shaped in this limited cognitive space, they choose to align with the polity (see 
Levy, 2008: 952). Progress driven by the hegemonic rationale then seems as a natural and universal 
trajectory (Levy, 2008: 952), even though the core-groups of the historical bloc hold ideological 
leadership (Haas, 2019: 67–68). 
 
                                               
2 Which reminds of a Foucauldian notion of power that reproduces through normative structures (see Foucault, 1995: 26). 
3 In detail, The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (2018) states that “OGCI companies set a target to reduce the collective 
average methane intensity of our aggregated upstream gas and oil operations to below 0.25% by 2025, with the ambition 
to achieve 0.20%.” and “our aim is to work towards near zero methane emissions from the full gas value chain”. 
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Thus, hegemony provides a perspective on why groups with conflicting interests may consent to a 
position where they have little influence and enjoy lesser benefits than others (Levy, 2008: 952). 
Established when a dynamic societal system sets into a relatively stable state (see Levy & Newell, 
2002: 86–87), hegemony offers one explanation to a key-issue in organizational theory: 
Understanding the source of stability in organizations that lodge in fields (Fligstein, 2013: 39–40).  
 
But furthermore, the neo-Gramscian approach also answers the question’s counterpart – about 
understanding change in fields that accommodate organizations. However, Levy and Scully (2007: 
977) suggest that the neo-Gramscian approach can contribute to organizational field theory with a 
strategic focus, since the latter has failed to provide a strategic perspective on how challengers could 
outmaneuver structural power within fields. This is based on the Gramscian notion that hegemonic 
ideology is never fully complete but remains fragmented. Challenging groups may destabilize 
hegemony in a superiorly resourced historical bloc via two long-term strategies that exploit this idea 
(Levy & Newell, 2002: 87). The first strategy, called as “war of position”, builds up alternative cores 
of power rather than “frontally assaults” the hegemony. It coordinates across multiple locations “to 
gain influence in the cultural institutions of civil society, develop organizational capacity, and to win 
new allies” (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87–88). The second strategy of “passive revolution” is a reformist 
attempt to gradually alter the hegemony from above (Haas, 2019: 68; Levy & Newell, 2002: 88). 
 
Naturally, historical blocs try to address opposition. This usually realizes through concession, in 
which challenging claims are adopted – but only partially. They are brought up in accordance to the 
interests of the historical bloc and integrated into its hegemonic agenda (Haas, 2019: 68; Levy & 
Newell, 2002: 88). This strategy of resistance, called as “trasformismo”, lets to assimilate potentially 
dangerous ideas. They become domesticated parts of the hegemonic ideology, which in turn obstructs 
the formation of organized opposition to establish new cores of power (Cox, 1983: 166–167).  
 
In the context of energy politics, trasformismo is a strategic attempt to manage contestation about the 
meanings and purposes of energy policy (Newell, 2018: 5). A multitude of actors, ranging from 
academic scholars to NGOs and social movements, demand transformative changes to energy 
regimes, suggesting a reconsideration of power relations nested with energy systems. This includes 
questions about the ownership of energy infrastructures (see Burke & Stephens, 2018: 79), means of 
fossil energy-dominated production (see Newell, 2018: 5), and political understandings of energy 
related risks (see Johansson, 2013: 203). In turn, trasformismo offers incumbent actors a strategy to 
address these calls without losing stability and transforming social hierarchies (Fligstein, 2013: 41). 
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It narrows down the debate about the quality of changes to modest transitions that base on 
technological improvements and government-imposed regulations (Newell, 2018: 5), excluding such 
options as a sweeping sustainability transformation with alterations at all societal levels (Sovacool, 
2017: 21). 
 
 
2.3. Incumbent energy security 
 
Energy security is considered to be one of the three significant global energy challenges that make 
up the energy trilemma (Falkner, 2014: 192; Van de Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 52). However, energy 
security research has not been able to deliver one comprehensive definition for the concept (Jewell et 
al., 2014: 743; Sovacool, 2011: 7). Instead, more than dozens of definitions have been given 
(Sovacool, 2011: 3). Four energy security concepts dominate IR literature: neorealism, neoliberalism, 
constructivism, and international political economy (Proskuryakova, 2018: 205). Energy security has 
also been studied in other social sciences, economics, natural sciences, and engineering – all leaving 
their own imprints (Månsson, Johansson, & Nilsson, 2014: 9). According to Proskuryakova (2018: 
204) a “classic approach” to conceptualizing energy security is to address four factors, originally 
proposed in Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre's (2007: 19–40) report. Kruyt, van Vuuren, de 
Vries, and Groenenberg (2009: 2167) have later adopted this to academia. The “four A’s” are 
availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability – referring to 1) physical or geological 
existence of resources, 2) geopolitical elements, 3) economical elements, and 4) environmental and 
social elements (Kruyt et al., 2009: 2167). 
 
However, instead of trying to determine what energy security is about, critical literature has rather 
focused on how it is used. Szulecki (2020: 2) states that “there is a whole realm of questions related 
to the way energy security rhetoric can empower, frame, distract, or insulate certain stakeholders 
within energy governance with direct political implications”. Different kind of actions and policy 
interventions can be justified in the name of securing a society from threat, once energy becomes 
framed as a national security issue (Bridge et al., 2018: 201). Definitions of energy security and 
concerns after it have given governments and organizations justification for various policies and 
actions thorough history (see Luft & Korin, 2009: 7–8). Being one of the central areas of energy 
policy, energy security shapes the energy landscape (Bridge, 2015: 330). 
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Ironically, the multifaceted understandings of energy security may even promote actions that are 
contrary (Proskuryakova, 2018: 204). According to Chester (2010: 887), the concept of energy 
security has evolved in link to the post-World War II energy order, defined by the dominance of fossil 
fuels, nuclear energy, energy market liberalization, rapidly increasing demand for energy in 
developing countries, political instability, and large-scale natural phenomena. A significant share of 
the mainstream policy interest in energy security centers around powering the key sectors of the 
economy, such as the industry, transportation and housing (Bridge et al., 2018: 201). Hence, energy 
systems may appear as the objects of vulnerability for states. On the contrary, environmentalists and 
social justice activists may consider energy systems as objects that also generate insecurity (see 
Johansson, 2013: 200) – such as climate change and centralized political power (see Burke & 
Stephens, 2018: 79). Balmaceda (2018: 131) states that “much of our current thinking about energy 
and politics can be traced back” to “the 1973–1974 oil crisis and embargo”, which left a fundamental 
impact on how energy and political power is understood (Balmaceda, 2018: 131; Bridge, 2015: 333). 
Accordingly, conservative energy security thinkers have rarely expanded their focus outside fossil 
fuels (Proskuryakova, 2018: 211), whereas a newer line of research has increasingly accounted recent 
energy trends and technology development (see Brown et al., 2014: 74). This as well has political 
implications: Should countries choose to increase hydrocarbon trade or reduce consumption and 
develop domestic production of renewable energy? Finally, like one major topic of discussion in the 
literature suggests, European countries have worried about the threat of Russia politically using its 
natural gas supply against dependent energy trade partners (Balmaceda, 2018: 132). This represents 
a threat to the security of supply (SOS) – a popular way to approach energy security, particularly in 
net-energy importer countries (see Bridge, 2015: 331–332; Johansson, 2013: 200–201; Sovacool, 
2011: 2). Quite oppositely, the main energy security concerns for net-energy producers like Russia, 
which is one of the largest (Sharples, 2013: 683), are securing long-term demand and favorable 
contracts (Johansson, 2013: 202). 
 
The fact that nearly everything is related to energy in the modern societal system (see Mitchell, 2009: 
400; Urry, 2014: 8–9) makes energy security an interesting concept to study. This “polysemic” nature 
of the concept allows free interpretation that can be based on one’s own interests (Sovacool, 2011: 
7). According to Bridge (2015: 330), energy security is actually an “empty signifier” – a concept 
taken as more concrete than the object which it refers. Thus, on one hand, energy security is a socially 
embedded discursive construct. In the social process of securitization of energy, new objects of 
concern are produced under the frame of “energy security”. The abstraction of “security” hides such 
qualitative aspects as reason, cost, and social relation (Bridge, 2015: 328–330): What is considered 
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as a satisfactory level of security? What are the costs of pursuing energy security? For whom energy 
is secured? 
 
However, what makes energy security not only a discursive debate but also a politically relevant 
matter, is that energy systems are as well embedded in the material and organizational dimensions 
(see Newell, 2018: 17; Urry, 2014: 7). Since energy security policies base on particular 
understandings of “good life” (Bridge, 2015: 333) that has depoliticized (Szulecki, 2020: 2), they 
secure certain cultures of energy production and consumption and place certain energy technologies 
over others (see Urry, 2014: 8). Bridge (2015: 330) argues that energy security is much more 
constitutive than disclosing as a policy objective, as it seeks to preserve established norms and societal 
structures through the development of social resilience. This helps to maintain the current status quo 
of political–ecological relations (Bridge, 2015: 330) and makes energy security a rather different 
administrative logic compared to the other dimensions of the energy trilemma, which essentially 
require disclosure and administration of change to the energy regime (Cherp et al., 2011: 86). 
 
Aristotle has reputedly said that “he who controls the definition, controls the debate” (Sovacool, 
2011: 2). Defining energy security can be one instrument to secure advantageous incumbent positions 
in power, since energy systems, which are subject to strategic action (see Geels, 2014: 28–31; 
Mitchell, 2009: 409; Tynkkynen, 2016: 395; Urry, 2014: 9), are given special value accordingly. 
Conventional understandings of energy security provide incumbent actors both powerful rhetoric 
instruments and political “realities” against destabilizing change that other more disclosing energy 
policy objectives may require (Bridge, 2015: 333; Szulecki, 2020: 1). Of such, climate change 
mitigation is one, when it transforms power relations in energy related fields, challenging their fossil 
energy-based incumbency (Newell, 2018: 3–4). 
 
This contestation over the meanings of energy security (Sovacool, 2011: 2–8) and its political 
consequences is a fine subject to apply the neo-Gramscian approach, which treats social reality as a 
“socially engineered” combination of discursive, organizational, and material elements (Levy, 2008: 
952), which powerful actors are able to control (see Haas, 2019: 67–68). It is a fruitful tool for 
understanding political motivation to securitize energy, which stems from the need to protect 
incumbent positions in power – apart from more altruistic political goals. 
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3. YAMAL LNG 
 
Regardless of Yamal LNG’s strategic importance to the Russian state, the project has been researched 
very limitedly. This section describes the case and its most important stakeholders by explaining their 
relations to the project, basing on literature and stakeholder documents. Adapting the neo-Gramscian 
understanding of societal structure in three realms – state, economy, and civil society (Levy, 2008: 
951), I describe the Yamal LNG case from these three viewpoints. The first section 3.1., State realm, 
includes two subsections: 3.1.1., Energy security interests in LNG, and 3.1.2., Yamal LNG and 
energy-related state interests in the Arctic region. In these I discuss the context of Russia’s energy 
strategy in a changing global energy landscape with the emergence of environmental policies and 
LNG production – and increasing climate change and energy security interest in the Arctic region. 
Section 3.2., Economic realm, shortly describes interests and roles of different corporate and business 
actors in developing the Yamal LNG project. Finally, section 3.3., Civil society realm, with two 
subsections as well, describes civil society actors’, such as environmental NGOs’ and local residents’, 
relations to the Yamal LNG project. 
 
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of the Yamal LNG value chain. The upstream production site 
Sabetta, eastward and westward routes on the NSR, reloading and reshipment terminals, and primary 
downstream sites of LNG consumption are illustrated. Additionally, Russia’s pipeline gas flow from 
other major production sites in Western Siberia is shown with a yellow arrow. © Lauri Lähteenmäki 
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Generally referred as Sabetta, the production site of the Yamal LNG project is located in Northeastern 
Yamal Peninsula on the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye gas field, where natural gas is extracted and liquefied 
(Yamal LNG, 2015c). Sabetta has a seaport onshore the Gulf of Ob (Yamal LNG, 2015e), which 
Yamal LNG uses to export LNG and natural gas condensate (Yamal LNG, 2015b). Whereas Sabetta 
is a distinct locality, the project’s LNG logistics, however, cross international state borders. During 
the summer season (July–December), LNG is shipped eastward along the NSR. During the winter 
season a route between Sabetta and Western Europe is utilized (Sovcomflot, 2019; Yamal LNG, 
2015b). Two terminals for reloading cargo between Yamal LNG’s ARC-7 ice class (in Russian 
Maritime Register of Shipping) LNG tankers and conventional LNG tankers have been planned into 
Bechevinskaya Bay in Kamchatka Krai and Ura-Guba in Murmansk Oblast (The Barents Observer, 
2019). In 2015, a 20-year contract was established for LNG reloading in the port of Zeebrugge, 
Belgium, which operates a natural gas hub (Yamal LNG, 2015f). Finally, the end-use product is 
consumed in sites far away from the upstream: Yamal LNG’s primary market is the Asia–Pacific 
region (see Yamal LNG, 2015a, 2015b). A share of Yamal LNG’s produce also goes to marine vessel 
LNG bunkering, which the Zeebrugge terminal announces to offer (Yamal LNG, 2015f). Gritsenko 
and Efimova (2017: 10) state that a similar service is likely to become developed in the Sabetta 
seaport as well. Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of the Yamal LNG value chain. 
 
 
3.1. State realm 
 
3.1.1. Energy security interests in LNG 
 
The Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 23) 
targets to diversify Russia’s energy export structure. The strategy assesses that an ongoing 
restructuring of the world energy markets, economic growth in developing countries, and 
intensification of competition will reshape the global energy landscape. This should result in 
increasing uncertainty and risks, caused by oil price dynamics, impacts associated with the financial 
crisis of 2008, energy supply shortages, and “multiple-valued prospects for concluding international 
agreements on environmental policy and climate change” (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2010: 21). 
 
According to the strategy, Europe and the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States will 
remain as the main markets for Russia’s energy exports (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
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Federation, 2010: 22–23). However, the EU is trying to reduce its fossil fuels consumption and 
dependence on imported energy resources (Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013: 392; Sharples, 2013: 688). The 
EU’s European Energy Security Strategy (European Commission, 2014: 7–15) not only seeks to 
increase energy efficiency and domestic energy production – particularly renewable, but also 
considers LNG as a potential source for import diversification. 
 
Southeast from Russia, demand for natural gas is however expected to grow. IEA (2018b: 184) notes 
that in Asian emerging economies “there appears to be plenty of room for future growth” in gas 
consumption: Natural gas has a 10 % share in the region’s energy mix, whereas the global average is 
22 %. According to IEA (2018b: 184), gas is “good fit … for a population that is increasingly 
concerned about qualitative aspects of economic development, including air quality”. Because of 
this, for example, the government of China promotes a coal-to-gas switch policy (IEA, 2018: 184). 
Additionally, gas demand in Japan has grown since the 2011 Fukushima disaster led Japan to abolish 
much of its nuclear energy production capacity (Bridge & Bradshaw, 2017: 228). 
 
Not surprisingly, Russia seeks to increase natural gas export to the Asia–Pacific region (Ministry of 
Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 23). LNG seems to be the most viable option for this, 
highlighted in the Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2010: 23). As the Arctic region and the federal subjects surrounding the northern parts of 
Ural are the most important regions for natural gas production in Russia (see Tatarkin & Loginov, 
2015: 25–30), a move to direct gas flow eastward with a pipeline would require building continent 
crossing infrastructure. For a reference, the distance between Salekhard, YNAO, and Beijing, China, 
is 4 248 km. 
 
Beside geography, Russia’s will for developing LNG resonates with a trend in global gas trade: 
Already by 2025, the volume of LNG should surpass pipeline gas in global natural gas trade (IEA, 
2018: 174). Since LNG is increasingly traded in spot-markets and with short-term contracts, similar 
market structure to oil is predicted to build up (Bridge & Bradshaw, 2017: 227). In emerging Asian 
economies, LNG should have a significant share in the future gas consumption. The IEA (2018b: 
190) estimates that 80 % of the growth in global LNG imports up to 2040 takes place in those, of 
which nearly half in China. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the Yamal LNG project targets primarily 
markets in the Asia–Pacific region (Yamal LNG, 2015b). 
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Whereas this structural change in the global gas market influences producers to rethink strategy, it 
also raises the question of SOS for importers. In Asia, where gas supply quickly finds its consumers, 
the government of China has viewed overseas investment as one the most important areas to address 
energy security. This has been led by national oil companies – one being the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (Wu, 2014: 7). The concern over SOS is well acknowledged by 
Russia, who put energy security on G8’s agenda during its presidency in 2006 (Van de Graaf & 
Westphal, 2011: 22). In 2014, Russian Novatek established “mutually beneficial cooperation” with 
CNPC with a 20 year supply contract of three million tons of LNG per year (Yamal LNG, 2014a). 
However, critics have argued that the economic sanctions imposed over Russia by the United States 
and the EU due to the Ukrainian conflict explains why Chinese actors have such large stakes in the 
Yamal LNG project. The sanctions have limited financing for some Russian companies and the 
operations of US-based IOCs in Russia, which were as well barred from exporting upstream oil and 
gas technologies (see Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016: 242; Soroka, 2016: 373–375). 
 
 
3.1.2. Yamal LNG and energy-related state interests in the Arctic region 
 
Situated in the Arctic, the Yamal LNG project is related to increased geopolitical interest in the region 
(see Andreassen, 2016: 78; Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016: 240). The Artic region is known to hold 
significant hydrocarbon resources. YNAO alone withholds the largest natural gas reserves of any 
region in Russia (Tatarkin & Loginov, 2015: 30). The Russian Arctic region also retains considerable 
quantities of oil – approximately more than half in offshore deposits (see Zolotukhin & Gavrilov, 
2011: 901). However, these have remained largely undeveloped, for which challenging 
environmental conditions have been a contributing reason (Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 523). 
Nevertheless, increasing climate change grants potential for hydrocarbon development (Harsem, 
Eide, & Heen, 2011: 8039), as Arctic amplification results in about twice higher than average rate of 
warming in the region (IPCC, 2013: 1062). In this sense, the Arctic has been framed as a new 
“extractive frontier”, where different states wish to establish control (see Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016: 
244; Harsem, Eide, & Heen, 2011: 8038; Sidortsov, 2019: 135; Soroka, 2016: 362) – an imaginary 
resembling the European discovery of the Americas (see Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 565). 
 
Sergunin and Konyshev (2016: 27) describe “access to natural resources” as Russia’s “first and 
foremost” attraction toward the Arctic region. In order to sustain current production levels of natural 
gas and oil, Russia needs to increase production in the Arctic (Harsem, Eide, & Heen, 2011: 8042). 
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Moreover, Andreassen (2016: 83) encapsulates the role of Arctic mineral reserves as “crucial” for 
developing the Russian economy – which reflects an idea of energy-income fueled modernization 
(see Tynkkynen, 2016: 390). According to Sidortsov (2019: 134), “under the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation management of natural resources is de jure under joint federal and provincial 
jurisdiction, de facto it is near complete control of the federal government”. Bertelsen and Gallucci 
(2016: 241) claim that also China’s general interest in the region is the supply of energy and raw 
materials. 
 
However, untapping Arctic energy resources is a demanding task in a hinterland where infrastructure 
is limited (see Soroka, 2016: 363). While it needs to be improved in order to utilize the energy 
resource potential of the region (Government of the Russian Federation, 2013: 3), this has also 
implications on regional development and security. For example, hinterland connectivity, search and 
rescue services, as well as military capabilities to protect shipping lanes are needed (Andreassen, 
2016: 83; Soroka, 2016: 362). Infrastructure projects, such as constructing deep-water seaports, 
pipelines, and railway connections, thus help to establish potential economic conditions and 
administrative control over the region (see Soroka, 2016: 362–363). 
 
In addition to energy development, climate change offers prospects for also marine traffic in the 
Arctic region, as the sea ice cover diminishes (Holmes, McCauley, & Hanley, 2018: 25). Onshore the 
Ob Bay of the Kara Sea, the Yamal LNG project is in close distance to the NSR. The route itself is 
the shortest shipping route between Europe and East Asia (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 28), and thus 
has drawn interests of various actors. 
 
For China, the NSR generally represents a route to west that avoids passing through the Malacca 
strait. Nearly 80 % of China’s oil imports travel through the chokepoint, which appears to be a weak 
spot in the country’s energy security (Kennedy, 2011: 126). Recently China, whose export-driven 
economy has relied on sea-based trade, has put much strategic emphasis into the development of its 
trade connections. This is most apparent with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Bertelsen & 
Gallucci, 2016: 241) – a program to increase regional connectivity to China by infrastructure 
development (Chung, 2017: 1). In 2016, the Silk Road Fund acquired a 9.9 % stake of the Yamal 
LNG project (Novatek, 2016), which obviously associated the project with the Ice Silk Road Initiative 
under the BRI (Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016: 244). The fund (2019) describes its purpose “mainly” as 
a provider of “investment and financing support for trade and economic cooperation and connectivity 
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under the framework of the [BRI]”. However, some say that China is only limitedly interested in the 
NSR (Bertelsen & Gallucci, 2016: 25; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 85). 
 
Russia seeks to maintain and improve control over the route, as it locates inside the exclusive 
economic zone of the country (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 88). The Yamal LNG project supports 
this interest at least in two ways: First, the project financed – although only partially – the Sabetta 
seaport in the northern coast of Russia, where transport infrastructure is very limited (see Gritsenko 
& Efimova, 2017: 12; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 84) and welcomed by the state due to its regional 
development plans (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 28). The YNAO regional government has provided 
both financial and rhetorical support for Sabetta and the Yamal LNG project (Gritsenko & Efimova, 
2017: 13). Secondly, the Yamal LNG project has brought traffic and maintenance support to the NSR, 
which has not yet managed to attain much international traffic (see Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 86–
87; Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 572), but is a core Arctic interest for Russia (Sergunin & Konyshev, 
2016: 28–29). Sergunin and Konyshev (2016: 82) claim that the cost of maintaining the route is 
“extremely high”. ARC-7 class LNG tankers  – able to travel the route without icebreaker support 
– utilize the route during the summer period (Yamal LNG, 2015b).  
 
While much of Russia’s Arctic interests are related to the development of hydrocarbon resources and 
their safe transport via the NSR – among other objectives (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 27–33), the 
imaginary dimension of Arctic development cannot be ignored either (Soroka, 2016: 370). Sergunin 
and Konyshev (2016: 35) describe that the Arctic “has become an ‘existential question' for the 
Russian intellectual and political elites”. The region represents a sphere where Russia can 
demonstrate its capabilities and geopolitical influence, when it is otherwise constrained with an 
inability to set agenda for dialogue with Western and other post-Soviet nations. Hence, some associate 
Arctic development to the “restoration” of Russia’s great power status after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016: 35–37). This also links Arctic development, which energy leads, 
to the idea of Russia as an “energy superpower”: A belief that Russia’s “revival” to economic 
prosperity and to world power should occur through the development of its energy sector 
(Bouzarovski & Bassin, 2011: 788). 
 
Consequently, Sidortsov (2019: 135) states that the Russian government saw “strong reasons” for 
proceeding with the Yamal LNG project, which precedes similar projects planned and under 
construction in the Arctic region of Russia. Such include the neighboring Gydan Peninsula’s Arctic 
LNG 2, which too is implemented in international cooperation by Novatek and TOTAL S.A. with 
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Chinese partners, CNPC and China National Offshore Oil Corporation, and Japanese Mitsui-Jogmec 
consortium and Japan Arctic LNG (TOTAL, 2019). 
 
 
3.2. Economic realm 
 
 
Figure 3. LNG tanker Yuriu Kuchiev docked in the Arctech Helsinki shipyard, Helsinki, Finland, 
24.7.2019. © Lauri Lähteenmäki 
 
In 2011, the private Russian gas company Novatek announced that it holds 100 % of the shares of 
JSC Yamal LNG (Novatek, 2011b). Prior to this, Novatek had cooperated with Gazprom in order to 
implement a pilot LNG production plant based on the resources of the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye natural 
gas field (Novatek, 2010). Novatek (2010) points out that the companies had interest in diversifying 
Russia’s natural gas markets and that an ice-class tanker fleet was to be built. 
 
However, the deal with the state-owned company Gazprom came short. Even before the Yamal LNG 
project, Novatek had proven that it can outperform Gazprom in terms of efficiency and profit 
(Lunden, Fjaertoft, Overland, & Prachakova, 2013: 666). Novatek signed a memorandum with 
TOTAL S.A. to develop strategic partnership (Novatek, 2011c) and so the international oil and gas 
“supermajor” (Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 562), originating from France, soon acquired a 20 % 
stake in Yamal LNG (Novatek, 2011a). Since then, not much have been heard of Gazprom in the 
project. 
 
A leading reason for dropping Gazprom might have been that Russian energy companies have lacked 
production technology required for ramping up new production in the Arctic area (Harsem et al., 
2011: 8042). Contrarily, most advanced technology in the oil and gas sector is generally considered 
to lay in the hands of international oil companies (IOCs) (Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 566). TOTAL 
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S.A. pledged to offer its “expertise” (Novatek, 2013) and, according to Novatek (2011d), “experience 
in implementing complex oil and gas projects” with “presence in LNG markets” to Yamal LNG. The 
project helps to renew TOTAL S.A.’s resource portfolio, as its production of mature resources 
decreases elsewhere (see Novatek, 2013a; Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 566). According to the 
company’s upstream President, TOTAL S.A.’s participation “increases [TOTAL S.A.’s] presence in 
a high potential region of Russia in terms of gas resources” (Novatek, 2013). 
 
Today, Yamal LNG is a joint-venture LNG project operated by JSC Yamal LNG. It has four 
shareholders: Novatek, TOTAL S.A., CNPC and the Silk Road Fund, with shares of 50.1 %, 20 %, 
20 % and 9.9 % (Yamal LNG, 2015a). Yamal LNG (2015b) announces that “virtually all” of its LNG 
production capacity will be supplied under long-term contracts. Its primary market is the Asia–Pacific 
region (see Yamal LNG, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
As argued in the previous section (3.1.2.), the Russian decisionmakers have been supportive toward 
the Yamal LNG project (see Gritsenko & Efimova, 2017: 13; Sidortsov, 2019: 135; Soroka, 2016: 
365; Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 571): President Putin had been positive for long about TOTAL 
S.A., which serves as a link between Franco–Russian relations (see Overland, Godzimirski, Lunden, 
& Fjaertoft, 2012: 145). Also Novatek’s major shareholder and executive Gennady Timchenko is 
“widely considered Putin’s protégé”, Overland, Godzimirski, Lunden, and Fjaertoft (2012: 145) 
claim. This potentially paved the way for issuing Yamal LNG a license for exporting LNG. Until this, 
Gazprom had a gas export monopoly in Russia (Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 571). 
 
Yamal LNG was also granted a favorable tax regime: It is exempted from Mineral Extraction Tax, 
export duties, and VAT for some foreign built equipment (Yamal LNG, 2014c). In addition, the 
National Welfare Fund of Russia financed the project with 150 billion RUB (Yamal LNG, 2016). 
Construction of the Sabetta seaport, used by Yamal LNG, was also primarily funded with public 
funds (see Gritsenko & Efimova, 2017: 12). 
 
In 2014, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Novatek (Novatek, 2019: 62). This caused 
uncertainty about securing funding for the Yamal LNG project. However, the Russian government 
came in to help by negotiating with China (Soroka, 2016: 364–365) – and the project acquired funding 
from two Chinese banks (Yamal LNG, 2016). 
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Construction and planning of the Yamal LNG project has required a great number of contractors. To 
name some of the most essential, supplying the LNG facility was contracted to TechnipFMC, JGC, 
and Chiyoda (TechnipFMC, 2018). Siemens has contributed gas-to-power technologies in the project 
(see Novatek, 2018). Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering was contracted to build 16 LNG 
tankers (Yamal LNG, 2013a). Designing the tankers, as well as six support ice breakers, was 
contracted to Aker Arctic, which is primarily owned by the state of Finland (see Aker Arctic, 2014: 
4–10). See Figure 3 for reference of the Yamal LNG tanker Yuriu Kuchiev. Sovcomflot (2017) states 
that in addition to Sovcomflot, the rest of the tankers “were ordered by Mitsui OSK Lines, Teekay 
and Dynagas LNG Partners, together with their Chinese state-owned shipping partners”. Belgian 
contractor Jan de Nul Group dredged the port basin, the access channel, and the sea channel for the 
Sabetta seaport (Jan de Nul Group, 2016). 
 
 
3.3. Civil society realm 
 
Gramscian theory considers the civil society as the realm within hegemony is secured with ideological 
compliance. It is also the key site of political contestation (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87). In this section 
I examine the realm of civil society, where contestation has occurred in the Yamal LNG case. First, 
I describe the local relevance of the Yamal LNG project. Secondly, I focus on NGOs in national and 
international dimensions – as Levy and Newell (2002: 90) suggest that NGOs are key actors for 
ensuring and opposing hegemony. 
 
 
3.3.1. Local indigenous population, gas extraction, and climate change 
 
With about 700,000 reindeer (Rangifer spp.)4, YNAO is the world’s largest reindeer herding region 
(Kumpula, Forbes, & Stammler, 2006: 20). In 2016, the head count in the Yamal Peninsula alone was 
about 254,020 (Schwalbe, 2017: 6). Of the more than 11,000 indigenous inhabitants in the peninsula 
about 6,000 practice reindeer nomadism. Significant majority of this population are Nenets (Yamal 
LNG, 2015d). Other indigenous groups in YNAO include Komi, Khanty, and Selkup (Environ, 2013: 
58; Kumpula et al., 2006: 20). 
 
                                               
4 According to The Barents Observer (2016), who refers to “the authorities in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug”. In 
2010, reindeer headcount was 665,200 (Federal State Statistic Service, 2011). 
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Traditional indigenous land use has taken place in parts of the license area of Yamal LNG: According 
to Yamal LNG’s Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) (Yamal LNG, 2014b: 8/87), 
56 families regularly migrate within the project’s license area. Other herder groups from higher north 
also traverse through it annually. A number of sacred sites locate along their routes. Two river 
estuaries in the area are as well used for fishing.
 
Apart the ESIA, an ethnographic field research conducted for a German NGO, The Institute for 
Ecology and Action Anthropology (Schwalbe, 2017: 14–15), reports considerable social impacts 
from the project: As it is forbidden and punishable to enter the license area, local population uses it 
illegally. Hundreds of hectares of pasture land have degraded. Infrastructure crossovers aiding in 
reindeer migration are considered limited and one sacred site has been destroyed under a crossover. 
The number of families residing in Tambey, a multi-purpose trading post (or “factoria”) within the 
license area (Environ, 2013: 55), has reduced from fifteen to only three (Schwalbe, 2017: 15).  
 
Schwalbe's (2017) research report also questions the ESIA’s (Yamal LNG, 2014b: 8/67) assessment 
of fishing as a non-subsistence activity, which is claimed to take place only during autumns by “a 
few tens of individuals”. However, this estimate is asserted uncertain. The report (Schwalbe, 2017: 
13) comments that “fish is one of the most important components of the indigenous peoples’ diet” and 
that it is commonly used like currency in exchange. According to Forbes et al. (2009: 4), during 
summer, reindeer herders rely mainly on fish caught from rivers and lakes. A report by WWF Russia 
(see Ametistova & Knizhnikov, 2016: 19) also reveals that “representatives of local population” had 
been concerned about the project’s impact on fish resources. An anonymous stakeholder (A5), who I 
interviewed, confirms that this was a representative of the local Nenets reindeer herders.
 
Ecosystem degradation and fragmentation of the tundra landscape accompanied with rapidly 
increasing climate change in the Arctic region (see IPCC, 2013: 1062) poses a threat for the resilience 
of reindeer herding-based indigenous culture (Forbes et al., 2009: 1; Kumpula et al., 2006: 18). By 
“nibbling” away usable land, intensifying industrial land use reduces the indigenous population’s 
flexibility to absorb external shocks, such as the impacts of climate change. Nenets report that the 
frequency of unpredictable weather events has increased, which has led to episodes of significant 
reindeer loss. Thus, intensifying industrial land use and climate change synergistically causes change 
in the socio-ecological system of the Yamal Peninsula (Forbes et al., 2009: 3–6). 
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Regarding the above, I 
consider the indigenous 
population affected by the 
Yamal LNG project as a 
stakeholder group in this 
case. However, according to 
Schwalbe (2017: 17), the 
YNAO administration 
considers that the root of the 
problem with land use is the 
outgrown size of the 
reindeer population, 
overgrazing pastures.   
Figure 4. Reindeer herd of Khanty owners, north of Salekhard, 
YNAO, 2018 © Lauri Lähteenmäki
 
 
3.3.2. Internationally linked NGOs 
 
WWF Russia (2019) announces in its official website that “climate and energy” are “among the main 
areas of WWF Russia's work”. However, like other NGOs in Russia, it has approached climate and 
energy issues only very limitedly in recent years. According to Henry (2010: 768), for Russian 
environmentalists it is hard to influence the oil and gas sector, which is important for the state. 
Russia’s climate policy is not much more fertile ground for political activism either. This has been 
proven already with Russia’s motivation toward the Kyoto Protocol (see United Nations, 1998), even 
after extensive campaigning done by Greenpeace, WWF, and other Russia-based environmental 
NGOs (see Henry, 2010: 770). 
 
WWF Russia acknowledges fugitive methane emissions related to the use of LNG (see Ametistova 
& Knizhnikov, 2016: 24; Klimentyev, Knizhnikov, & Grigoryev, 2017: 58). It (Ametistova & 
Knizhnikov, 2016: 15) also suggests that producing unnecessary GHG emissions (by gas flaring and 
thawing permafrost) should be avoided in LNG project development. Greenpeace sides with the 
indigenous population in the Yamal Peninsula by defending Nenets reindeer herding against the 
impacts of climate change (Vasilieva, 2016). Also, Bellona – an environmental organization with two 
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offices in Russia, which is mainly dealing with nuclear safety, industrial pollution, renewable energy 
and legal aid to environmental activists (see Bellona, n.d.) – has released an article regarding Yamal 
LNG, in which it considers climate change as enabling and threatening factor for the project (see 
Bellona, 2019). 
 
The above summarizes Russian NGOs’ involvement with the Yamal LNG project that is based on 
climate activism. Other than that, Russian NGOs focus on other issues. Nevertheless, WWF Russia 
and Greenpeace have criticized Yamal LNG of environmental damage. 
 
In 2016, WWF Russia published a report titled as Environmental Aspects of Arctic LNG Projects 
Development (Ametistova & Knizhnikov, 2016). It comments the environmental impacts of the whole 
LNG sector in Russia and pays much attention to the Yamal LNG project. Particular focus is given 
to dredging operations conducted in the Ob Bay, which were needed for construction of the deep-
water port of Sabetta (Gritsenko & Efimova, 2017: 15). The report comments the water ecosystem 
and hydrology impacts of the dredging operations and states that “such scale of bottom dredging 
works is unprecedented for the Arctic region”. According to the report, dredged sediments were also 
disposed to the Gulf of Ob, against the best environmental practice (Ametistova & Knizhnikov, 2016: 
19). Greenpeace Russia has joined this concern with a media commentary (see Johnson, 2018). WWF 
Russia also discusses the Yamal LNG project’s impacts to the beluga whale (Delphinapterus leucas) 
and threatened bird species (see Ametistova & Knizhnikov, 2016: 56–57; WWF & WWF Russia, 
2015: 11). 
 
Another document of WWF and WWF Russia (2015: 3) condemns the project’s ESIA “not complete 
regarding a number of issues”. It (2015: 5) refers to a policy agreement signed by 21 Russian 
environmental NGOs to point out that Yamal LNG’s development model is contradictory to the 
Environmental Standards for Operations of Oil and Gas Companies Acting in Russia (2004). WWF 
and WWF Russia (2015: 4–5) consider that if the Yamal LNG project would have been integrated 
with JSC Gazprom’s projects on Bovanenkovskoye fields, area would have been saved from excess 
infrastructure development and a better placing for the LNG seaport would have been found. 
According to them, the government’s natural resource policy was the leading reason why integration 
was not considered: “The reason for this situation is, first of all, weak government policy concerning 
application of comprehensive approaches in development of resources, which imply optimization of 
solutions for infrastructure development, ecosystem-based approach and strategic environmental 
assessment.” 
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Despite NGOs’ influence toward the Russian society in climate and energy issues is limited, many of 
them have transnational ties on their support. This has as well led many NGOs to be included in the 
government’s list of “foreign agents” – as a part of wider restrictions on NGOs’ space to act in Russia 
(Pierk & Tysiachniouk, 2016: 998). Often Russian NGOs direct their environmental appeal toward 
international audiences, as they can be easier to mobilize than the Russian civil society (Henry, 2010: 
767). However, the relationship runs the other way as well: Henry (2010: 760) suggests that 
“environmental norms” can be shared and promoted within the international environmentalist 
community, in which Russian NGOs assist. It is logical to assume that in international partnerships 
and especially branch organizations, such as Greenpeace and WWF with their top-down 
administration models (see Greenpeace, 2019; WWF International, 2013: 5), information, values and 
political rationale is shared. 
 
Some organizations who Russian NGOs have partnered with engage actively in climate and energy 
politics. As an example, Greenpeace International publishes its own energy outlook as an alternative 
to the IEA’s (Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council, & SolarPowerEurope, 2015: 
4). Some of these partnerships regarding the Yamal LNG case include “support” of the European 
Climate Foundation for WWF Russia’s report Prospects and opportunities for using LNG for 
bunkering in the Arctic regions of Russia (see Klimentyev et al., 2017: 2), the appearance of the “head 
of the pressdesk” Tatiana Vasilieva of Greenpeace Russia in Greenpeace International’s article about 
Nenets facing climate change (see Vasilieva, 2016), and cooperation of the Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) with other organizations related to reindeer husbandry 
in the CAFF (2006) report World Reindeer Husbandry, which discusses climate change and other 
environmental impacts of the oil and gas industry. 
 
In addition, there are international civil society actors who openly challenge state interests regarding 
energy security (described above in section 3.1.), claiming them unsustainable. For example, one 
such actor is the Heinrich Böll Foundation, who declares itself inter alia a “think tank for policy 
reform” that is “closely associated with the German Green Party” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2013). 
Regarding this, it has some limited leverage on the politics of Germany and the EU. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the research methodology of this thesis. Section 4.1., Methodological design, 
describes the methodological structure of this study, explaining why particular methods were used. 
The case study methodology this study follows is described in section 4.2., Case study. Section 4.3., 
Data, describes the data of this study and how it was collected. Section 4.4., Frame analysis, 
introduces the frame analysis method and tells how such was conducted. Section 4.5, Applying the 
neo-Gramscian approach, provides information about applying the theory approach in analysis 
practice. Finally, section 4.6., Ethical considerations, discusses research ethical issues regarding this 
study. An additional report of the research process can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
 
4.1. Methodological design 
 
The research design of this study follows the format of an explanatory case study, thus providing 
significant documentation of the Yamal LNG case (see Yin, 2009: 7–9). Following the case study 
methodology, various types of data are included (see Yin, 2009: 99). 
 
The analyses of this study were conducted in two stages: The first stage consisted of a basic frame 
analysis, which provides an in-depth description of the stakeholders’ understandings of the Yamal 
LNG project in relation to energy security and energy transition. As mentioned in the previous section 
3., hegemonic ideology that actors of the historical bloc may have adapted does not necessarily reflect 
the fundamental values or interests that they would express in an ideal situation. In response to this, 
I suggest that frame analysis can be used to gain deeper understanding of consenting actors’ 
worldviews – particularly since hegemonic ideology is always fragmented and reveals ideas behind 
the hegemonic projection of reality (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87). Therefore, I used frame analysis to 
find out frames through which stakeholders and experts of the Yamal LNG case understand the 
project’s relation to energy security and energy transition. These cognitive frames, which are 
embedded in politics via discourses, reveal the stakeholders’ sensemaking of the project – as well as 
operation space (Burr, 2003: 170), since frames guide actions (Huttunen, 2014: 65). Section 5.1. 
presents the results of the frame analysis, which basically answer to the first research question: how 
the stakeholders of Yamal LNG consider the project to connect with the energy security of Russia? 
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However, frame analysis itself does not provide sufficient tools for analyzing power, as it does not 
explain well how an actor came to use certain frames in its speech or text. This is why I combine the 
neo-Gramscian approach with it, focusing particularly on how strategy is used to alter understandings 
of reality. This second stage of analysis explains how stakeholders utilize frames to appeal on others 
for the cause of gaining their support, which legitimates the stakeholders’ actions (see Levy & Newell, 
2002: 87). Comparing stakeholder claims to the frames found with frame analysis makes it possible 
to identify when a stakeholder utilizes a certain frame or has adapted one regarding a specific issue. 
Because hegemonic ideology is incomplete and challenging claims are adapted only partially (Levy 
& Newell, 2002: 87), this is done by comparing the claim or an argument under focus with the frames, 
which reflect the studied actors’ fundamental interests and understandings of the world (Goffman, 
1986: 21). I describe this analytical stage in detail in section 4.5., Applying the neo-Gramscian 
approach. Furthermore, arrangements in organizational and material dimensions (most of which are 
given in section 3. and discussed in the data) are examined in relation to discourse, which they interact 
with (Levy & Newell, 2002: 93). Ultimately, this stage of analysis allowed me to formulate an 
understanding of social relations and strategy, which are presented in section 5.2. Finding out the 
stakeholder positions, strategies of discursive accommodation, and their practical success reveals why 
a certain projection of energy security dominates. Hence, this part of the results answers the second 
research question: Whose interests the Yamal LNG project actually secures as energy security and 
how that concept of energy security becomes projected as a general national interest, instead of 
having energy transition among the top objectives of energy policy? 
 
 
4.2. Case study 
 
Case study is a widely used methodology in all social sciences (see Yin, 2009: 4). It is used to examine 
complex social phenomena that are contemporary (Yin, 2009: 4) and inseparable from their contexts 
(Yin, 2009: 18). Case study research is often explanatory, building upon the research questions of 
“how” and “why” (Yin, 2009: 9). Testing hypotheses or finding out causal relations come second to 
profound, holistic, and valid descriptions of the studied case (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 58), which 
is pursued with high level of data triangulation, including different types of data (Yin, 2009: 115–
116). 
 
Case studies can include multiple cases, but often they focus on single cases. The scope of this study 
covers only one case for the following reasons given in the case study methodology: First, the Yamal 
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LNG is the first project exporting natural gas out of Russia without direct state ownership, which 
makes it a unique case. Unique cases cannot be fruitfully compared to any other (see Yin, 2009: 54). 
Secondly, however, with extensive state involvement and location in Western Siberia (see Tatarkin 
& Loginov, 2015: 25–30), the Yamal LNG case can simultaneously function as a type example of a 
Russian Arctic energy project. Information drawn from the case can be considered applicable to other 
similar cases (Yin, 2009: 47–49). Thirdly, the size limit of a master’s thesis prevented choosing a 
comparative approach, because multiple-case studies may require resources and time beyond the 
limits of an independent researcher (see Yin, 2009: 53) 
 
A common critique of case studies is that since they are case-specific, their results cannot be 
generalized. However, case studies can contribute to analytic generalization in terms of expanding, 
testing, and developing theories (Yin, 2009: 15). For example, this study could contribute to 
understanding energy security as a discursive construct for incumbents, who can resist destabilizing 
change by generalizing a certain projection of security. Moreover, Alasuutari (1999: 234) notes that 
such ideal of science which demands (statistical) generalizability (see Yin, 2009: 15) is not the only 
one. A number of fields consider that the ultimate objective of social science is to stimulate critical 
thinking and provide material for its support. From this perspective, this study does not find out 
whether LNG could be integrated to energy transition, but instead, seeks to provide a perspective on 
how the discussion of the issue and consequent actions are influenced by politics. 
 
 
4.3. Data 
 
The data of this study was collected following the case study methodology. In total numbers, the 
study data consists of 1,702 pages of text in 51 sources, including 11 research interviews. By format, 
the data can be grouped to research interview data, which consist of 7 oral interviews and 4 email 
interviews, and archival (or “desktop”) sources (see Gritsenko & Efimova, 2017: 5), which were 
found online. Archival sources include 7 ready-made interviews and 33 text format sources. Closer 
look to the data groups is given in sections 4.3.1. and 4.3.2. Appendix 1 provides a list of all study 
data. 
 
Additionally, I categorize the data into two epistemic levels (see Yin, 2016: 91). First, stakeholder 
level data was collected from actors who indisputably hold agency in the case and affect its outcome. 
It includes data from the following stakeholders of the Yamal LNG case: the shareholders of JSC 
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Yamal LNG, both the federal government of Russia and the regional government of YNAO, a project 
contractor, industrial organizations, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) representing gas 
producer countries, a Finnish gas supply company, the EU, various NGOs that publicly debate natural 
gas, a political think tank that is associated with the German Green Party (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 
2013), and various IGOs representing indigenous Arctic communities (complementing failed 
interview attempts, discussed in section 6.4.). These stakeholders were chosen because they both 
represent different important societal sectors of the Yamal LNG case field (see Levy, 2008: 951) and 
geographical sites that are essential mediators of political-economic change (see Bridge & Bradshaw, 
2017: 216). 
 
Second, expert level data was collected from experts of the research topic (e.g. academics and 
consults), whose actions do not directly impact the outcome of the case, but who possess valuable 
information of the research topic. In quite poorly researched subjects, like the Yamal LNG project, 
expert knowledge can prove to be useful (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 35). Following a constructivist 
approach, I consider an expert as a person who possesses specialized knowledge, that is not directly 
available to myself as a researcher, and who has a prestigious position in a qualified organization 
relevant to my research subject (Bogner & Menz, 2009: 47–50). Experts may be willing to make such 
information public that stakeholders would like to conceal, and can function as a source of 
complementary information about the stakeholders (see Bogner & Menz, 2009: 46). 
 
However, not all data can be indisputably incorporated into either of the categories. For example, an 
included academic media article focusing on the Yamal LNG project has been authored by Tatiana 
Mitrova, who was the 2006–2011 Head of the Center for International Energy Markets Studies in the 
Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Oil & Gas Council, 2018), which has 
involved in developing the energy strategy of Russia (ERI RAS, n.d.). In such few cases where the 
data level could not be clearly defined, the data was namely classified as expert level data in order to 
avoid error in higher priority stakeholder data. In the analysis, data sources were treated individually. 
 
The general principle in data collection was to try to get as close as possible to the political process 
under investigation and gather as detailed information as possible. In practice, this meant that I wanted 
to include interview data (see Mosley, 2013: 6), primarily from the case stakeholders which I 
identified based on literature and media. However, since it would have been unrealistic to saturate 
the data with stakeholder interviews (see Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 60), I complemented it with 
archival sources and expert interviews. 
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The principle to prioritize stakeholders over experts stems from that action and behavior interconnects 
with discourse. Ideas shape interests and actions (see Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013: 393), which are 
implicated in discourses (Burr, 2003: 169). By collecting and analyzing text data (including oral) 
from stakeholders, through discourse, it is possible to reach the ideas of the actors who formulate 
actual policy. Experts might share similar ideas, but divergence is also likely. Moreover, this is a 
widely used methodology in social constructivist energy and environmental policy analyses (see 
Ekberg & Tarasova, 2016: 173; Huttunen, 2014: 70). 
 
Due to my limited understanding of the Russian language, only English and Finnish language data is 
used in the study. However, since a large share of the research interview participants are native 
speakers of Russian, they can reflect Russian accounts on the research subject. This might widen the 
scope of the study to cover some Russian discussion on the topic. Ultimately, the study should be 
understood as an English–Finnish rendition of the topic. According to Yin (2016: 88), 
multilingualism, even with two languages, increases credibility due to triangulation. 
 
Nevertheless, different nationalities are present in the data: By origin of represented organization, 22 
sources of data can be traced to Russia, 6 to Finland, 5 to China, 3 to Germany, and 2 to the United 
Kingdom. I consider that nine sources have international origin.5 One archival data source includes 
authors from Russia and France. 
 
As this study’s data is carefully selected, well triangulated, follows the case study methodology, and 
has particularly large volume for a master’s thesis, it makes possible to answer the research questions 
validly and reliably. This was also shown in practice while conducting the analysis, as I found that 
the data saturated (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 60). It bore quite uniform results between different data 
levels and groups. Moreover, having multiple epistemic levels and various formats of data 
complement possible weaknesses of individual data types. While the primary interview data answers 
direct questions, archival sources allow the actors to discuss the study themes in freer forms, without 
the presence of the researcher (see Yin, 2016: 142). 
 
  
                                               
5 They consist of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with international activities and the French 
origin supermajor oil and gas company TOTAL S.A., being a transnational corporation with production and operations 
in numerous countries (see TOTAL S.A., 2019: 7). 
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4.3.1. Interview data 
 
The interviews, 11 in total, were conducted in English or Finnish, using the methodology of thematic 
interview6, which is a semi-structured interview methodology. The prominent idea in the 
methodology is that interviewing follows certain beforehand selected themes, which are shared 
between separate interviews. It allows relatively free conversation and dialogue compared to more 
structured methodologies (e.g. with fixed questions), giving space for the interviewee’s interpretation 
and value expression (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 48). Table 1 summarizes the research interviews. 
 
Table 1. Research interviews. 
REF. 
CODE 
ORGANIZATION TYPE 
& AFFILIATION 
SECTOR COUNTRY DATE DATA 
TYPE 
SIZE 
(pp.) 
LEVEL NOTES 
A1 Energy sector think tank 
Deputy Director on Energy Studies 
Academic RUS 2019 Email 5 Expert 7 
A2 Energy sector consulting firm 
Deputy Director General 
Consulting RUS 2019 Email 4 Expert 8 
A3 Energy sector consulting firm 
Consultant 
Consulting RUS 2019 Oral (Skype) 9 Expert  
A4 Environmental organization 
Program Leader 
NGO RUS 2019 Email 2 Stakeholder 9 
A5 Environmental organization 
Program Leader 
NGO RUS 2019 Email 5 Stakeholder 10 
A6 State-owned gas company 
Senior Vice President 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 9 Stakeholder 11 
A7 State-owned gas company 
CEO 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 6 Expert  
A8 Private ship engineering company 
CEO 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 5 Stakeholder 12 
A9 Financial research institute 
Senior Adviser 
Governance FIN 2019 Oral 5 Expert  
A10 University 
Doctoral Candidate 
Academic FIN 2019 Oral (Skype) 1 Expert 13 
A11 University institute 
Program Director 
Academic UK 2018 Oral (Skype) 6 Expert  
 
                                               
6 Free translation of the Finnish word teemahaastattelu. Other translations have been used as well. 
7 The organization took part in creating the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2020. 
8 The company focuses on political analysis of the Russian energy sector. 
9 Considered as a stakeholder due to public engagement in debate about LNG’s climate impacts. 
10 Considered as a stakeholder due to campaigning against energy infrastructure development in YNAO. 
11 Considered as a stakeholder, since the company markets natural gas widely as a solution to climate change. 
12 Data partially lost, but the interview was partially reconstructed. 
13 Data almost completely lost. 
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The interview structure consisted of three main themes, which I discussed with all interview 
participants. I chose the themes basing on previous and background literature on the research topic, 
and gave them the names the project and actors, energy security, and climate change and energy 
transition.14 Additional questions were also presented depending on the professional affiliation of the 
interview participant. I had a list of further-in-depth questions to guide me asking advanced questions. 
In order to map out the research field, I incorporated questions of the production network of Yamal 
LNG (see section 3. for reference). Except one, all of the interviews started with an introductory 
question to get familiar with the interview situation (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 107) and to find out 
the participant’s affiliation and general view of the energy landscape. Most of the interviews ended 
with an open comment. However, nobody added anything valuable for the analysis. I ended the 
interviews when the discussion started to saturate or when time ran off. The length of the interviews 
varied from 30 minutes to about 75 minutes. 
 
I mostly picked the interview questions that I asked from a framework sheet, which has 3–5 questions 
under every theme (see Appendix 2). During the interview phase of the study process, I tried to 
develop the sheet based on experiences gained from interviews (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 59). Quite 
often I reshaped the scripted questions when presenting them to ensure fluent continuity in discussion 
and gradual change in discussed themes. Acknowledging that interview answers reflect the 
interviewers ways to ask questions (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 49), I avoided presenting my own 
opinions and paid attention to listening (see Yin, 2016: 28). 
 
I conducted the interviews in three setups: conventionally, via Skype (internet call and video call), 
and by email questionnaire with open questions. Regarding the latter, I tried to emulate the thematic 
interview methodology as much as possible and sent few more in-depth questions back after receiving 
answers. Permitted by the participant, I double-recorded the live interviews, used Skype’s call record 
function, and made some notes. All audio data was transcribed. 
 
Unfortunately, two of the interviews were largely lost due to technical problems. However, it was 
possible to reconstruct one (A8) quite well, basing on memory, notes and specialist literature. I was 
not able to reconstruct the other (A10), which, eventually, provided only partial answers to few 
questions. I tried to compensate the losses with an extra interview (A6) in early April 2019. At this 
point, the interview delivered mostly saturated data. Archival data compensated the losses as well. 
                                               
14 The theme names used in this paragraph are free translations of Finnish used in the interview framework sheet. 
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The central idea for choosing interview participants was to interview representatives from the most 
important sectors (e.g. governance, commercial, NGO etc.) and positions regarding the research field 
and the research questions, in order to understand interplay between different actors. Academics from 
the Research Group on the Russian Environment of the Aleksanteri Institute (2019) were consulted 
to suggest potential experts for interviews. I also made two conference trips to Russia to search for 
potential interviewees, which resulted in contacts and few interviews.15 Additionally, some interview 
participants were identified from staff listings of the stakeholder organizations. 
 
Most of the potential interview participants were contacted by email, which explained the research 
interest, the topic, the From Failand to Winland research project (From Failand to Winland -
tutkimushanke, 2019), and practical affairs. It also promised extensive anonymity. In total, 30 persons 
were invited to participate interviews. 
 
 
4.3.2. Archival data 
 
Archival data was gathered for triangulation and to fill possible gaps in interview data. In practice, I 
collected data from unreached stakeholders and included other types of data (e.g. strategies and other 
documents with institutional value in steering action). 
 
The data includes 11 reports, 7 discussion transcripts, 6 bulletins, 5 strategies, 2 speech transcripts, 1 
industry magazine article, and 1 academic media article (not peer-reviewed). In addition, the absence 
of media data was partially compensated by including 6 video-recorded interviews, which were 
published in professional and mass-media, 1 published interview transcript, and 1 reply to an 
interview question given in a conference (Arctic Media World, 2018). 
 
I acquired the archival data by searching the case stakeholders’ web pages of documents related to 
the Yamal LNG project, energy security and energy transition. I also used Google search with 
combinations of the search terms “Yamal LNG”, “Yamal”, “energy security”, “energy transition”, 
“climate change”, “LNG” and “natural gas” to find sources that comment the Yamal LNG project, 
                                               
15 The first conference, Energetika XII (Saint Petersburg State University of Economics, 2018), was organized in St. 
Petersburg, 13.–15.11.2018. The second, Arctic Media World (2018) media congress, was held in Salekhard, 9.–
11.12.2018. 
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gas industry in the Yamal Peninsula, and LNG or natural gas in relation to energy security, energy 
transition or climate change. In addition, I did some snowball sampling by looking at references to 
actors and documents in the collected data (including interviews) (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 59–60). 
 
The archival data collection required heavy selection, as only relevant sources had to be included in 
the data. To ensure novelty of sources, a general principle was to reject all documents released before 
2015, which was the year the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015a) was established. However, 
with documents regarding the Yamal LNG project development, the timeframe is slightly longer. 
Also, since few documents seemed indispensable and particularly valuable, they were included as 
exceptions. For example, the 2010 energy strategy of Russia (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2010) was included in the data, because no English nor Finnish translations of a newer 
strategy exist. 
 
 
4.4. Frame analysis 
 
Frame analysis analyses the appearance of frames in language. According to Franzosi and Vicari 
(2018: 394), “frame analysis aims to investigate processes of signification by looking at the way 
meanings become functional to organize social experience”. 
 
Franzosi and Vicari (2018: 395) consider media studies and sociology as the most important 
disciplines contributing to the development of the frame concept. However, frame analysis has been 
used extensively in various other fields – such as political science (see Ekberg & Tarasova, 2016; 
Huttunen, 2014), which have produced own variations of the concept (Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 394). 
 
Methodologically, frame analyses have been conducted with varying focus and precision, depending 
on frameworks of research (see Ekberg & Tarasova, 2016; Huttunen, 2014; Kuypers, 2009: 188–197; 
Ojala & Harjuniemi, 2016). Consequently, there is no single or “objective” approach for conducting 
frame analysis (see Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 394). However, research articles often describe how 
their frame analyses were conducted in practice (e.g. Ekberg & Tarasova, 2016: 172–173; Huttunen, 
2014: 66; Ojala & Harjuniemi, 2016: 5–6). 
 
Instead of choosing to adopt some of the early developments of frame analysis, I mainly followed 
Kuypers' (2009) “framing analysis” approach to conduct my analysis. This was due to the fact that 
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frame analysis has overcome issues and evolved since Bateson and Goffman laid the theoretical 
foundations of the method (Franzosi & Vicari, 2018: 393–402). However, since Kuypers' (2009) 
description of using the method in practice is limited as usual, making no exception to any other 
scholarly guide, I adapted some practices given by other scholars in order to be able to conduct the 
analysis. My analysis followed the description given in the next three paragraphs. 
 
In Kuypers (2009: 187) approach, the process of identifying frames first deals with reading the data 
and searching for “themes” (see Ekberg & Tarasova, 2016: 172–173). He defines theme as a subject 
of an expressed thought or discussion. 16 Next, after themes have been found and grouped (see Reese, 
2009: 30), particular “framing devices” are used to examine how found themes were interpreted (see 
Kuypers, 2009: 187). This results in frames, which are then examined with “reasoning devices” that 
are used to identify reasons, causes, consequences, moral judgements, and solutions (Vehkalahti, 
2016: 99–102). What is not said is also important to notice (Tynkkynen, 2016: 393), as it hides 
meanings of the context and makes other aspects more significant (see Goffman, 1986: 201). 
Research questions guide the whole process of analysis in order to keep it relevant (Kuypers, 2009: 
186). Usually the results of the analysis are summarized in a matrix (see Huttunen, 2014: 69; Ojala 
& Harjuniemi, 2016: 7–10; Vehkalahti, 2016: 102). 
 
I coded the study data with the Atlas.ti software in order to identify themes (including such as “project 
development”, “Russian energy security”, “energy importer security”, “energy transition” etc.), 
which I then grouped. The framing devices I used included words, concepts (particularly from energy 
security and energy transition literature), labels, metaphors, analogues, and contextualizing remarks 
(see Kuypers, 2009: 186–191). My starting point for identifying frames was to look for different 
understandings of problems (as well as what are not considered as problems) related to the themes I 
had found. When I had found distinct frames, I applied reasoning devices in order to understand 
relationships between various themes and logic of reasoning within the frames. I particularly focused 
on problem definitions, reasons, consequences, solutions, and moral judgements, which especially 
made differences in understandings visible. I also noticed issue aspects that had been left unsaid.17 
With this, I avoided the common failure of mistaking sole themes as frames (see Kuypers, 2009: 188). 
                                               
16 For example, in the following quote (A1) “Energy transition is a political term for the desire to fully switch to renewable 
energy sources”, from this study’s data, includes the themes “energy transition” and “climate change mitigation”, as the 
text discusses energy transition, aimed for eliminating greenhouse gas emissions. 
17 For example, I asked an interviewee (A1) that is it possible to meet the target of the Paris Agreement. In response, he 
answered that attempts to take “tough measures” in climate policy would lead to failure in energy policy since the demand 
for energy is increasing globally. He argued that a challenge is to provide satisfying supply, which would reduce energy 
poverty, while simultaneously decarbonizing energy sources. Acknowledging the energy trilemma concept, I noticed 
 
 41 
4.5. Applying the neo-Gramscian approach 
 
Applying the neo-Gramscian approach requires the researcher to compare contents of data with 
theory and make interpretations. There are different ways and practices, but a common principle is to 
contrast empirical data to neo-Gramscian theory with a focus on theoretical concepts, alliances, 
strategic action, and different forms of power. I conducted my analysis by following examples from 
IPE (see Evans & Phelan, 2016; Haas, 2019; Levy, 2008). 
 
In practice, my analysis proceeded with the following steps: First, as I had my data coded and 
arranged under thematic categories after conducting the frame analysis, I extracted coded text 
snippets from the Yamal LNG stakeholders. Basically, these were claims and arguments – or concepts 
which embed such (see Kuypers, 2009: 187). I compared these to the arguments, claims, and values 
that I had grouped under the frames found with frame analysis. I flagged similarities in the stakeholder 
claims (in text snippets) with color codes matching with the frames that they represent. Secondly, I 
connected the claims to stakeholders by looking at who had stated them. Thirdly, by comparing the 
claims of a stakeholder, I was able to analyze how particular stakeholders discuss particular issues. 
When there was a mismatch between frames that appeared in an individual stakeholder’s statements 
regarding a topic of discussion, I identified this as a potential sign of discursive accommodation – 
adapting a certain frame in order to appeal on others. Fourthly, by comparing such arguments about 
specific issues, I was able to categorize groups of arguments and notice patterns of discursive 
accommodation. When I also looked at how material and organizational arrangements interact with 
such discursive arrangements, I came up with certain discursive strategies. Finally, following neo-
Gramscian theory about the conditions of a historical bloc and actor roles in it, I could specify whether 
a historical bloc over the Yamal LNG case appears and which roles each stakeholder has adopted. 
Previous literature supported my interpretations about strategies and social roles (e.g. Geels, 2014; 
Haas, 2019; Henry, 2010; Levy, 2008; Levy & Newell, 2002). 
 
  
                                               
what had been left unsaid: The interviewee values the Paris Agreement – the single most important political agreement 
to mitigating climate change – less than the other two dimensions of the energy trilemma. 
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4.6. Ethical considerations 
 
Because information can be used for ethically wrong purposes, the consequences of information 
production must be evaluated beforehand. A researcher’s status as a member of the science institution 
provides legitimacy and trust, which generates responsibility to use it rightfully. This section presents 
crucial ethical considerations of this study. 
 
The principal ethical considerations of this study relate to data collection. The study provides 
anonymity to research interview participants and invitees, as some of them have various ties to the 
Yamal LNG case. This is required to ensure the option to express open critique (see Yin, 2016: 48). 
 
As this study is best described as a critical observational study, having high research integrity (Yin, 
2016: 44), I see no alarming ethical problems considering the use of its content. The results of the 
analysis basing on the neo-Gramscian approach (presented in section 5.2.) might prove useful in 
developing further political strategy. However, this study does not take sides, and thus, they provide 
equal resources for development for all the stakeholders involved in the case. 
 
Since this study classifies best under the field of environmental politics, I argue that it is central to 
consider its environmental ethics. The study’s negative environmental impacts are mainly the 
consequences of traveling committed to data collection. With case studies, data collection may often 
require field work in the case area. During this research process, I made two long-distance travels: 
First, to St. Petersburg, and second, to Sabetta and Salekhard, YNAO. The purpose of these trips was 
to gather interview contacts and witness the Yamal LNG project area. My effort to reduce the negative 
environmental impact of traveling was to minimize air travel. Except a trip from Helsinki to Moscow, 
and a commissioned Moscow–Sabetta–Salekhard–Moscow trip I traveled by rail. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
The results of this study are divided in two sections: First, section 5.1. describes the results of the 
frame analysis, regarding the relationship of energy security, energy transition, and Yamal LNG. 
These frames represent cognitive frameworks that guide interpretation and actions of the case 
stakeholders (Goffman, 1986: 21), and which stakeholders also utilize discursively to influence others 
(see Snow & Benford, 1992: 137–138). Secondly, section 5.2. applies the neo-Gramscian approach 
to the data, resulting in analysis of power. The section examines political contestation based on 
stakeholder alliances and strategic action by comparing stakeholder data to previously identified 
frames and social and material conditions described in section 3., Yamal LNG. 
 
As aforementioned in section 4., Methodology, this study includes data in two levels: stakeholder and 
expert. I make this division visible when presenting the results. Whenever my interpretation is solely 
based on expert data, I refer to the particular expert source(s) in question. Descriptions for interview 
reference codes are presented in Table 1. However, when an argument is adopted from a stakeholder 
by the expert (e.g. “My experience of discussions with the Novatek management imply that they care 
about air quality in cities.”), I do not include a reference. I also use literature to guide interpretation. 
Otherwise, all interpretations are based on stakeholder data, even if the sources are not namely 
referred to. 
 
 
5.1. Framing Yamal LNG, energy security, and energy transition 
 
The following subsections describe the four resulting frames, which I named as Neorealist producer, 
Neorealist importer, Neoliberal economist, and Environmentalist (see Table 2 for summary). These 
names refer to political ideologies and schools of political thought, which are reflected in the frames. 
According to Proskuryakova (2018: 205–206), the Neorealist and Neoliberal schools are the most 
widely represented in energy security research, highly influenced by the field of international 
relations. They also reflect two of the three most common discourses in EU–Russia energy relations, 
diversification and liberalization (see Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013: 401–403), whilst environmentalist 
thought on energy transition anticipates many new themes in energy security research (see 
Proskuryakova, 2018: 209). 
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Table 2. Summary of the resulting frames. 
 NEOREALIST PRODUCER NEOREALIST IMPORTER NEOLIBERAL 
ECONOMIST 
ENVIRONMENTALIST 
IDEO-
LOGICAL 
BACK-
GROUND 
– Neorealist discipline of IR 
– Nationalism 
– Naturalism 
– Pragmatism 
– Neorealist discipline of IR 
– Nationalism 
– Naturalism 
– Liberalism 
– Neoliberal economics 
– Individualism 
– IPE discipline of political science 
– Green politics 
– Democracy 
– Internationalism 
YAMAL LNG – Yamal LNG compensates for depletion of 
natural gas reserves in traditional 
production areas in Western Siberia. 
– Yamal LNG triggers energy project-based 
infrastructure developments along the 
coastline of Russia's Arctic region, thus 
developing the NSR. 
– Yamal LNG diversifies Russia's energy 
markets and export routes by exporting 
LNG eastwards to Asia via the NSR. 
– Yamal LNG showcases that Russia is 
successfully able to implement energy 
projects despite financial sanctions imposed 
by Western actors. 
– Yamal LNG is a secure 
source of supply for China, 
who has control over the 
company. 
– Yamal LNG advances the 
Belt and Road Initiative, whose 
central objective is to improve 
China's supply security. 
– Yamal LNG produces LNG 
to global markets, and thus 
brings energy security and 
environmental benefits for 
energy importing countries. 
– Yamal LNG is a purely 
commercial project, but 
happens to correlate with 
Russia's state interests. 
– International cooperation 
and public–private 
partnerships, as in the Yamal 
LNG project, stabilize project 
security. 
– Yamal LNG's gas can 
displace coal consumption in 
Asia. However, individual 
energy projects are only 
marginally related to climate 
change. 
– Russia acts irresponsibly, as it engages 
in hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic, 
which is made possible by climate 
change, caused by fossil fuels. 
– The Yamal LNG project could be 
undermined by climate change risks, 
which the project actors fail to account. 
– However, Yamal LNG is not the worst 
energy project in the Yamal Peninsula. 
ENERGY  
SECURITY 
– Russia's economic and political regime 
depends on energy export revenues. 
– Producing, exporting and consuming 
hydrocarbons is intrinsic. 
– Russia's energy security is about ensuring 
the continuity of the hydrocarbon-intensive 
economic–cultural–political system by 
addressing risks related to resources, their 
development, market demand and export. 
– Energy security is a state matter. 
– Social and economic 
structure, well-being and 
development depends on 
access to energy resources. 
– Secure supply and sovereign 
control over resources are the 
key objectives of energy 
security. 
– Energy security is a matter of 
states, state coalitions and trade 
partners. 
– Energy security and climate 
change mitigation are opposite 
directions of energy policy. 
– Energy security is about the 
security of supply with an 
acceptable financial cost for 
net-energy importer countries. 
– The market addresses 
energy security. More supply 
means more security. State 
intervention to the market by 
energy security politics 
constructs energy security 
problems. 
– Liberalization and high 
liquidity of the LNG market is 
beneficial for energy security. 
– The concept of energy security should 
be re-evaluated, as it is historically bound 
to centralized fossil-fuel-based energy 
systems. Today, climate change and 
social development are the largest 
security concerns related to energy. 
– Conventionally understood energy 
security, reproduced by private corporate 
and capitalist state actors, drives energy 
policy into the opposite direction than 
climate change mitigation requires. 
– Climate policy and energy transition is 
a risk to Russia's energy security. 
ENERGY  
TRANSITION 
– Climate change is a non-anthropogenic 
phenomenon, which benefits Russia by 
improving conditions for hydrocarbon 
production and export. 
– Climate policy frameworks lack realism 
and thus are not legitimate. 
– Energy landscape does not allow 
penetration of renewable energy. 
– Energy transition works as a geopolitical 
instrument against actors with pragmatic 
energy policy, which is required to address 
social and economic issues. 
– The stage of technological 
development is insufficient to 
allow transitioning to a 
renewable-energy-based 
energy system. 
– Low-carbon technologies are 
beneficial for both the climate 
and energy security. 
– A share of fossil fuels in 
society's energy mix does not 
undermine climate policy. 
Fossil fuels are still needed at 
least in medium term. 
– Market forces and 
technological development 
determine the future of 
energy. 
– Energy transition should be 
an endogenous process, in 
which innovations and 
practices should be tested in 
competitive commercial 
environments. 
– Natural gas and LNG can 
displace fuels with higher 
GHG emissions. 
– A phase-out of fossil fuels and a 
transition to a fully renewable-energy-
based energy system is required to tackle 
climate change. 
– Natural gas, resulting in carbon lock-in 
and fugitive emissions, is not needed, 
since the prospects for a climate 
sustainable energy system are already 
available. The question is about political 
will and social justice. 
– However, natural gas is not the worst 
issue regarding climate change. Higher 
priority should be given to coal and oil. 
 
 45 
5.1.1. Neorealist producer 
 
The fundamental basis of energy security in the Neorealist producer frame is the importance of fossil 
fuel production for Russia’s national economy and society, which is considered as heavily dependent 
on export revenue generated by energy trade. Export revenue is especially essential for funding the 
state budged. The welfare of the society is considered to be directly related to the economic condition 
of the society, which relies on the financial success of the energy sector. Achieving a higher level of 
economic development requires increasing natural gas production, states an interview expert, Deputy 
Director on Energy Studies of a Russian energy sector think tank (A1). 
 
The Neoliberal economist frame considers Russia’s dependency on energy export revenues 
problematic and suggests abolishing it by diversifying the structure of the national economy (see 
further section 5.1.3.). Reducing dependency is somewhat coherent with the Neorealist discipline too. 
It considers the world as an anarchic setting, in which self-interested states compete against each 
other over resources, instead of, for example, enjoying the benefits provided by mutual dependency 
(Stein, 2015: 26). However conflictingly, in this frame, economic diversification should happen 
through modernization of the energy sector and increasing investment into it (see Ministry of Energy 
of the Russian Federation, 2010: 14, 22). 
 
In this frame, the state is responsible for energy security. Governance of the energy sector is a 
particular interest of Russia’s political leadership. President Putin (2018b) regards energy security as 
“extremely important and pressing”. In a meeting of President Putin and the Energy Minister 
Alexander Novak, the minister expressed an objective related to the strategic gazifikatsiia18 program 
to connect more domestic users, towns and neighborhoods into a gas supply network (see Putin & 
Novak, 2019). While addressing energy supply security, the gazifikatsiia program itself fortifies state 
central power in regions of Russia via energy infrastructure by increasing regional dependence on 
gas that comes with structural change and economic development. Control over the gas supply 
network is in the hands of the central authority, who possesses significant legal ownership and 
political power over the energy sector (Tynkkynen, 2016: 377–378, 382, 392). Although being just 
one example, this demonstrates how energy security politics strengthen the power of Russia’s 
political regime – which again reflect to this frame’s tendency to consider energy related issues as 
state issues. Briefly said, energy security is considered also as security of the political regime. 
                                               
18 Translates as “switching to gas” or “construction of gas infrastructure”. 
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Thus, energy security is defined as “one of the most important components of the national security” 
in the Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2010: 28). 
 
The Neorealist producer frame considers that the pragmatic concept of Russia’s energy security, first 
of all, deals with resource base: Energy security is provided with cheap and abundant gas resources. 
President Putin (2018) emphasizes that even though Russians are “lucky”, the “truly enormous” 
resources “were given … not by the Lord alone”. “Past generations … developed [Russia’s] lands”, 
and “the work done by … predecessors” is continued in energy companies. In this sense, sufficiency 
of resources is not considered as a problem in this frame, but attention is paid to their development: 
Localization of production technology, project financing and efficient management are stated as key 
for ensuring the resource base. Regarding geology, the Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 
2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 75) considers the depletion of gas deposits 
in traditional production region Tyumen problematic, and addresses this by stating that “developing 
new gas-producing centers on the Yamal Peninsula” is a “necessity”. In this sense, development of 
Russia’s Arctic region is related to energy security. 
 
Secondly, multiple interview experts argue similarly to Sharples (2013: 695) that security of export 
is a central pillar in the concept of Russia’s energy. Essential for this is projecting long-term market 
demand realistically, claims an interview expert, a university institute Program Director (A11). 
Having good relations to energy trade partners, and diversifying export markets and delivery routes 
are also pivotal components of energy security. 
 
Besides the Arctic is the region which is considered to allow Russia to avoid the threat of decreasing 
total natural gas reserves, in this frame, it is also considered important for the delivery of energy 
exports. Therefore, regional development in Arctic Russia is related to energy security. In this frame, 
the NSR is considered a priority for Arctic development. The NSR provides an additional export route 
for Russia’s hydrocarbon trade, and saves time compared to the Suez Canal–Malacca Strait route in 
shipping eastwards to Asia. Thus, development of the NSR is considered strategically important. 
 
Essentially NSR development is considered to realize through infrastructure developments on the 
Arctic coast and in arctic shipping, for which upstream energy projects are seen as the source. In 
general, LNG is considered as central for Arctic development and for the future production of 
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Russia’s natural gas. In its behalf, the Yamal LNG project – widely framed as successful – is 
considered to impose a trigger effect for energy project development in Russia’s Arctic region. The 
frame considers that the project was set to explore potential for LNG development in the Arctic, and 
was completed ahead of its schedule, despite financial sanctions imposed over Novatek by the United 
States (Novatek, 2019: 62). It was able to gather financing from the West and is seen as a proof of 
willingness for companies to do business with Russia. In response to China’s increased presence in 
the Arctic region and Chinese companies’ shareholder position in JSC Yamal LNG, the frame regards 
that the balance of power in the Arctic does not allow China to grow its power. In addition, 
international cooperation is not required nor does it itself improve the energy security of Russia. 
 
In this frame, climate change is closely linked to the approach on Arctic development. According to 
President Putin (2017a), “so far, we do not get the sense here that the temperature is going up 
rapidly”, as he claimed that Moscow had faced snowfall and St. Petersburg “quite chilly” weather in 
June 2017, thus questioning global warming on one occasion. Earlier the same year, Putin (2017b) 
suggested that climate change “may have to do with some global cycles on earth or even some 
planetary cycles” and that “preventing” climate change “is impossible”. He told a story of him 
traveling to the Arctic Franz Josef Land, where an expedition team had witnessed a decline in the 
number of glaciers already in the late 19th century, before “there were no such man-made factors, 
such emissions”. When the impacts of climate change are discussed in Russian context, they are 
majorly regarded as positive in this frame: Warming of the Arctic region is considered to improve 
conditions for hydrocarbon production and extend the navigational season in the NSR due to 
decreasing sea ice. According to President Putin (2017b), this is will lower the cost of Russian LNG 
and thus improve competitive advantage. To summarize, in this frame, climate change is considered 
as a non-anthropogenic phenomenon benefiting Russia and the efforts to mitigate it are insignificant 
– as they face the great powers of nature. 
 
Subsequently, multiple interview experts claim that Russia has no own will to mitigate climate 
change. The frame considers that disparate interest, stages of economic development and energy 
landscapes of countries prevent efficient international climate policy. The Paris Agreement (United 
Nations, 2015a) is considered as a technically just, but not very well working document, which 
according to Putin (2017b) “does not contain any mandatory requirements” for national governments. 
Its target to limit the rise of the global average temperature to well below 2°C above the pre-industrial 
level is considered as unattainable. The “price tag” for climate change mitigation is considered too 
expensive, and radical implementation of climate policy could lead to political consequences like the 
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gilets jaunes, “as has happened in France”. On the other hand, in St. Petersburg International 
Economic Forum panel, Putin (2017b) stated that the structure of the economy must be modernized 
heavily to cut GHG emissions. However, what followed immediately after was an expression of 
concern over the workforce employed in incumbent fossil fuel regimes, who “will be made 
redundant” and “join the army of people living below the poverty line” if they will not be reemployed 
again. 
 
In addition to climate and policy related notions, the frame seeks to delegitimize energy transition on 
natural and technological basis. Change in the energy landscape level is seen as a slow process, where 
subtle transformation takes place constantly. Fast transition is considered implausible. The alleged 
reason for this is that energy – in (or similar to) its current structure of production and consumption 
– is considered as a primary structure and a basic human need. In this frame, the energy system has 
structural power to shape the frameworks determining how energy in society is considered (see 
Strange, 1988: 24–25). As an energy system based on renewables would look rather different to 
today’s, the current “stage of development” in renewable energy technology is considered as a barrier 
to energy transition, and, renewable energy services inadequate to satisfy human needs. 
 
The previous naturalistic assumption of energy also bolsters a pragmatist discourse regarding the 
foreign energy policy of Russia. The frame considers that only third-party actors cause energy 
security problems and that deteriorated energy relations with the West have been politicized against 
Russia. The pragmatic ground for problems with energy relations is considered nonexistent: During 
“50 years”, Europe’s supply security problems with Russian natural gas have been marginal. 
Additionally, dialogue on energy relations is framed as nontransparent and nonpragmatic. This kind 
of emphasis on pragmatism combined with the previous framing of climate change sets up ground 
for regarding energy transition primarily as an instrument for gaining geopolitical power. An expert, 
Deputy Director General of a Russian energy sector consulting firm (A2), states that “energy 
transition is a political term for the desire to fully switch to renewable energy sources”. 
 
Furthermore, energy transition is not considered to fit together with other global issues considered as 
“realities”. Namely, such are the state of social and economic development in developing countries 
and lower classes of society in developed countries. Energy poverty and cooking with wood are 
typical examples given in this frame. Growth in the world’s total energy consumption is considered 
as a direct consequence of positive development addressing these issues. Occasionally, the argument 
is extended to concern Russia and other parts of the world as well: An expert (A2) summarizes that 
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“[climate change related developments] should not undermine the economic development of the 
country and the world as a whole”. Luckily, developing Asian countries are considered to follow 
pragmatic approaches to energy trade, as they put climate change mitigation after their top-priority 
“realities” related to social and economic development.  
 
The frame claims that the most efficient, practical, and needed way to satisfy growing demand for 
energy is to increase natural gas consumption. Natural gas is presumed to continue being one of the 
primary sources – if not the primary source – of energy in the world for decades. As a quite recent 
technology, LNG improves the access to natural gas, and thus increases its the share in the world’s 
energy mix, which is considered favorable. 
 
 
5.1.2. Neorealist importer 
 
The Neorealist importer frame shares ideological similarities with the Neorealist producer frame but 
adapts a consumer-focused, and thus opposite, perspective on the concept of energy security. In this 
frame too, the world is seen as an anarchic setting where states compete over resources (Stein, 2015: 
26). As this neorealist worldview adapts a net-energy importer perspective, it sets an imperative for 
energy security: Energy security is about access to energy resources, since nonrenewable resources 
are finite and access to them can become limited. Thus, security of energy supply is the main concern 
in the frame. 
 
Access to energy resources is linked to social well-being and continuity of the economic structure of 
the society. The need for energy derives from basic human needs, which can be satisfied with 
residential heating in homes, for example. In the context of developing countries and China, access 
to natural gas is much related to “improving people’s living standard”, as stated by CNPC Vice 
president Xu Wenrong (2016), and to reducing energy poverty. IEA (2018b: 96–98) estimates that 9 
% of population in Asia and 57 % in Sub-Saharan Africa still lack access to electricity, and nearly 
2.7 billion cook primarily with biomass, coal and kerosene, which damages health and impairs 
productivity development. In addition, according to multiple interview experts, urban air quality has 
become a health risk which is now taken into political consideration in China. Increased access to gas 
also allows the country to reduce air pollution. This is addressed in Xu's (2016) speech as well. 
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The neorealist ideological basis of the frame directs to seek sovereign control over consumed energy 
resources. Security is considered as a state-issue, whereas rival states are sources of insecurity. Actors 
engaging in this frame pursue a high-level of domestic energy production, which however, is not 
considered to be easily attainable. Therefore, actors attempt to achieve highest possible control over 
the resources they import. For example, the EU desires to increase the share of domestic production 
of the hydrocarbon energy it consumes. However, production growth within this generally downtrend 
sector (IEA, 2018: 204) would center on unconventional fuels, which could only compensate for 
declining conventional natural gas production (European Commission, 2014: 13). China, as well, 
pursues domestic energy production and ownership in joint-venture energy projects abroad. An expert 
from a Russian energy sector consulting firm (A3) describes that China accepts only projects where 
it can itself participate in production of the energy it imports. CNPC (2017a: 13) states that Yamal 
LNG is “an important stronghold along the Ice Silk Road” and that it is “the largest overseas oil and 
gas cooperation project that CNPC has participated in under the Belt and Road Initiative”. Using 
the world “stronghold” implies geographical control. According to Chung (2017: 2), diversity of 
energy supply for China is one of the core-objectives of the program. CNPC (2017b) supports this 
claim by stating that “LNG delivery from Yamal to China will be of great significance to China’s 
efforts in accelerating the restructuring of its energy mix and safeguarding energy security”. 
 
Since access to resources can become limited, energy security is essentially related to variety of risks 
in this frame. Five types of risks are considered: availability risks, market risks, technical risks, risks 
related to acceptability, and geopolitical risks. The first mentioned type include risks to physical 
availability of energy resources, of which CNPC (2017a: 15) provides an example: In order to reduce 
air pollution in a number of urban areas in China, the government carried a program to promote 
natural gas and electricity as alternatives to coal consumption. This resulted in a temporary shortage 
of gas supply in 2017. It also caused a market risk, as the price of LNG hiked. An interview expert, 
a CEO of a state-owned gas company (A7), explains that the EU in turn has witnessed low utilization 
rate of its LNG terminals due to high prices of LNG in Asia. This has partially forestalled the Union’s 
action toward its target of reducing supply dependency on Russia (see European Commission, 2014: 
2). A typical example of a technical risk in the data is infrastructure failure. The frame considers that 
after the Fukushima accident in 2011, an acceptability related risk led Japan to agree phasing out 
nuclear energy since the public opinion turned negative toward it. 
 
Geopolitical risks to energy security dominate the Neorealist importer frame in quantity. The 
geopolitical risk discourse mostly centers on Europe’s dependency on Russia’s supply of natural gas. 
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As the supply for Europe highly concentrates on one supplier, it is seen as the primary source for 
vulnerability in this frame. This condition spurs European actors to perceive Russia as the ultimate 
source for threats to energy security. Even though the European Commission (2014) does not literally 
refer to Russia as a threat in its Energy Security Strategy, multiple experts verify such framing. For 
example, an interview expert (A11) states that Chinese ownership in JSC Yamal LNG entails that 
“Russia is very unlikely to do anything to undermine energy security”. This implies that in other 
conditions Russia would be more likely. Furthermore, in the Energy Union Package framework 
strategy, the European Commission (2015: 7) adds that it will consider “reframing the energy 
relationship” with Russia “when the conditions are right”. Instrumental use of energy in foreign 
policy is a common energy security threat that the EU considers. The European Commission (2015: 
6) practically refers to Russia as a part of a group, and states that “energy policy is often used as a 
foreign policy tool, in particular in major energy producing and transit countries.” Multiple 
interview experts consider that Russia could use energy to achieve geopolitical targets. 
 
Likewise to the EU, Chinese actors relate geopolitics with energy security. Bertelsen and Gallucci 
(2016: 241) describe that China’s Arctic interests can partially be explained with supply security for 
energy resources, feeding the country’s manufacturing-based economy. In addition, China pays effort 
to develop marine trade routes, including the NSR. An interview expert (A2) claims that the route 
would provide China an access to the Atlantic Ocean beyond the geopolitical power of the United 
States, active in the Pacific coast of Asia. In this context the CNPC’s (2017a: 13) discourse on Yamal 
LNG’s significance for China’s energy supply becomes inevitably related to an Arctic strategy aiming 
to bypass the geopolitical power of the United States. Furthermore, both CNPC and JSC Yamal LNG 
highlight the China–Russia energy cooperation in the project, which is considered to allow CNPC to 
become “a frontrunner in the resource development in the Arctic” (CNPC, 2017a: 13). 
 
Oppositely to the Neoliberal economist frame (see section 5.1.3.), this frame considers that addressing 
energy security actively is needed. For example, European Commission (2016: 10) states that “the 
fact” is that “the market does not fully reward the security-of-supply benefits of gas stored for crisis 
situations”. Reduction of vulnerability is sought as a response to risk. 
 
The primary energy security target for the EU is to reduce dependency on Russia’s energy supply. 
This reflects the Neorealist perception of other states as sources of risk. Consequently, the primary 
practices suggested in order to improve energy security are diversification of supply sources, delivery 
routes and fuels – as in the Neorealist producer frame. The EU considers LNG as an option that 
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resonates with all the above factors. Expanding LNG infrastructure network allows regasification of 
container-movable LNG and connects more separate regional gas markets, which are pipeline-
dominated. The European Commission (2016: 2) advocates LNG especially for four East-European 
member states, who are regarded as “heavily dependent on a single supplier”. In addition, the EU 
sees energy saving as beneficial for energy security and suggests reducing the total volume of import 
energy by increasing energy efficiency. A more integrated foreign energy policy of the EU is aimed 
to address otherwise potentially underdog positions of individual member countries in energy 
dialogue with Russia. 
 
Another concept in the EU’s energy security policy, which is maybe more inward-looking, is called 
“resilience” – the ability to resist disturbances. This frame considers that higher resilience can be 
achieved by restructuring the energy system by infrastructure development. The EU seeks to increase 
capacity for energy storage and strengthen gas transmission links between member countries 
(European Commission, 2014: 3–4). 
 
Generally, the Neorealist importer frame considers energy security and climate change mitigation as 
contrary directions of energy policy. As with the Neorealist producer frame (see section 5.1.1.), the 
level of social and technological development is considered insufficient to allow transitioning to a 
renewable energy-based energy system. This argument is often explained with operational instability 
of electricity grids. They are not considered to suit extensive penetration of renewable energy without 
support power from other sources. Also, LNG is considered to become the primary energy source for 
ship propulsion, which would lock-in the energy system to fossil fuels for a certain period of time. 
Again, other sources for propulsion are considered as technologically lacking. The frame adapts a 
naturalist stance on energy systems: A transitioning system should provide close to the same services 
as today’s fossil energy-based system provides. 
 
However, energy technology development is seen as beneficial for energy security, and renewable 
and nuclear energy production are regarded as central measures for increasing domestic energy 
production in this frame. The European Commission (2014: 7) considers the EU’s emission trading 
system as a potential mechanism to drive higher energy efficiency. The EU also claims that if 
infrastructure lock-in is actively addressed in energy policy, it will not become a problem with natural 
gas. According to the European Commission (2016: 11–12), “the EU should continue to support the 
growth of LNG as an alternative fuel where it replaces more polluting conventional fuels and does 
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not take the place of renewable energy sources, consistent with sustainability goals”. The pipeline 
infrastructure could also be used with biogas or synthetic gas derived from excess electricity. 
 
Nevertheless, the EU considers that a share of fossil fuels in energy production is still needed at least 
in short and medium terms. A small share in the energy mix is not considered to undermine climate 
policy. Xu (2016) claims that energy transition in China should come “almost half a century” later 
than in developed countries – in this case implying that China is not one. 
 
 
5.1.3. Neoliberal economist 
 
The Neoliberal economist frame builds up on the ideology of liberalism. This is most noticeable with 
regard to the frame’s understanding of the economy and politics. Like Bellamy (2015: 27) describes 
the liberalist role of the state, the frame considers that the state should remain only as a facilitator of 
social interaction instead of possessing control over social institutions. In this frame, economic 
actions are considered to be “other than political” (see Stephan et al., 2013: 68), reflecting a traditional 
understanding of politics. It places politics in institutions such as the state and commissions, and in 
between state relations (Stephan et al., 2013: 69–70). Political attempts to intervene the economy are 
considered to result in instrumental treatment of individuals, as they are furthered to serve social 
purposes possibly against their own will (Bellamy, 2015: 30). 
 
Followingly, since energy projects are developed and operated by commercial companies, they are 
fundamentally seen as depolitical – private matters of the companies owing property rights 
guaranteed in legal justice. Thus, an interview expert, a Senior Adviser of a Financial research 
institute (A9), describes that economic motives guide all upstream natural gas developments. The 
same rationale applies to the Yamal LNG project as well, as argued by an interviewed stakeholder 
(A6). He claims that the reasons behind the establishment of the project were purely economic, and 
that “Novatek notably operates on commercial grounds”, as far as he knows the company. Other 
companies Novatek picked to join the project were chosen based on commercial attributes. Two 
expert sources (A2; Bros & Mitrova, 2016: 9), describe that for TOTAL S.A., Yamal LNG granted 
an opportunity to develop business. Reflecting this perspective, the Novatek CEO Mark Gyetvay 
(2018) states, when interviewed about the financial sanctions imposed over the company by the 
United States (Novatek, 2019: 62), that the company has “always raised the question that why is 
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Novatek in the list of the sanctions”, since “it is not a state owned enterprice” but “a private 
company”. 
 
The frame alludes that the Yamal LNG project correlates with the political strategies of Russia and 
answers to many state-interests, but this falls more on coincidence than causation. When describing 
the relations of the state and Novatek, a stakeholder (A6) argues that “Russia operates in its own 
way”. The frame considers that good relations to the state are required to be able to operate large-
scale business in Russia – especially in the energy sector. Followingly, alleged close relations of 
Novatek to President Putin, through the CEO Leonid Mikhelson and a major shareholder Gennady 
Timchenko, are seen as an advantage for business. In turn, the central role of energy companies in 
Russia’s Arctic strategy (see Russian Federation, 2013) is explained with natural geography by an 
expert (A9): The Arctic region happens to hold large hydrocarbon resources, and thus their extraction 
is a part of the region’s development strategy. A stakeholder (A6) considers that many of these 
resources, situated in remote regions, have been previously inaccessible, but now LNG technology 
and Arctic shipping allows to tap into them. However, the potential benefits of exporting LNG via 
the NSR depend on how suitable it becomes for navigation. An expert (A9) concludes that after all it 
is not a requirement for successful operation of the project. Furthermore, a stakeholder, CEO of a 
private ship engineering company (A8), expresses doubt over wider utilization of the route. He 
suspects that the route’s governance might be incompatible with shipping companies’ operational 
practices. In addition, weather and ice conditions might cause variation in travel times, and thus 
uncertainty over the timespan of freight delivery. According to him, ship owners have skeptical 
attitudes toward traveling in Russia’s Northern territorial waters. 
 
Conclusively, the Yamal LNG project is considered almost solely in commercial and economic 
means. When asked about benefits of the Yamal LNG project, three experts (A1, A2 and A9) account 
them to shareholders. An expert (A9) and a stakeholder (A8) add that also contractors benefit. 
According to A8, to his understanding the project area was “uninhabited” and therefore the project 
does not bear any negative consequences. A9 considers that individual energy projects are only 
trivially related to larger issues – namely energy security, climate change, and the NSR. 
 
However, economic policy makes an exception to the frame’s understanding of the “depolitical” 
economy. For example, Russia’s entrance in LNG markets as a producer was considered to be led by 
a motive of securing overall market position in natural gas. Literally, the Energy strategy of Russia 
for the period up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 79) addresses that 
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LNG projects are “primarily aimed at enhancement of Russia’s positions on the foreign market” and 
that they “will make it possible to enter the markets, which are absolutely new for Russia”. Multiple 
interview experts admit that the country’s national economy relies considerably on energy export 
revenue, and therefore entrance to the growing LNG market was considered to be required. However, 
they do not think that it should be considered as a matter of security. 
 
Despite seeing not much in common with the Yamal LNG project and energy security, the frame 
recognizes the latter as a separate issue. In this frame, the concept of energy security adopts a SOS 
perspective: Securing the supply of energy with acceptable financial cost is a relevant question for 
net-energy importer countries, who have limited domestic energy production. 
 
The Neoliberal economist frame considers that the arena where issues regarding energy are 
effectively addressed, is the global energy market, if it can function independently. Basing on 
economic liberalism, the market is considered as politically relativist sphere, where subjective needs 
and desires are treated legitimately and fairly, regardless of values and ideologies (Bellamy, 2015: 
28–30). Demand and supply are considered as the primary drivers of the market. Since access to 
energy is provided by the energy markets for countries who lack sufficient domestic production, 
increasing supply is supposed to improve availability and price. Therefore, all energy projects are 
considered to increase energy security, in hand to hand with total supply. This market-focused 
concept of energy security reflects, for example, in TOTAL S.A.’s (now ex-)CEO Christophe de 
Margerie's (2014b) statement: “Long term project[s] are good for the world, are good for the balance 
between offer and demand. We need gas, we produce gas.” 
 
Regarding the impacts of the Russia–West foreign political relations to the Yamal LNG project, de 
Margerie (2014b) also states that “I think that the industry, companies, are sometimes good element 
to help people to understand better each other, and to understand the benefit we have from each 
others”. This implies that following commercial logic can at least occasionally bring benefits, which 
could not be achieved if “politics” were not put aside. The idea of “political forces” taking control of 
the “depolitical” economic domain by questioning the legitimacy of the value-relativist market, is 
highly apparent in this frame. When energy becomes securitized with “political” consideration, 
energy security problems build up. For example, an interview expert (A9) reasons that if a share of 
Yamal LNG’s production is earmarked to China due to CNPC’s participation in the project, a 
relatively lesser share of the total output will be freely available. Earmarking decreases the liquidity 
of markets, thus making them less efficient to address demand. 
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Nevertheless, the frame considers that wider adoption of LNG would generally reduce the role of 
politics in energy and improve energy security. The LNG market structure is regarded as the primary 
reason for this, since more and more often LNG is traded with spot-pricing, and moved and sold 
without continental limits (Bridge & Bradshaw, 2017: 215). An expert (A7) considers that with LNG 
producers are not physically able to control energy flows and determine prices, which is why lesser 
power dynamics are related to LNG than pipeline transmission. The frame tends to suggest that 
regarding the energy security of LNG, the origin of gas can be ignored because of this transmission 
structure. 
 
Furthermore, the Neoliberal economist frame considers that liberalization of the energy markets 
increases energy security, as suggested by Goldthau and Witte (see 2010: 3–5). Energy projects such 
as the Yamal LNG, bound on international cooperation and primarily operated by private companies, 
are considered to improve energy security and generate mutual benefits for both energy importers 
and exporters. An interview expert (A11) suggests that corporate involvement in energy projects 
raises threshold for selfish actions that might undermine security. To conclude, the Neoliberal 
economist frame does not perceive energy security as a zero-sum game of geopolitical contestation, 
but a mutual interest pursued with fair commercial cooperation. 
 
Regarding the future of energy, the Neoliberal economist frame lets the market guide vision. As the 
global demand for natural gas is forecasted to grow (IEA, 2018: 174–175), increases in supply are 
“highly welcomed in many places”, as stated by an expert (A9). An essential implication in this frame 
is that developing countries, with outpowering demand for energy, will determine how the future 
energy system will look like by steering the market with their demands. This viewpoint is value 
relativist in nature, since it does not evaluate the desirability of outcomes. Instead, it only considers 
that all desires should be judged equally regardless of their quality (see Bellamy, 2015: 30). 
Followingly, also energy transition as a method of climate change mitigation becomes juxtaposed to 
all other policy objectives. As an example of this ethical hierarchy, the European Commission (2014: 
12) notes that renewable energy is feared to destabilize energy markets. In case the reasons for such 
concerns are non-parallel with transition, for some, the ends do not justify the means. 
 
However, the frame considers that a trend toward energy transition is taking place. A quality shift in 
energy demand has been reported to occur, at least in certain geographical areas. A stakeholder (A6) 
and an interview expert (A7) report that certain political groups and parties have emerged to oppose 
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investment in hydrocarbon technologies – primarily this is visible in regional administration level 
politics and in the civil society. These groups prefer compatible technologies with a low-carbon 
energy system. A stakeholder (A6) assesses that this shift has started to diffuse into developing Asian 
countries as well. In long-term, LNG could also face opposition as being too GHG intensive source 
of energy, an expert (A7) concludes. 
 
The market is considered to response in this shift in demand, seeking to find an economic equilibrium. 
Thus, supply is assumed to adapt to a renewed mode of consumption.19 Additionally, the frame 
considers that companies must adapt to consumer preferences in order to retain acceptability of 
business. In this sense, the civil society utilizes power to shape the economic. An example of this is 
provided by a stakeholder (A6): According to him, Russian gas companies follow the industry 
standards of auditioning and reducing fugitive methane emissions in their production chain. The 
saved gas resulting from this reduction of waste increases total production output. Thus, this 
efficiency improvement is also economically just. 
 
The Neoliberal economist frame reflects a theoretically oriented understanding of technological 
progress: It is considered as an exogenous process, where technological substitution realizes through 
price adjustments, reflecting traditional models of neoclassical economics. The actual micro-level 
dynamics of technology change is left out of scope (see Geels, 2010: 497). Hence, energy transition 
is considered to take place when economic competitiveness of alternative technologies and practices 
outstrip their fossil fuel intensive contestants. 
 
Since the frame trusts in this ontological (see Geels, 2010: 496) process of technology substitution, it 
does not perceive path-dependency and lock-in problematic, even though they shape socio-technical 
transitions (see Geels, 2010: 495). Carbon intensive technologies, which may drive transition into 
negative pathways, are considered to become displaced as soon as energy transition-compatible 
competitive technologies and practices emerge. 
 
An open-minded stance toward natural gas as a solution to GHG emission reductions, is a resulting 
manifestation of this approach to energy policy. The data suggests that natural gas is often regarded 
as less GHG emission intensive source of energy than other fossil fuels, and therefore, is seen 
potential for displacing more intensive sources. In this frame, two prevalent themes related to climate 
                                               
19 However, the European Commission (2014: 14) underlines that energy system change “will not happen” without 
stimulating new technology development. 
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change are tied to this argument: GHG emissions could be reduced with natural gas by substituting, 
first, coal in Asia and, secondly, heavy fuel oil in marine shipping. Because of this, the Yamal LNG 
project is considered as beneficial for climate change mitigation – but however, only in marginal 
scale since it is a single project. 
 
The Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2010: 83) draws a vision of “transition of the world economy and energy sector to the 
new technological level characterized with high energy efficiency of business and extended use of 
non-hydrocarbon energy resources”. Foreign demand for Russia’s natural gas is considered to 
decrease in such scenario. In addition, two Russian interview experts (A1 & A3) cautiously consider 
that Russia has some underlying potential for climate change mitigation and energy transition. 
However, one of the two experts (A1) consider it to be constrained by a sort of a resource curse. He 
claims that measures toward climate change mitigation and energy transition “bumps on the 
availability of huge resources of cheap gas”. Nonetheless, unpreparedness is not considered to cause 
any risk for Russia in near future. An expert (A9) contemplates that climate change related financial 
risks to natural gas projects are still considered marginal. 
 
 
5.1.4. Environmentalist 
 
The Environmentalist frame questions the traditional notions of energy security. Numerous data 
sources engaged in the frame perceive energy security and climate policy as inseparable issues. An 
interviewed stakeholder, a Program Leader of an environmental NGO (A5), states that climate change 
should be considered in practices aimed to address energy security. 
 
The Environmentalist frame perceives modern societies as dependent on excessive energy 
consumption, which is maintained by corporate actors, such as oil and gas companies, automotive 
industries, and agricultural corporations, who benefit from excessive consumption of fossil fuels: 
They lobby for “security” provided “only” with fossil fuels. If other modes of energy production and 
consumption were adapted, they claim that the result would be “insecurity” with economic dislocation 
and deprived growth (see Levy & Spicer, 2013: 663). As a consequence, governments are motivated 
to follow corporate interests with energy security policy. 
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Thus, the Environmentalist frame perceives conventional energy security as a safeguard for growth-
dependent fossil capitalist systems (see Mitchell, 2009: 400; Yergin, 2008: 14–17), driving energy 
policy into the opposite direction than climate change mitigation would require. This is one reason 
why the frame sees climate change mitigation fundamentally as a political struggle (see Burke & 
Stephens, 2018: 80), as prospects for transition are considered to be available. According to 
Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council and SolarPowerEurope (2015: 9), “if we 
remain dependent on fossil fuels in the pursuit of energy security, the result will be a potentially 
catastrophic spiral towards increasing greenhouse gas emissions and more extreme climate 
impacts”. In addition, the NGO and its co-authors (2015: 214) state that hydrocarbon resources are 
“larger than our climate can cope with”, implying that concerns over resource scarcity are unjustified. 
Also the EU recognizes that some measures intended to improve energy security may extend fossil 
fuel use (see European Commission, 2016: 2). 
 
Contrarily to the traditional notions of energy security, the Environmentalist frame considers climate 
change as the greatest threat to security. It is insistently related to energy, as it ties to the patterns of 
extensive consumption of fossil fuels (Bridge, 2010: 523). If the consumption continues, the world is 
declared to face a climate catastrophe (see Levy & Spicer, 2013: 663–664). Greenpeace International 
(2013: 7) calls for a fossil fuel phase-out: “either replace coal, oil and gas with renewable energy, or 
face a future turned upside down by climate change”. Multiple stakeholders engaging in this frame 
address that climate change impacts would also concern the Arctic region and, thus, the Yamal LNG 
project. They claim that sea level rise and diminishing permafrost are climate risks, which could 
potentially undermine the project. According to Bellona's (2019) estimation, these risks have been 
left largely unconsidered. 
 
Moreover, the frame considers Russia as an irresponsible actor in regard to climate change. Extraction 
of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic area and exporting them via the NSR is labeled as ironic and 
shameful, since such has been made possible largely by climate change, resulting from the same 
process of extensive production and consumption of fossil fuels. Russia’s burden for climate change 
is considered even double of that what is auditioned for the UNFCCC’s framework Paris Agreement 
(see United Nations, 2015b), since Russia is a net-exporter of hydrocarbons. 
 
As a solution to climate change, the frame advocates a transition into a fully renewable energy-based 
energy system. This system should not be perceived as a “decarbonized” copy of today’s 
hydrocarbon-based energy system that provides similar services and sustains the same societal 
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structures. Instead, the frame considers that a transitioned system would be different in quality. For 
example, the European Commission (2015: 2) visions itself as an “Energy Union with citizens at its 
core”. It states that its current “economy where energy is based on a centralised, supply-side 
approach and which relies on old technologies and outdated business models” is “driven by fossil 
fuels”. Such system needs to be “moved away from”, by “citizens taking ownership of the energy 
transition”. A transitioned system would be characterized with new technologies and a market 
structure, which engages citizens and consumers (see European Commission, 2015: 2). Some actors 
go even further to emphasize less production and consumption, localization and environmentally 
friendly land use, resembling the Sustainable lifestyles imaginary presented by Levy and Spicer 
(2013: 665), which is contrary to consumerism, careerism, and sustainment of current lifestyles. 
 
Some advocates in the Environmentalist frame place quality requirements for the transition: It should 
be a “just”. The concept of just transition refers to social justice aspects of energy transition (see 
Sovacool, Burke, Baker, & Kotikalapudi, 2017: 677). Friends of the Earth Germany, Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung, & Misereor (2017: 17) underline that structural change resulting from energy transition 
should be guided “democratically”, ensuring that change does not fall on the “detriment of the 
weakest”. Arguably this statement refers to the disproportionate impacts of climate change, most 
harmful for the most vulnerable who conflictingly contributing the least to the problem (Tokar, 2015: 
2). Also Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council, and SolarPowerEurope (2015: 9) 
call for retraining of labor force into renewable energy industries, as a coal phase-out would result in 
loss of jobs. However, in this frame, development of renewable energy is considered essential for 
sustainable development, providing energy access for millions of people. 
 
The Environmentalist frame delegitimates such approaches to climate change mitigation that overly 
rely on the market. Friends of the Earth Germany et al. (2017: 7) abates policy reliance on proceedings 
of renewable energy and the falling rate of increase in energy demand to “business as usual”. 
Attempts to shape the capitalist economy into a “green economy” – a mechanism that would 
implement systemic change to climate and environmental sustainability endogenously – are 
considered faulty, just as excessive focus on technology development. Market-based approaches to 
transition are claimed to ignore the power of backfire forces, such as resisting incumbent political 
actors. In turn, the frame opts for political instruments: Governments should act with regulation and 
support to advance energy transition. One such option could be moderation of hydrocarbon demand, 
which the European Commission (see 2014: 7; 2015: 12) discusses as a potential energy security 
measure as well. 
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As the Environmentalist frame depreciates climate policy shaped by conventional energy politics and 
the neoliberal notion of the market, which could be argued as “post-political” approaches to climate 
change mitigation (Swyngedouw, 2010: 215–216), it is skeptical toward using natural gas as a mean 
to reduce GHG emissions. According to an interviewed stakeholder (A5), this is against the hopes of 
the Russian government, who wishes that natural gas could have a role as a transition fuel in 
displacing coal. After all, the government is considered to fear the risk of decreasing foreign demand 
for hydrocarbons as a result of energy transition. The Environmentalist frame acknowledges the 
considerable fugitive methane emissions related to the production chain of natural gas, which increase 
the fuel’s global warming potential during its lifecycle. For example, regarding Arctic shipping, a 
study conducted by Klimentyev et al. (2017: 58) of WWF Russia claims that LNG propulsion would 
reduce equivalent carbon dioxide (CO2e) GHG emissions only by 8 % compared to heavy fuel oil 
due to higher fugitive emissions in ship engines. Secondly, choosing something else than a transition 
path without a full fossil fuel phase-out is considered to cause path-dependency, which extends 
hydrocarbon consumption in time. In most cases the frame discusses all fossil fuels as a unite group. 
As Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council and SolarPowerEurope (2015: 214) note, 
“decisions about opening up new oil, gas and coal mines lead almost certainly to a ‘lock-in’ 
situation”. In turn, limiting and abstaining financing for fossil fuel projects is highly advocated. 
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5.2. Power and contestation over the meanings of energy 
 
Analysis based on the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach suggests that hegemony constitutes over 
the field of the Yamal LNG case. Section 5.2.1. shows that a group of government and business actors 
form a core alliance within the historical bloc of the Yamal LNG case field. The section describes 
how this group, fundamentally based on mutual dependencies between its actors, has the highest 
coercive power and dominates the economic dimension. It also shows how these actors, having 
specialized roles, legitimate each other’s actions with discursive, organizational and material support 
– thus making the core alliance a distinct group in the case field. 
 
Opposition to the meaning of production set by the core alliance is examined in section 5.2.2. The 
section describes strategic action against the historical bloc that is taken by the actors of the subaltern. 
Primarily, their strategies build upon two arrangements: First, on transnational organizational and 
discursive alliances between actors and, secondly, on discourses and arguments that the core alliance 
and other powerful actors consider legitimate, but which are turned to promote reform. 
 
Section 5.2.3. describes the historical bloc’s strategic resistance against opposing action. These 
include both coercion and accommodation. With accommodation, the historical bloc integrates most 
of the challenging agendas of the opposition into the hegemonic rationale. This is done with 
ideological leadership taken by various non-Russian corporate actors, industrial organizations and 
IGOs, forming a “leading class” in Gramscian terms (see Gramsci, 1999: 148–161; Haas, 2019: 67). 
 
With careful alignment of material, organizational and discursive arrangements, the historical bloc 
projects a certain “reality” that limits prospects for opposing action. The subgroups may find such 
cognitive frames that would fundamentally best serve their needs incoherent with their perception of 
reality. As a result, they majorly choose to consent to the hegemonic rationale, as it appears 
unavoidable in any case. Section 5.2.4. describes how the subgroups adopt the core alliance’s claims. 
Ultimately, the historical bloc achieves consensual legitimacy of the subaltern. For other actors, the 
civil society’s consensual support makes the hegemonic rationale seem as a general interest. The core 
alliance however, systematically benefits the most from the hegemony, whereas the subgroups of the 
historical bloc have very limited chance to achieve their objectives. Table 3 summarizes the results 
of the analysis based on the neo-Gramscian approach. 
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Table 3. Summary of the results of the analysis based on the neo-Gramscian approach. 
 CORE ALLIANCE CONTESTING SUBGROUPS 
ACTORS – Russian federal government 
– TOTAL S.A. 
– Novatek 
– CNPC 
– Silk Road Fund 
– Industrial organizations 
– Russian environmental NGOs (A4 & A5) 
– International environmental NGOs 
– Local indigenous peoples 
– International development NGOs 
INTERESTS – Ensure Russia’s export dependent energy security by 
developing LNG production 
– Develop LNG business and competitiveness 
– Export energy to East Asian markets 
– Phase off fossil fuel production and consumption 
– Adopt renewable energy transition 
– Mitigate climate change 
– Protect local environment and traditional indigenous 
culture 
STRATEGIES – Coercive control over opposition of the civil society 
– Accommodation of claims, turning them to benefit the 
core alliance’s interests, by 1) arguing that natural gas 
should be a part of a low-carbon energy system and, 2) 
expanding the meaning of energy transition to include 
other environmental and social aspects 
– War of position: build alternative cores of power with 
allies where contestation is fruitful 
– Passive revolution: align own interests with the core 
alliance’s interest and try to assure that systemic change is 
inevitable 
DISCURSIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
– Issue framing using the Environmentalist frame, 
arguing that natural gas is “low carbon”, technically 
required for energy system operability, and a solution to 
fast reduction of GHG emissions 
– Adopting environmentalist rhetoric and using it 
misleadingly 
– Issue framing using the Neoliberal economist frame, 
seeking to equate climate change with social 
developmental issues such as energy poverty 
– Issue framing using the Neoliberal economist frame 
to appeal to neoliberal actors, arguing that energy 
transition is economically beneficial and a solution to 
global development issues 
– Issue framing using the Neorealist importer frame to 
appeal to energy importers, arguing that energy transition 
benefits energy security 
– Issue framing using the Neorealist producer frame to 
appeal to the Russian government, arguing that physical 
constraints to resource production are a reason for reform 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
– An alliance consisting of multinational actors with 
specialized roles creates transnational consistency, 
helping to project meaning as “universal” 
– Lobbies promoting the core alliance’s interests 
– Assuring legal rights for action by following rules 
– Transnational cooperation of NGOs and IGOs 
– Alliances with other civil society actors 
– Collaboration with green niche industry and the Green 
political movement 
– Publishing legally nonbinding rules and guidelines 
MATERIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
– Promise to improve the technological condition by 
reducing fugitive methane emissions 
– Existing natural gas infrastructure creates path 
dependencies 
 
CONSENT TO 
HEGEMONY 
 – Russian environmental NGOs accept the societal model 
in which energy security guarantees societal welfare 
– Russian environmental NGOs perceive the 
government’s policy of the Arctic as a region becoming a 
frontier for hydrocarbon development as an inevitable 
reality 
– Environmental NGOs allow natural gas production and 
consumption to a certain degree, incorporate it to their 
transition strategies, and believe that technologies 
improve 
– NGOs legitimate the core alliance’s rhetoric of natural 
gas as “low-carbon”, “clean”, “green”, and “the last fossil 
fuel” etc. 
– Phasing off natural gas remains a question to long term 
future 
 
 
5.2.1. The government and energy companies form the core alliance in mutual dependence 
 
The government and the JSC Yamal LNG consortium energy companies, including their subsidiaries, 
form the core alliance of the historical bloc that is found in the case field. In accordance with Geels 
(2014: 26), the core alliance is integrated due to mutual dependencies between its actors. On one 
hand, the government depends on energy companies that secure funds for the state, and on the other, 
the companies depend on the state’s authority and political relations. 
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However, also personal relationships and discursive arrangements that are subjected to international 
political arenas, fortify the core alliance. Basing on previous empirical findings, Geels (2014: 26) 
suggests that policymakers and incumbent corporate actors often form close alliances. This is 
particularly true in the Yamal LNG case, as a major shareholder of Novatek, Gennady Timchenko, is 
considered personally close to President Putin (Overland et al., 2012: 145). According to an interview 
expert (A3), he had entered negotiations with the Novatek CEO Leonid Mikhelson and the Russian 
President to establish the Yamal LNG project. Multiple experts (A1, A2, & A3) confirm this 
organizational alignment, where energy company executives are in close vicinity to the government. 
 
Beside working together jointly in the Yamal LNG project, the actors of the core alliance give public 
discursive support to each other. For example, in 2017, during an international Arctic forum in 
Arkhangelsk, President Putin (2017c) discussed the Yamal LNG project as an example of the way 
how “all countries have the right to work” in the Arctic region. This relatively liberal discourse 
supports commercial activity and gives credits to foreign companies participating the project. CNPC 
(2017b) has utilized similar discourse, using the implementation of the Yamal LNG project as an 
example of successful international cooperation, framing China’s foreign policy as neoliberal and 
interested in mutual economic benefit. Such neoliberal rhetoric fortifies the power of firms (see Geels, 
2014: 27). In response, Novatek’s CEO Mark Gyetvay (2018b) has joined the discourse claiming that 
energy security issues have been politicized against Russia (see section 5.1.1. for reference) and 
CNPC (2017a: 13) uses a rhetoric that is positive toward the Russian government for its policies of 
developing the NSR. 
 
Nevertheless, meeting interests is the primary bind between the government and the energy 
companies. Section 3., Yamal LNG, describes the interests, competencies and deficiencies of the core 
alliance actors. However, to summarize shortly, the government’s interests in Yamal LNG are related 
to ensuring Russia’s energy security. Additionally, the project serves the Energy Strategy of Russia 
for the period up to 2030’s (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 27) target of 
augmenting state-private partnerships in the energy sector, “particularly in construction and 
modernization of energy infrastructure and development of innovations”. Two data sources (A3 & 
A11) suggest that the government wanted to partner with a private consortium after Gazprom failed 
to implement an equivalent project in the Yamal Peninsula. Moreover, corporate actors of the core 
alliance are interested in financial profits and increasing their competitive advantage in global energy 
markets. However, CNPC makes a small exception to this, since additionally it reflects the state 
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interests of China, which are essentially related to SOS and geopolitical competence (see sections 
3.1.1. and 3.1.2. for reference). 
 
When the core alliance counters opposition against the hegemony, its actors take quite distinct 
strategic roles. Naturally, the state possesses the highest coercive power (Levy, 2008: 951). 
According to an article included in this study’s data (Bros & Mitrova, 2016: 17), the state’s control 
over Russia’s energy sector has increased. Additionally, via President Putin, the government widely 
expresses its stances in international forums where energy issues are discussed. Two experts (A3 & 
A5) claim that it seeks to generally delegitimize renewable energy. As shown in section 5.2.3., the 
government also engages in discursive action by framing natural gas as “clean” and “green” fuel for 
international audiences and by trying to shift focus away from climate change to energy poverty and 
protection of the ecological environment. The data in this study suggests that the regional government 
of YNAO follows and executes the federal government policies: “The mission of our region is to 
effectively produce hydrocarbons”, said the governor of YNAO Dmitry Artyukhov (2018) in a press 
conference. 
 
In turn, TOTAL S.A. holds a top position in the leading class in Gramscian terms, highly contributing 
to the strategic action against energy transition that is described in section 5.2.3. TOTAL S.A. also 
pays great effort in deploying organizational strategies that function as “evidence” of the 
corporation’s contribution to climate change mitigation and promote the issue in favor to the 
company.20 With an embed and running energy transition theme, TOTAL S.A.’s climate strategy 
(TOTAL, 2018) indicates that the company is able to handle well public relations regarding the theme. 
Other actors show lesser strategic capabilities in handling public relations in this area, which suggests 
that TOTAL S.A. leads the process of discursive accommodation regarding the energy transition 
theme in the Yamal LNG case. This result is in line with the understanding of the company as a source 
of gas-industry expertise for other members of the JSC Yamal LNG consortium (see section 3.2. for 
reference). As an international corporation, TOTAL S.A. is also the best-equipped of all actors to 
counter the opposition’s strategy of war of position, which seeks to build transnational alliances 
(described in section 5.2.2.). It places Yamal LNG in a central part of its strategic response to energy 
                                               
20 For example, it has established a number of partnership projects appealing to and partnering with civil society actors 
(e.g. the “Clean Gas Project” (see TOTAL S.A., 2019: 106) and “Total Access to Energy program” (see TOTAL, 2018: 
43)). In addition, TOTAL S.A. funds research and development of carbon capture and storage (see TOTAL, 2018: 38) 
– a technology that has been considered as a technological promise of the hydrocarbon regime, which in so far has been 
unable to materialize (Geels, 2014: 24, 34). As a part of a group of IOCs trying to lobby for a carbon-pricing scheme 
(TOTAL, 2018: 14–15), TOTAL S.A. may try to demonstrate that it is prepared to face policy instruments that will 
negatively affect its businesses. 
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transition, which importantly includes growth in LNG business (see TOTAL, 2018: 27; TOTAL S.A., 
2019: 8, 105). 
 
Industrial organizations, such as the Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel and the Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum, and gas supplier companies, take active role in mediating the leading class’ agenda 
downstream, as they deal with consumers and customers. Since gas suppliers posit themselves in 
different operational environments than producers, they also mediate between the different 
understandings and policies of energy security (i.e. the Neorealist producer and Neorealist importer 
frames, described in sections 5.1.1. and 5.1.2.). Adopting the Neorealist economist frame (see section 
5.1.3.) largely allows them to do this. 
 
It seems that Novatek, CNPC, and the Silk Road Fund have more passive strategic roles. The former 
seeks to depoliticize itself from all other than business related issues by seeking a status of a “private 
company”, like the CEO Mark Gyetvay (2018a) words. On the other hand, regarding the economic 
sanctions Novatek received, its energy security related statements (see Gyetvay, 2018b) coalesce with 
the interests of the government of Russia. However, it remains uncertain whether this is about 
subjugation to state strategy or purely vested interest. The latter two participate minorly in discursive 
action that seeks to frame natural gas as a climate friendly source of energy (see section 5.2.3. for 
reference). 
 
 
5.2.2. Hegemony contestation in the Russian and transnational civil society 
 
The research interviews I conducted for this study revealed very limited direct opposition against the 
Yamal LNG project. One stakeholder interviewee (A8) felt that the lack of opposition has been 
“strange”, since usually this kind of projects face resistance. From a neo-Gramscian perspective this 
may imply that hegemony is well established, since the subaltern’s demands have been successfully 
curtailed. 
 
However, resistance occurs indirectly and can be geographically spread across the research field. 
Analysis based on the neo-Gramscian approach identified two strategies that the groups of the 
subaltern use: War of position and passive revolution, defined in section 2.2.2., Neo-Gramscian 
approach to energy politics and power. First, I shall focus on the former, which seeks to build 
alternative cores of power, rather than engaging in direct resistance against the hegemony. They allow 
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opposing groups to organize and gain influence (Levy & Newell, 2002: 88). According to Henry 
(2010: 770), such strategies have brought some gains, as the government has opportunistically made 
concessions to transnational pressure in the oil and gas sector of Russia. 
 
The organizational structure of NGOs that have engaged in critique toward the Yamal LNG project 
best manifests that the strategy of war of position is utilized by the subgroups. Some of the NGOs 
that operate in Russia are franchises or regional offices of larger international organizations, as 
discussed in section 3.3.2., Internationally linked NGOs. This study’s data includes Greenpeace and 
WWF, which are international organizations with semi-autonomous regional offices in Russia. 
Bellona, headquartered in Norway, is also included. Its foreign operations are often related to the 
country’s industries. Nevertheless, it has multiple foreign offices in Russia (Bellona, n.d.). 
 
In general, the NGO sector in the Yamal LNG case shares informal relations based on mutual 
interests. Since most environmental organizations are relatively generalist in their environmental 
protection-related objectives, it is not uncommon for them to collaborate. Such alliance forging 
approach is, for example, suggested by a stakeholder interviewee (A5), who calls representatives and 
activists of other NGOs “colleagues” and “allies”. On some occasions, NGOs also collaborate with 
other types of organizations that share common interests. This is indicated, for example, by the 
coauthored report of Greenpeace International, Global Wind Energy Council and SolarPowerEurope 
(2015), of which the latter two represent renewable energy industries – niches that challenge current 
fossil energy-based socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2014: 23–26). 
 
Some NGOs with environmentalist agendas, like Greenpeace and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
actively side with indigenous peoples to support their interests (particularly Nenets). Also the CAFF 
(2006) report World Reindeer Husbandry in the data indicates that indigenous peoples’ organizations 
engage in international cooperation. This mostly concerns their foreign counterparts, but also 
environmental programs funded by governments. Since discourses in the CAFF (2006) report 
highlight sustainability and protection of relatively low-disturbed arctic environment, this suggest 
that such institutions generally share mutual interests with environmental NGOs. 
 
The power of informally and formally connected NGOs constitutes via their coordinated operations 
and cognitive framing. While only one directly Yamal LNG related and transnationally coordinated 
environmental campaign can be recognized in this study’s data, it can be argued that the agendas 
promoted by international organizations are cognitively associated to their franchises and partners. 
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For example, when Greenpeace International turns against fossil fuels and promotes energy transition 
in its strategic report (see Greenpeace International et al., 2015), Greenpeace Russia’s activism on 
Arctic energy infrastructure development and resource extraction becomes viewed through this lens, 
even though it might officially have other objectives. This way transnational ties allow 
environmentalists to strategically challenge unfavorable political conditions for activism in Russia 
(Henry, 2010: 762). In a report included in this study’s data, Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Friends of 
the Earth International (2015: 38–39) stress that since “the government shuts down critical voices”, 
“civil society groups that might push for more sustainable sources of power are few and far between” 
in Russia. 
 
Strategic framing by the groups of the subaltern reflects the war of position as well. By choosing to 
frame themes and issues in certain ways, they can appeal on other groups interested in those frames 
(Fligstein, 1997: 399). When interests concur, new alliances can be established. 
 
The analysis shows that the strategically most utilized frame by environmental organizations is the 
Neoliberal Economist (see section 5.1.3.). The primary argument they use that builds up on the frame 
is that energy transition is economically beneficial, whereas failing to implement the transition leads 
to economic damage. Renewable energy is considered as lower cost than fossil energy, and its 
development would generate economic growth and employment. Conservative states and companies 
sticking with fossil energy-based production are framed to be left with stranded assets, when energy 
transition advances further. The arguments used by the NGOs that promote energy transition are also 
prone to extensive technical and economic optimization regarding the practicalities of transition, even 
though the Environmentalist frame suggests that climate change mitigation is a question of political 
will (see section 5.1.4. for reference). 
 
Another argument that environmental organizations often present focuses on global development, 
which is a topic of neoliberal international politics, as it often limits to only economic perspectives. 
This is indicated in the Neoliberal Economist frame, which prioritizes global development through 
energy cooperation before national interests (see section 5.1.3.). Environmental NGOs claim that 
renewable energy is an efficient solution to global developmental challenges, such as energy poverty 
and unemployment. While the argument may appeal to neoliberal actors, it also draws sympathy from  
groups that focus on sustainable development, who may be more prone toward issues regarding social 
development than the environment. 
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Some environmentalist groups also utilize the Neorealist importer frame (see section 5.1.2.). Energy 
transition and renewable energy production is in many ways framed as beneficial for countries 
concerned with energy security issues regarding energy import. The main argument for this is that 
domestic production of renewable energy could reduce the need for imports, thus decreasing 
dependence on foreign providers. Followingly, and supported with other endorsing arguments, 
environmentalist groups also use this argument to promote solutions to the problem of states having 
contrary policies regarding energy security and climate change mitigation (see Bridge, 2010: 623). 
Again, with this frame as well, the opposition accompanies inducements with deterrents:  Greenpeace 
International, Global Wind Energy Council and SolarPowerEurope (2015: 214) argue that 
geologically constrained and finite hydrocarbon resources per se conflict with increasing energy 
demand. Inevitably approaching peaks of production and resource depletion are contributing reasons 
to begin energy transition. They (2015: 217) also claim that Russia’s gas reserves have been 
overestimated “by about 30 %”. A stakeholder interviewee (A5), representing an environmental NGO 
based in Russia, states that the country will face peak oil in 3–5 years. 
 
Similarly, the strategy of passive revolution, which seeks incremental change through slow reforming 
of the hegemony (Haas, 2019: 68; Levy & Newell, 2002: 88), bases on the same arguments regarding 
geological constraints to resource exploitation in Russia. The claims that relate to the theme of 
resource scarcity bring hope for the environmentalist groups, but they resonate even more with the 
interests of the Neorealist producer frame – like one state source in the data confirms (see section 
5.1.1. for reference).  
 
 
5.2.3. Strategic resistance to opposition 
 
The historical bloc counters opposition primarily by adopting arguments from the Environmentalist 
frame and introducing them in favor of the core alliance. To lesser extent, it also adopts arguments 
from the Neoliberal economist and Neorealist importer frames (see section 5.1. for references). Thus, 
the subaltern’s discursive opposition becomes majorly accommodated in the hegemonic rationale and 
hegemony resists destabilization. 
 
The accommodation strategy structures followingly: The “first reaction” of the core alliance to the 
general fact that its power and production is opposed, is to pay sympathy for the subaltern. Basically, 
this messages that the core alliance “is on the same side with” the opposing groups and their concerns 
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are recognized. The core alliance accepts that a need for energy transition is experienced and that 
evidence of increasing capacity of renewable energy production (IEA, 2018: 245) and climate policy 
(i.e. the Paris Agreement, see United Nations, 2015a) supports the idea of a beginning transition. 
 
At first hand, this sympathy is expressed in discourses given by international gas industry actors. The 
grandiose words of TOTAL S.A. (TOTAL, 2018: 5) in its climate strategy frame the 21st century as 
“The Electric Century”, whereas “coal and oil drove the transformations of the 19th and 20th 
centuries”. The (erstwhile) Secretary General of GECF, Seyed Mohammed Hossein Adeli (2017), 
joined this discourse in the Russian Energy Week forum, 2017, saying that “the advance to a low 
carbon society is a global movement which is going to advance its own way”21. In addition, other 
actors follow: In the same forum session, President Putin (2017b) replied “of course, we need to move 
towards transition to renewable energy so that it becomes the number one energy source”, when 
questioned if Russia should follow Saudi-Arabia’s example of planning the future after fossil fuels. 
An interview expert (A11) claims basing on personal communication that also Novatek recognizes 
that there is a demand for emission reductions in the energy sector. CNPC, as well, accepts that energy 
transition concerns China too (see Xu, 2016). 
 
However, nearly all of the above statements are followed with a “but”. The core alliance actors imply 
that currently there are material and institutional factors that either work as barriers for transition or 
justify postponing action. These they frame as exogenous (and most of these are presented in the 
previous sections 5.1.1., Neorealist producer, 5.1.2., Neorealist importer, and 5.1.3., Neoliberal 
economist). Therefore ultimately, the sympathetic rhetoric turns into superficial expressions of 
understanding, accompanied with countering claims. 
 
Beyond the general reaction to opposition, the core alliance builds two major discursive strategies, 
which align with the material and organizational dimensions. The first of these seeks to narrate that 
the relationship of energy transition and the historical bloc’s production is complementary and 
positive. It suggests that natural gas production and climate change mitigation do not conflict 
– contrary to what is considered in the Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4.). The second 
strategy, in turn, attempts to expand the meaning given to energy transition. By associating interests, 
which are mutually shared with the opposing groups but remain irrelevant – to energy transition, it 
                                               
21 Russia is a member of GECF – an IGO promoting coordination, collaboration and member states’ sovereignty of 
developing, preserving and using natural gas resources (GECF, 2016). 
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looses its original meaning and finding solutions becomes more complicated. With these strategies 
energy transition advocacy is made to serve the interests of the core alliance. 
 
In the first discursive strategy, the historical bloc argues that natural gas production fits well together 
with increasing share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. Since the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency improvements are considered to stimulate 
further electrification (see IEA, 2018: 435–436) – as noted in TOTAL S.A.’s climate strategy 
(TOTAL, 2018: 5), this is argued to favor natural gas in electricity generation. In turn, the previous 
is considered to provide prospects for business (see Adeli, 2017; TOTAL, 2018: 7; TOTAL S.A., 
2019: 8–13). Electricity generation with renewable energy, which is affected by seasonal fluctuations 
and weather conditions, is also claimed to require backup reserve capacity, for which natural gas is 
presented as the best option (see Adeli, 2017; TOTAL, 2018: 33). 
 
The above given arguments are in turn based on the extensively presented claim that natural gas is a 
“low-carbon” fuel that in use displaces other fossil fuels with higher GHG emission intensities. This 
“low-carbon” fuel argument appears in the data from CNPC (see Xu, 2016), TOTAL S.A. (see 
TOTAL, 2018: 27), a Finnish state-owned gas company (interview with A6), a Russian energy sector 
consulting firm (interview with A2), President Putin (2017b), and Novatek (see 2019: 6). 
 
Additionally, the “low-carbon” argument is supported with a standard material resistance strategy 
that draws on quality improvement of the socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2014: 33). According to an 
interviewee (A6), both Russian and European natural gas producers increasingly audit fugitive 
methane emissions and seek to prevent them in production and liquefaction. TOTAL S.A. (TOTAL, 
2018: 28) claims to be “one of the … top performers” of oil and gas industry in this issue. Also 
President Putin (2017c) relies on improving technology when he speaks of environmental protection 
and emissions. He refers to the Yamal LNG project as an example of “eco-friendly” technology, 
which should provide a general solution to environmental issues. Yamal LNG’s ESIA (Yamal LNG, 
2014b: 9-20) estimates that the project’s CH4 emissions are 1,857 t/y during the operational phase. 
 
Whereas some actors solely rely on stating the “low-carbon” gas argument, some build further policy 
strategy over it, suggesting that natural gas should be used as a “bridge fuel”. In this strategy, rapid 
energy system “decarbonization” could be achieved in short term by substituting other fossil fuels 
with natural gas. In longer term, natural gas could be phased off, as alternative and less GHG emission 
intense energy sources emerge. Symbolically, natural gas could then function as a “bridge” between 
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today and a utopian future, where sustainable technologies are available without the cost of engaging 
in their active development now. 
 
An interview with a state-owned gas company official (A6) revealed that the bridge fuel argument 
can leave many questions unanswered. When I asked the interviewee’s vision on how the following 
natural gas phase out would actualize in the long term, the interviewee expressed uncertainty. My 
question about “the other end of the bridge” became responded with lengthy pondering, murmur, 
uncomfortable chuckle and a reply: “Well, that’s not quite clear” (A6). However, some others deliver 
answers endorsed with material alignments. They suggest that biogas or synthetic gas produced with 
renewable energy could be used to substitute natural gas in the long term, since some of the required 
gas infrastructure is already in place. With additional adoption of discourse from the Neoliberal 
Economist frame (see section 5.1.3.), the “bridge fuel” argument is also made to appeal on economic 
elites, who particularly are interested in costs of different transition pathways. Opting for natural gas 
can be made to seem economical if there should not be any need to waste existing infrastructure. 
Therefore, the bridge fuel argument already offers legitimacy for maintenance of the current gas 
infrastructure and building new. 
 
Moreover, it is worth to notice that, in this study’s data, the “bridge fuel” argument is only used by 
actors who are considerably in contact with Western actors. As a contra-example, Novatek (2019: 6) 
literally “disagree[s]” with the bridge fuel “characterization”, stating that “natural gas … will play 
a major role in the future energy mix as a key contributor to meet climate change and de-
carbonization goals.” This statement is more in line with the Neorealist producer frame (see section 
5.1.1. for reference) and could be argued to represent a more conservative view. In general, the 
research interview data suggests that if a Russian energy company does not focus particularly on 
European audiences, it has lesser capabilities to accommodate climate change related rhetoric in their 
communication. As an example of this, an interviewee (A6) told me that local Russian representatives 
of Gazprom in St. Petersburg had not even heard of the revolutionary “green” technologies that the 
same company had just presented to him in a Central European conference. 
 
Occasionally, the strategic adoption of ideas from the Environmentalist frame is taken to very fine 
detail. For example, TOTAL S.A. declares that it prepares to cope with increasingly decentralizing 
electricity generation (see TOTAL S.A., 2019: 13), which happens to be an essential demand of the 
energy democracy movement (Burke & Stephens, 2018: 79), whose claims are included in the 
Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4.). 
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However, the second major discursive strategy takes a very different argumentative direction. Instead 
of debating on the details, it tries to shift away focus from the original topic of debate by expanding 
the meaning given to energy transition. There are at least three directions where discussion is steered 
– in order to take it to new paths. 
 
First, when natural gas and LNG are discussed in relation to climate change, rhetorical phrases that 
include the words “clean” and “green” are used. Characteristic to this rhetoric is that the concepts are 
not given definitions, which allows open and broad interpretation of their meaning. However, both 
previous literature and the frame analysis suggest that the “clean” rhetoric derives from discussion 
regarding air pollution. Historically, it has been used by the gas industry to delegitimize “dirty” coal 
consumption (Ashby & Anderson, 1981: 97–98). Gas industry actors, such as the Society for Gas as 
a Marine Fuel, still use this rhetoric in similar contexts (Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel, 2017: 5). 
Occasionally, the word “green” is used as a synonym for it. 
 
Thus, the actual meaning of these words and their context of use do not match. These environmental 
problems have definitive and mostly separate primary drivers (IPCC, 2014a: 44, 57). Nevertheless, 
the strategic mismatch can stay unnoticed for a person without expertise on the issues of climate 
change and air pollution, which can lead to distorted understanding. This is the window of opportunity 
for this strategy. 
 
A clear example of this strategy is given in the CNPC Vice President Xu Wenrong's (2016) speech. 
He argues that natural gas is a “realistic choice to a green and low carbon future”, which he backs 
with a number of transport and electricity generation related points. The topic appears to be 
considering climate change, but knowing that air pollution is a significant problem regarding fossil 
fuel consumption in China (Han, Zhou, Pickett, Li, & Qian, 2018: 233) reveals that Xu (2016) mixes 
together the two issues. According to a China specialized expert (A10), in the West, China’s energy 
policies are often misinterpreted to be motivated with climate change mitigation, even though they 
primarily seek to target air pollution.22 In addition to the Chinese actors, this discursive strategy is 
used by the Russian government (see Putin, 2017b), TOTAL S.A (see TOTAL, 2018: 43), Novatek 
                                               
22 A relevant and following question is then that do Chinese actors – like CNPC or the Silk Road Fund, who calls Yamal 
LNG as a “clean energy development project” (see Qi, 2017) – take advantage of this gap in Westerners’ knowledge on 
purpose. 
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(with unpromising success, however) (see Novatek, 2019: 6), and a Finnish state-owned natural gas 
company (A6). 
 
The second direction where energy transition discussion is steered, is the environment in general. 
Responsibility over environmental issues can be used to legitimate natural gas production. Again, the 
issue arena becomes expanded from only climate change to include other environmental problems. 
This strategy works in two ways: First, for those who understand the concept of environment so that 
it includes climate (as suggested in the Environmentalist frame in section 5.1.4.), advocacy for 
environmental protection can easily seem like advocacy for climate change mitigation among other 
environmental issues. Second, since the primary advocacy (or interest) groups for climate change 
mitigation often share general concerns over the environment, actors who express mutual interest on 
other environmental problems can appeal to these groups and have bargaining power. This may be 
useful at least in the context of Russian environmental NGOs, as their chances to influence the energy 
sector are fairly limited (Henry, 2010: 768). 
 
Discursive arrangements in this strategy that are utilized by all core alliance actors include the 
aforementioned “green” rhetoric, as the word associates to environmental friendliness and 
sustainability. Occasionally, actors adapt the Neoliberal economist frame’s rationality in giving 
legitimacy for commonly binding rules but being otherwise relativist toward ethical issues (see 
section 5.1.3. for reference). Such institutional arrangements as the Yamal LNG’s ESIA (Yamal 
LNG, 2014b) and Russia’s obligation to the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015a) are used this 
way. They function as evidence of the core alliance’s commitment to climate change mitigation, even 
though neither one of the two concern the act of exporting hydrocarbons abroad, where consumers 
might not be committed. According to an opposing voice (A5), exporting hydrocarbons essentially 
raises the responsibility burden over climate change for producers. 
 
The third direction steps away from the environmental issue arena but retains mutual interests with 
most of the opposing groups. The issues of social development and sustainable development are 
brought into debate, which draws sympathy from many actors of the subaltern. Actors of the core 
alliance try to display respect over social concerns in their policies and operations – declarations of 
caring over indigenous peoples’ interests and rights in Arctic issues (see Putin, 2017c) and adhering 
to sustainable development principles and goals are common (see Novatek, 2019: 9). 
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What particularly stands out in the theme is how much value is given to energy poverty. Highlighting 
the issue, whose problem status is institutionally and materially cast in the Sustainable Development 
goals (United Nations, 2015b: 23) and increasing energy demand in developing countries (IEA, 2018: 
40), can work as an antithesis for the discourse advocating reduction to energy consumption, found 
in the Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4. for reference). Whereas some subgroups of the 
historical bloc render decentralized renewable energy as a cure to the issue (see Greenpeace 
International et al., 2015: 3), the solution that the core alliance actors offer is natural gas. 
 
Couple of times in the data energy poverty is interestingly turned into an explanation for energy 
transition. Some actors highlight the role of increasing energy demand in emerging economies as a 
source of energy landscape change and associate it with rhetoric found in the Environmentalist frame 
(see section 5.1.4. for reference). Thus, energy access appears as one driving reason for energy 
transition. For example, when TOTAL S.A. discusses energy “transformations” in the foreword 
chapter of its climate strategy (TOTAL, 2018: 5), it pays significant remarks to energy access, which 
it claims to be “shaping the world’s future”. 
 
Ultimately, with these strategies, the historical bloc accommodates the claims of the subaltern in the 
hegemony and turns them to benefit the interests of the core alliance. The core alliance adopts the 
overall concern over climate change and the idea of transforming the energy system from the 
Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4. for reference) but gives them only secondary value after 
other interests – which are related to national energy security, economic profit, geopolitics, and 
stability of the incumbents (described in sections 3.1. and 3.2.). 
 
 
5.2.4. Consent to the hegemony legitimates the meaning of production 
 
Despite having conflicting interests, civil society groups reproduce the core alliance’s agenda. This 
signals that hegemony is established and that these groups form the consenting subaltern. To a certain 
degree, they incorporate the historical bloc’s strategic claims deployed to ensure the core alliance’s 
stability (presented in the previous section 5.2.3.). Regional differences in energy security concepts 
mostly appear to determine which claims the subgroups adopt. Whereas Russian civil society actors 
echo the Russian government’s claims the most, international actors, who are mainly West-oriented, 
adopt claims that suit importer-focused understandings of energy security. 
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The most incorporated subgroup actors in the hegemony are Russian NGOs, as they share the highest 
amount of the core alliance’s claims. Two research interviews (A4 & A5) suggest that Russian 
environmental NGOs are quite willing to accept that fossil energy production is the basis on which 
societal welfare is built in Russia – as argued in the Neorealist producer frame (see section 5.1.1. for 
reference). When asked about the energy sector’s contribution to societal welfare, it was considered 
“very important in all ways” (A4) and “unfortunately … [a] key factor in Russian social policy” as 
the revenue from energy exports provides a large share of the state budget (Simola & Solanko, 2017: 
31). The interviews do not particularly suggest that this societal model should be changed – 
opposingly to the Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4. for reference). 
 
Russian environmental NGOs are also the most positive toward natural gas. The interviewed two (A4 
& A5) openly support the bridge fuel strategy that the core alliance advocates (see section 5.2.3. for 
reference). One (A4) frames this as a general “Russian” stance on the issue. The same NGO also 
trusts on the Yamal LNG project’s ESIA’s  review of the projects climate impacts, which are claimed 
to be relatively low (Yamal LNG, 2014b: 9-5–20). 
 
WWF Russia’s report Prospects and opportunities for using LNG for bunkering in the Arctic regions 
of Russia (Klimentyev et al., 2017) indicates that the NGO is supportive toward LNG production. It 
suggests using LNG for marine bunkering in Arctic Russia, as its production is localized. While 
studying the environmental impacts of shipping, the study chooses to leave many renewable fuels 
that it calls “sustainable” out of its scope of research (Klimentyev et al., 2017: 11). While this 
message is welcomed by the core alliance actors, it also reflects the opinion of an interviewed private 
ship engineering company’s CEO (A8), who foresees no future alternatives to LNG in reducing GHG 
emissions of marine shipping. Interestingly, a body of research indicates that sufficient GHG 
emission reductions in the international shipping sector cannot be achieved by transitioning to LNG 
propulsion (Brynolf, Fridell, & Andersson, 2014: 93; Pettit, Wells, Haider, & Abouarghoub, 2018: 
303). By projecting a “9-fold decrease in methane emissions per used [LNG] fuel unit by 2030” 
(Klimentyev et al., 2017: 58), WWF Russia also legitimates the material strategy of technological 
improvement (see section 5.2.3. for reference). 
 
Ultimately, the Russian environmental NGOs’ understanding of the future of the Arctic region likely 
best indicates how the subaltern relies on the hegemonic projection of reality. The NGOs are not able 
to question the government-endorsed primacy of oil and gas development in the country’s Arctic 
policy discourse (Sidortsov, 2019: 135). For example, this is seen in how WWF Russia endorses 
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many government claims regarding the benefits of developing the hydrocarbon resources and the 
NSR in the Arctic region (see Klimentyev et al., 2017). From an environmental perspective, the 
reported benefits are much based on arguments that the government and its private sector allies, such 
as the Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel (see Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel, 2017), promote. 
 
When supply security is at stake, environmental NGOs based outside Russia choose to consent to the 
hydrocarbon-dominated socio-technical order, enforced by the core alliance. For example, multiple 
environmental NGOs consider that natural gas could be used to ensure back-up power capacity when 
transitioning to a renewable energy-based energy system (see Greenpeace International et al., 2015: 
60; Nestle & Brugger, 2014: 21). In addition, they reassert that, in long-term, natural gas 
infrastructure could be used with gas produced from renewable sources (see Greenpeace International 
et al., 2015: 268; Nestle & Brugger, 2014: 21). This legitimates the core alliance’s claim that the 
relationship of renewable energy and natural gas is complementary (see section 5.2.3.). 
 
Since in the level of political declaration international environmental NGOs advocate a total fossil 
fuel phase out, the above practical perspective leaves far behind. Regarding how much scientific 
uncertainty there actually is about the climate impact of natural gas (IPCC, 2014: 527), the NGOs 
seem to have quite optimist attitudes on the issue, which is certainly not against the core alliance’s 
strategy of framing gas “low carbon”. In addition, the NGOs have widely adapted the “clean” rhetoric 
when discussing natural gas and other energy sources (see section 5.2.3. for reference). A detailed 
look into the energy transition strategies of the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Greenpeace 
International unveils that they support natural gas consumption in short term – natural gas should 
have a longer future than other fossil fuels, which should be phased out first. This stance reflects the 
Neoliberal economist frame’s tendency for technical and economic optimization regarding energy 
transition (see section 5.1.3. for reference) and opens a window of opportunity for the bridge fuel 
strategy of the core alliance. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
This section discusses the general relevance of the results (in sections 6.1. and 6.2.), limitations of 
the research design (in section 6.3.), and methodological weaknesses (in section 6.4.). Analyzing the 
cognitive frames that guide stakeholders’ understandings of the Yamal LNG project in relation to 
Russia’s energy security and energy transition brought energy security theories under empirical 
examination. The frame analysis mapped out a base for a further neo-Gramscian theoretical analysis 
of strategic action, which identified a structure of political power that efficiently obstructs attempts 
to replace and reform the dominant understanding of Russia’s national energy that benefits certain 
societal groups over others. The identified frames indicate that there are differing and even contrary 
ways to reason about the Yamal LNG project’s relationship to energy security and energy transition. 
Tracing these in stakeholder statements and comparing them to claims that they have made discovered 
that calls for energy transition, which embed demands for changing the social order, can be 
domesticated into compliance with the status quo. 
 
 
6.1. Frames reflect interest groups and previous findings 
 
Even though that the frame analysis in this study was conducted on an empirical basis, mainly looking 
at different problematizations regarding the Yamal LNG project’s relation to energy security and 
energy transition, the found frames mostly correspond with theoretical findings in energy security 
literature, IR, and environmental movements research. 
 
On one hand, the frames follow a division between energy exporter, energy importer, economic, and 
risk perspectives, which also stand out in energy security literature (Johansson, 2013: 201–203; 
Sovacool, 2011: 2). For example, echoing an energy security literature discussion (Jewell et al., 2014: 
756; Sharples, 2013: 686), the Neorealist importer and Neorealist exporter frames’ opposite stances 
toward energy transition are primarily determined by the potential impacts of renewable energy to 
national energy production. Despite that the Neorealist producer frame sees little risk in energy 
transition to Russia’s natural gas exports, it suggests that if demand for Russia’s natural gas decreases 
in Europe due to political reasons, the Arctic region, providing diversity of export, allows to 
compensate for it by finding new markets in Asia. Climate change would more likely benefit than 
trouble Russia in this strategy. This provides as well an incentive for the Russian government to 
support the incumbents of its energy sector (see Putin, 2017b). 
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The Environmentalist and Neoliberal economist frames, in turn, have deeply contrasted 
understandings of the relationship of energy and the economy. Briefly said, the first considers energy 
security as a political objective bound in centralized fossil energy systems and based on interests to 
protect the economy. While the frame implies that such interests in the Yamal LNG case can be partly 
traced to the personal relationship of President Putin and the case stakeholders (see section 5.2.1.), 
governments are also highly motivated to secure state competence in global markets and economic 
growth (Burnham, 1990: 1). These, again, are coupled with high energy consumption (see Phelan et 
al., 2013: 213). Instead of being wary for such energy availability related constraints that could halt 
a capitalist quest for infinite growth, the Environmentalist frame perceives climate and environmental 
change to be higher risks that have emerged as global problems (see Proskuryakova, 2018: 205–211). 
For the Neoliberal economist frame, politicization of energy remains mostly unnecessary, since it 
considers that an efficient market takes care of problems, as it evaluates them and connects demands 
to provided solutions. Thus, political intervention to energy markets only disturbs the pricing 
mechanism, which causes such energy security issues as overpricing (see Proskuryakova, 2018: 206). 
Dependence on individual sectors of the economy is another problem that is implied in the Energy 
strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030’s (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010: 
22) objective to decrease economic dependency on the Fuel and Energy Complex by diversifying the 
economic structure. 
 
On the other hand, the frames found in this study reflect theoretical schools of IR and political science. 
They include understandings of politics that are found in neorealism, neoliberalism, and IPE (see 
Proskuryakova, 2018: 205–206). The Environmentalist frame also shares ideological similarities with 
environmental and social movements – such as the Green political, social justice, and energy 
democracy movements (see Burke & Stephens, 2018: 78–79; Levy & Spicer, 2013: 664; Van de 
Graaf & Zelli, 2016: 50). In the examples given above, the Neoliberal economist frame’s 
understanding of energy security that puts economic cooperation before political sovereignty is rather 
different to neorealist political thought (see Proskuryakova, 2018: 205). Also, since the frame 
appreciates optimization23 and trusts in technological substitution that should take place in future, it 
is against any rapid increases of political ambition in climate policy that could sanction businesses. 
Thus, the frame can seem compromising to actors who embed with the Environmentalist frame. This 
                                               
23 The frame’s preference for optimization derives from a historical liberalist notion of the market as a mechanism for 
optimal development, which eliminates bad ideas and practices, as they become tested by competition. Thus, endogenous 
change through optimization and experimentation in the market is seen to result in fine societal progress (Bellamy, 2015: 
27) and is preferred over “social experiments”, where idealism is taken into practice. 
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frame, in turn, suggests reevaluation on how energy is securitized (see Bridge et al., 2018: 201), since 
the risks of climate change are largely of energy origin: Extensive combustion of fossil fuels has 
emitted GHGs to the atmosphere, which has led to dangerous global warming. Ultimately, this 
conception of energy security questions such traditional neoliberal notions of political-economic 
relations that place the economy as the subject of security. 
 
By looking at stakeholder engagement with the found frames, particular groups can be connected to 
specific frames. Leaving out the strategic utilization of frames, it is logical to argue that their 
sensemaking occurs mainly via these frames. The Neorealist producer frame is almost solely accessed 
by the Russian government stakeholders. The leadership of Novatek also uses this frames when it 
engages in political debates (see Gyetvay, 2018b, 2018a). The Neorealist importer frame is in favor 
of the EU and Chinese stakeholders, who share similar energy security interests but have quite 
different starting points. Energy companies, contractors, and other businesses – as well as the Energy 
strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010), 
mostly follow the Neoliberal economist frame, which promotes economic and technical values. The 
Environmentalist frame, in turn, is represented by environmental NGOs – both Russian and 
international, who also network with environmental niche industries. In addition, the EU adapts this 
frame by drawing a vision of its energy policy, which should abandon today’s fossil fuel supply based 
economic model (see European Commission, 2015: 2). 
 
Nevertheless, some findings of the frame analysis differ from previous research results. Like Bridge's 
(2010: 523) analysis outlines, conventionally literature has given a contrary relationship to energy 
security and climate change mitigation. Against this notion is the Neorealist importer frame’s favor 
for renewable energy production, which should benefit the energy security of net-energy importers. 
This shows that energy security is relative to societal conditions, which is why it can often be case 
specific. Moreover, climate change mitigation can provide an acceptable reason to reduce dependency 
on foreign fossil energy suppliers for concerned importers. The section 5.2.2. shows that also 
environmental NGOs understand this, since they effectively use it as an argument to appeal on 
stakeholders who are interested in SOS. Secondly, despite that the Energy strategy of Russia for the 
period up to 2030 has an objective to decrease the role of hydrocarbon exports for the economy and 
develop competitiveness in renewable energy markets (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 
2010: 22), much of this liberalist vigor has been lost by now (Tynkkynen, 2016: 390). Most of the 
stakeholders and experts interviewed for this study have not noticed nearly any climate change 
mitigation related discourses in Russia.  
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6.2. Energy trasformismo secures incumbent interests 
 
Since the groups of the subaltern majorly consent to the strategic claims described in section 5.2.3., 
they legitimate the meaning of production that benefits the core alliance. The subgroups’ demand for 
energy transition, which originally withheld the requisites of phasing off fossil energy and a rapid 
transition to a fully renewable energy-based energy system (as in the Environmentalist frame, in 
section 5.1.4.), becomes accommodated in the hegemony as its meaning gets modified. In this 
process, energy transition is reframed as a partly hydrocarbon-based transition that is driven by 
economic growth of developing countries, improvements in upstream technologies, and the rise of 
renewable energy technology accompanied with “low-carbon” natural gas – apparently a common 
rhetoric within the Russian energy regime (see Sharples, 2013: 690). In turn, this framing lets 
incumbent actors project that they adapt to the ongoing change in the global energy landscape, even 
though they actively counter opposition. Thus, a trasformismo occurs, as the incumbents narrow 
down disruptive change and are able to continue energy production (Cox, 1983: 166–167) – taking 
place in the Arctic, regardless of increasing climate change that further changes the region’s climatic 
and ecological conditions. 
 
The meanings that the core alliance associates to the Yamal LNG project is where other actors of the 
historical bloc build their understanding of it. The hegemonic meaning of production, rationale, or 
“ideology” in Gramscian terms, builds upon a combination of neorealist understandings of Russia’s 
energy security and neoliberal depoliticization of energy production (see sections 5.1.1. and 5.1.3.). 
While the former is of uttermost importance for the government, the latter lets energy companies and 
corporate actors cooperate with politically motivated actors as long as their interests concur with 
commercial interests. However, relativist neoliberal framings of energy policy (see section 5.1.3.) 
also provide the opposing groups a ground for reformist action to challenge state policies. 
 
Nevertheless, particularly the environmental NGOs’ strategies fall short in that they cannot offer any 
“easy” alternatives to the hegemonic reason. They hesitate to profess publicly that a future society 
emerging from the grounds of a fully renewable-based energy system would appear different from 
today’s, since social systems and energy systems are interconnected (Urry, 2014: 4–5) – as described 
in the Environmentalist frame (see section 5.1.4. for reference). Because promoting reduced luxury 
in lifestyle would be risky for their public support (Levy & Spicer, 2013: 665), they need to tolerate 
fossil fuels in politically sensitive issues where alternative solutions are limited. Such are fruitful 
grounds for securitizing discourses of the incumbents. Possibly due to this political struggle, the 
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environmental NGOs of the subaltern are motivated to consider natural gas as the “least harmful fossil 
fuel”. Followingly, they do not consider Yamal LNG to be as big of an issue as coal and oil 
developments. 
 
Because groups who posit conflicting demands with the state’s objectives regarding the energy sector 
face marginalization and exclusion from decision-making processes in Russia (Henry, 2010: 763–
769), local environmentalist groups might principally prefer the strategy of passive revolution instead 
of war of position. Overall, influencing the energy sector is a significant challenge for Russian 
environmentalists (Henry, 2010: 768). In this sense, direct opposition may not be strategically as 
effective as gradual reforming through placing arguments that carefully align with hegemonic 
interests and rhetoric. However, passive revolution has been used very limitedly in the Yamal LNG 
case. 
 
While Russian civil society groups must have the knowhow to operate in a challenging environment, 
the research conducted for this study suggests that overall, the civil society’s expertise of energy 
security and energy policy regarding natural gas is quite limited. Strategically, environmentalist 
actors could benefit from developing an independent “common sense” of the subaltern (Haas, 2019: 
68). It should adopt of a coherent concept of energy security, which links together the conventionally 
decoupled areas of energy security and climate change (see Bridge, 2010: 523; Bridge, 2015: 331). 
A “hydrocarbon superpower” (see Bouzarovski & Bassin, 2011) is not the only culturally compatible 
national identity that Russia could have, laying on its enormous stocks of renewable resources and 
carbon dioxide (CO2) sequestration potential (see Tynkkynen, 2019: 124–125). 
 
Potentially the most disadvantaged group in the Yamal LNG historical bloc is the local indigenous 
population. They bear the direct consequences of such a feedback loop in which increasing global 
warming stimulates hydrocarbon extraction to expand, essentially contributing to the acceleration of 
climate change and degradation of the Arctic environment. Along the deterioration of traditional 
culture, valuable knowledge of resilient and environmentally sustainable living in YNAO becomes 
lost (Forbes et al., 2009: 6–7). 
 
Overall, the Yamal LNG project demonstrates Russia’s capability to implement technically 
challenging energy projects under international pressure, namely the US-imposed economic 
sanctions, in response to the threat it sees in increasing European concern over climate change and 
energy security. However, Russia still depends on the EU’s energy markets (Kratochvíl & Tichy, 
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2013: 391). Considering the extreme global political challenge to get hydrocarbon producer countries 
committed to energy transition, which increasingly shifts the focus of environmental policy toward 
geopolitics, the EU and other climate concerned nations should reconfigure their political-economic 
relations with Russia to support energy system transformation (see Tynkkynen, 2019: 125). 
Acknowledging the incumbent political strategies for framing natural gas and LNG as low-carbon 
energy sources, such claims should be critically assessed in policy planning. 
 
 
6.3. Limitations of the neo-Gramscian approach 
 
Even though the neo-Gramscian approach provides comparably good analytical tools for 
understanding power, strategy, and contestation (see section 2.), its historical background in Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of the capitalist society (from the early 20th century Italian perspective, to be 
precise) has left an imprint, which complicates using the approach for empirical research purposes. 
Using the neo-Gramscian approach requires the researcher to do heavy interpretation, particularly 
due to the open conceptual character of Gramscian theory (Haas, 2019: 68). However, power itself is 
a multifaceted concept and therefore, developing as simple mechanistic framework for it could be 
actually impossible. Nevertheless, theoretical reliability would improve by having more distinct 
descriptions for the less arguable concepts, such as the concept of field, which was challenging to 
determine in the Yamal LNG case that spans state borders and societal sectors. The neo-Gramscian 
approach should also develop further its framework on strategy, which in a basic form is quite simple 
– grasping only two types of broad strategies for the subaltern and accommodation for the core 
alliance to resist opposition. Overall, the approach should be understood as a holistic theoretical 
perspective, which can guide empirical analysis – as in this study. A closer level analysis method 
(such as social network analysis) could be used to reveal finer stakeholder relations and dynamics of 
power. 
 
Actor heterogeneity in the core alliance of the Yamal LNG historical bloc raises up a question about 
the solidness of the hegemonic meaning of production. The actors of the core alliance represent quite 
different cultural backgrounds, nationalities, and organizational models. They also target their 
communication for different audiences with varying backgrounds. Considering this, the meaning of 
production or ideology in Gramscian terms, could in fact be quite incoherent. For some actors of the 
historical bloc it may be visible only in part. For example, despite that TOTAL S.A. holds ideological 
leadership in accommodating the opposition, a question remains that how well its communication 
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reaches the Russian civil society? However, the results point out that the subgroups agree with the 
core alliance in most discussed themes (see section 5.2.4. for reference). It is also worth to notice that 
leadership is essentially about mobilization of others – and the company has been considered to 
master technical and administrative knowhow that it mediates to other JSC Yamal LNG shareholders 
(see Stephenson & Agnew, 2016: 566). 
 
Since hegemony builds up in actor relations and has no single leader, it is safe to argue that not even 
the core alliance elite stands sovereignly outside the influence of the hegemonic meaning of 
production that they manipulate in the Yamal LNG case, which is a standard subject of critique toward 
Gramscian theory (Levy & Scully, 2007: 978). The meaning of production, which projects as a 
universal trajectory of the society, may also shade the sensemaking of the elites. A related question 
that is relevant for understanding the energy policy of Russia, is that do Russian energy policy actors 
realistically account the risks of not developing Russian energy production toward the direction of 
energy transition – when such delegitimizing frames as the Neorealist producer and hegemonic 
discourses likewise the Yamal LNG case shape their policymaking. 
 
 
6.4. Methodological considerations 
 
Issues related to data collection are the most significant methodological limitations of this study. 
Future studies of this subject should seek to interview as many stakeholders of the Yamal LNG case 
as possible. Of course, this was also my objective, but it must be acknowledged that for this level of 
research – a master’s thesis with limited time and resources, it was exceptionally challenging to reach 
the stakeholders. Relatively short timeframe, geographical distance, and language differences were 
elements that especially limited data collection. However, I was able to compensate deficiencies by 
including archival data and expert interviews. Overall, the amount of data, both by volume and the 
number of included stakeholders and experts, is larger than the average for a master’s thesis. 
 
Even larger set of data could possibly have given more detailed results, but even now the data showed 
signs of saturation, as a significant share of the codes reappeared multiple times between different 
pieces of data. The only constraint in the data was that the Neoliberal economist frame had to be 
assembled using more expert interviews and background literature, since a large share of this study’s 
data that represents business actors consists of publicly available archival sources (e.g. reports and 
documents). These sources discuss energy security and energy transition only dispersedly and in 
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specific contexts, which requires more processing from the analyst – compared to research interviews, 
in which focused questions can be asked. In addition, archival data has usually gone through an 
editor’s review before publication, which affects the communication by often including less frames. 
On one hand, this reduces the volume of “raw data” for the researcher, but on the other, the official 
views of the examined organization are displayed more clearly. In the Neoliberal economist frame, 
this has possibly resulted in less detailed frame description. This is opposite to the Neorealist importer 
frame, whose heavy focus on geopolitics could in part be the result of having extensive EU documents 
in the data. 
 
As I used Skype video call and email to conduct some of the research interviews, I consider that these 
interview methods did not significantly affect the results nor methodological practice. Compared to 
face-to-face interview, video call is more prone to technical problems – but in my case, I experienced 
equally devastating technical problems in a face-to-face interview situation when I recorded audio. 
Acknowledging that the interview questions had quite specialist topics, the fact that bodily and facial 
expressions are easier to ignore online than face-to-face had very little impact on the results in general.  
 
Using email for couple of interviews was my last preference. However, I consider that it was anyway 
better to interview than not, since the participants would have otherwise rejected my request. Luckily, 
only one of the email interviews bore noticeably less data than an average transcribed live interview. 
Because email exchange spanned relatively long periods of time and the answers did not look like 
carefully crafted pieces of communication – which could be a considerable difference to live 
interview, I consider that the email interviews fit well with other interview data. My conclusion from 
the one shorter email interview is that the interviewee was not very interested in the research topic. 
 
The neo-Gramscian approach would have benefited from including media data, as media is 
considered as a part of ideological reproduction in the civil society (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87). 
Initially, such was gathered from English language sources, but only extremely marginal amount of 
it covered relevant topics for the analysis. Thus, it seemed unmeaningful to include and was 
rejected.24 Having the possibility to collect and analyze data from Russian language media would 
probably have increased the study’s validity, but however, it can be argued that the Russian mass-
media largely reflects state interests (see Lipman, 2014: 180), which are already included. 
 
                                               
24 Appendix 3 provides a list of the collected media data sources. 
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Moreover, my inability to account Russian language data might be the study’s largest weakness, 
resulting in a limited coverage of the research field. Future research should overcome this issue. 
However, an effort was made to contact two local indigenous political activists from YNAO, who are 
affiliated with reindeer herding. In their case, I translated the interview questions to Russian with help 
from a native speaker of Russian. 
 
After a number of efforts to contact them, I had to conclude that reaching nomadic indigenous peoples 
for research interviews can be notably challenging when specialist knowledge of energy policy is a 
practical requisite for participation. The indigenous activists rejected taking part – stating that the 
interview questions were “too complicated” to answer. This is particularly shame, since YNAO’s 
indigenous cultures possess valuable experience-based knowledge about ecological sustainability 
(see Forbes et al., 2009: 1; Kumpula et al., 2006: 28) that is an essential idea behind energy transition. 
 
Some other interviewees could have felt the same, as they turned down certain themes, pleading to a 
lack of expertise. Developing the research questions required operationalization, which overall carries 
a risk for reliability, since the interviewees could have interpreted questions differently. Hence, the 
specialist subject and the unorthodox analytical framework, which connects energy security and 
energy transition, turned out as the main deficiency with the interview methodology, while it is a 
major contribution of the research design in general. 
 
However, the semi-structured interview was particularly suitable data collection methodology for this 
study, since the research subject has been studied only very limitedly before and it bore multifaceted 
results like assumed (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 35). The methodology also allowed interviewees 
some freedom for interpretation of the concepts with different understandings (see Bridge, 2010: 523; 
Sharples, 2013: 683), which brought up varying frames (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008: 35). Starting the 
interview process from the expert interviews allowed me to develop structured and clearer 
understanding of the area under investigation (Bogner & Menz, 2009: 46–47) and identify 
stakeholders. 
 
Critique given to the frame analysis method is often based on the subjectivity of interpretation 
regarding the identification of frames. According to Entman (1993: 51), “nowhere is there a general 
statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make 
themselves manifest in a text.” Also, Kuypers (2009: 198) warns that “careless critics often find what 
they set out to find … It is very easy to ‘discover’ a frame and then impose it upon the remainder of 
 
 87 
the rhetorical artifact.” To overcome these issues when identifying frames, I based my interpretations 
on research literature and this study’s theoretical framework. 
 
However, cultural differences might have posed a challenge in my analysis: Frames, that are deeply 
rooted in culture, can remain invisible for the researcher. Not being Russian, my comparably limited 
understanding of Russian culture may have caused misunderstandings. Nevertheless, only a share of 
the data, which overall includes number of different nationalities, represents Russian sources. 
Therefore, this same issue would have remained regardless of the researcher’s nationality. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research has largely neglected the essentially contrary relationship of two areas of energy 
policy: energy security and energy transition (see Bridge, 2015: 330; Sovacool, 2011: 7; Van de Graaf 
& Zelli, 2016: 53). This study pulled these two specific and theory-heavy literatures together. By 
adopting a case study approach, these were examined in an empirical setting. Particularly the role of 
the state, as a collective actor who also resists destabilizing change and partakes in creating socially 
constructed imaginaries of energy security, was assessed (Bridge, 2015: 330). 
 
Political power plays significant role in how energy security and energy transition related interests 
become addressed in actual policymaking (Bridge, 2015: 330; Newell, 2018: 4). With 
multidimensional alignments of discursive, organizational and material elements, resisting regimes – 
often in the shape of a historical bloc, can obstruct low-carbon developments. This is another theme 
that has been commonly put aside in energy transition research (Geels, 2014: 23–25). With the neo-
Gramscian approach, this study brought together multiple conceptual perspectives that are used to 
understand power, strategy, and contestation in social organizations. Thus, following Geels' (2014: 
26) suggestion, the study “enrich[ed] the regime concept with insights from political economy” and 
made possible to study collective actors and different forms of power. 
 
The research questions set this study to find out how the stakeholders of the Yamal LNG project 
consider it to connect with the energy security of Russia – to which climate change mitigation poses 
a potential threat. Previous literature has conceptualized Russia’s energy security as evidently related 
to maintaining the stability of the country’s national economy (Sharples, 2013: 683). Russia is 
dependent on the revenue generated by its hydrocarbon exports and its current political regime 
justifies this fact, consequently framing climate change mitigation as an external threat directed 
against Russia’s sovereignty and cultural identity (Tynkkynen, 2019: 1). However, different actors 
with varying interests toward energy can conceptualize energy security differently and delegitimate 
other framings (see Proskuryakova, 2018: 203–204). Therefore, this study also looked at whose 
interests the Yamal LNG project actually secures as energy security, and how that concept of energy 
security becomes projected as a general national interest. 
 
Results were derived by comparing four cognitive frames, drawn with frame analysis from both 
interview and archival data, to the strategic accommodation of frames by the case stakeholders in 
their discursive actions, accompanied with organizational and material alignments. The frames 
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consider the Yamal LNG project’s relation to the themes of energy security and energy transition. 
The Neorealist producer frame, the most numerous with Russian state actors, considers that Russia's 
energy security is about ensuring the continuity of the hydrocarbon-intensive economic-cultural-
political system of Russia by addressing risks related to resources, their development, market demand, 
and export. It frames climate change as a “natural phenomenon” that benefits Russia. Thus, it 
considers that energy transition is an external political threat subjected against the country. According 
to the frame, the Yamal LNG project then strategically serves Russia’s energy security by 
diversifying export structure and adapting to conditions changed by climate change. The Neorealist 
importer frame represents the perspectives of net-energy importer states, mainly the EU and China. 
It considers that access to energy resources is imperative to guarantee the social and economic 
structures that provide well-being and development of societies, valuing control over energy supply 
and domestic energy production. The frame sees energy security and energy transition as two separate 
areas of interest, which, depending of the context, either conflict or align. The Yamal LNG project is 
considered to improve SOS – particularly for China, to whose wider geopolitical strategies it connects 
to. Popular among commercial actors, the Neorealist economist frame perceives that efficient markets 
ensure energy security. Since the frame considers natural gas as the lowest GHG emitting fossil fuel 
– “low-carbon” compared to today’s primary energy mix, its increasing use contributes to climate 
change mitigation. The frame assumes that the Yamal LNG project has been established from purely 
commercial grounds, but unintendedly happens to benefit certain actors by coalescing with their 
strategies. The Environmentalist frame considers that conventional concepts of energy security drive 
energy policy into the contrary direction than what climate change mitigation would require. It sees 
climate change, other environmental problems, and social justice as the greatest threats related to 
energy, reflecting the interests of environmental NGOs, development organizations, the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic region, and alternative energy technology business. Consequently, it advocates 
phasing out fossil energy and delegitimizes Russia’s hydrocarbon production, which it claims to be 
threatened by climate policies, energy transition, and resource constraints. It believes that Yamal 
LNG faces the same risks, which the company and the Russian state have failed to account. 
 
This study found out that the Yamal LNG project supports the strategic interests of the Russian 
government (see Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2010) and the companies of the JSC 
Yamal LNG consortium. These actors, accompanied with their subsidiaries, lobbies, and allied 
industrial organizations, comprise a core alliance – a dominant political group based on mutual 
interests. The Yamal LNG project untaps new resources and drives infrastructure development in the 
resource rich Arctic region of Russia, where production has been previously constrained by extreme 
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climatic conditions and geographic isolation. More importantly, by harnessing the NSR and new LNG 
technology, it allows Russia to expand its natural gas export markets to East Asia, when Russia’s 
primary customers in the EU become increasingly interested in reducing fossil energy consumption 
and deploying renewable energy (European Commission, 2014: 7–12; Kratochvíl & Tichy, 2013: 
392; Sharples, 2013: 688), estimated to lead to reduced total energy consumption (IEA, 2018: 41). 
Russia’s oil and gas sector as well gains knowhow from the cooperation of TOTAL S.A. and Novatek. 
All this benefits Russia’s energy security within such concept that is favorable to the government. 
 
Moreover, Yamal LNG is involved in the strategies of adaptation to climate policies. With a major 
discursive strategy, which bases on accommodation of opposing groups’ claims, the core alliance is 
able to influence the meanings given to energy transition. In the strategy, natural gas and LNG 
become projected as climate friendly fuels that are interlinked with the deployment of renewable 
energy. In accordance with Newell (2018: 18), the origin of energy transition is questioned, as 
ascension from energy poverty is presented as an equally driving reason for it. Thus, production and 
consumption of fossil gas conversely become intrinsic objectives of energy transition, as gas is 
reframed as “green”, “clean”, and “low-carbon” energy source, which supports energy security in 
developing countries where energy demand increases. This allows incumbent regimes to restructure 
their production by paying greater emphasis on natural gas than before. Borrowing from neo-
Gramscian terminology (see Newell, 2018: 4–5), what is achieved I consider as energy trasformismo: 
A political attempt to manage energy transition in a way that ensures that the transformation of the 
energy order follows the means supportive to powerful fossil energy producer regimes, ensuring their 
energy security with continuing production. 
 
The analysis based on the neo-Gramscian approach revealed that the core alliance possesses 
hegemonic power. The civil society stakeholders of the case, including both Russia-based and 
internationally-based NGOs and Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations, show signs of consent to 
the core alliance’s interests. They reproduce the meanings given to Yamal LNG, energy security, and 
energy transition by the dominant groups. Despite their fundamentally conflicting interests (see Burke 
& Stephens, 2018: 90; Forbes et al., 2009: 7; Henry, 2010: 768–770; Schwalbe, 2017: 33–34), the 
Yamal LNG project has faced notably very little direct opposition. Therefore, it is logical to claim 
that to a certain degree these subgroups have absorbed the hegemony’s rationale or “common sense” 
of understanding one’s operational environment. In essence, the rationale bases on the above 
described concept of Russia’s energy security that the Yamal LNG project serves by producing “clean 
energy” in the new Arctic “energy frontier”. The establishment of the Yamal LNG project and the 
 
 91 
operation of fossil fuel production may have seemed and continue to seem unavoidable to these 
groups, which curtails potential for opposing action. However, such hegemonic projection of “reality” 
is the result of careful alignments of such material, organizational, and discursive arrangements, as 
expanding infrastructures, promises of developing low-carbon technologies, juridical legitimacy, 
corporate social responsibility, and discursive strategies etc. 
 
However, fragments in the hegemonic ideology provide some windows of opportunity for contesting 
actors (Levy & Newell, 2002: 87). From a historical perspective, it seems that the ideological 
leadership in the Yamal LNG case has come quite far to openly acknowledge the existence of climate 
change and energy transition. Some evidence, as well as theory (see Levy & Newell, 2002: 87), 
suggest that these ideas diffuse to even more conservative actors. However, it would require micro-
level research to find out how ideas actually transfer between the actors of the core alliance. After all, 
the fact is that the ground is not fertile for energy transition advocacy in Russia: The state’s control 
over the civil society is strong (see Henry, 2010: 758) and climate change denialism is common within 
the political leadership and media (N. Tynkkynen & Tynkkynen, 2019: 104). In the Yamal LNG case, 
advocacy groups rely on seeking support from transnational networks, which help them to establish 
alternative cores of power outside the country. 
 
In broader context, the Yamal LNG case can function as an example of how specific framings of 
energy security may become obstacles to the adoption of energy transition. Incumbent actors, who 
seek to sustain their positions in power by defending the status quo, may actively seek to securitize 
energy in ways which allow them to stay essentially unchanged (see Bridge, 2015: 329; Geels, 2014: 
27–28). Utilizing various forms of power, incumbent actors can accommodate environmentalist 
claims into hegemonic ideology, thus domesticating potentially destabilizing ideas to serve their 
interests. Often close relationships between energy companies and the state in fossil energy producer 
countries can lead to diffuse exchange of energy related interests, which is a setting prone to formulate 
historical blocs (Geels, 2014: 26–27), in which windows for opportunity regarding low-carbon 
development are extremely constrained. Against the prevailing approach, environmental politics 
should not forget to consider the role of the capitalist state, which provides support for incumbent 
industrial actors in a mutual relationship (see Lindblom, 2001: 42). 
 
Ultimately, more research is required to understand better the relationship of energy security and 
energy transition, which is subject to political contestation. Conventional concepts of energy security, 
which in the end serve the purposes of a fossil capitalist society (Bridge, 2010: 523), should be 
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recontextualized to recognize the greatest fundament of human security: Sustaining life, which 
indisputably depends on the ecological condition of the biosphere. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1. List of data sources 
 
Research interviews: 
 
REF. 
CODE 
ORGANIZATION TYPE 
& AFFILIATION 
SECTOR COUNTRY DATE DATA 
TYPE 
SIZE 
(pp.) 
LEVEL 
A1 Energy sector think tank 
Deputy Director on Energy Studies 
Academic RUS 2019 Email 5 Expert 
A2 Energy sector consulting firm 
Deputy Director General 
Consulting RUS 2019 Email 4 Expert 
A3 Energy sector consulting firm 
Consultant 
Consulting RUS 2019 Oral (Skype) 9 Expert 
A4 Environmental organization 
Program Leader 
NGO RUS 2019 Email 2 Stakeholder 
A5 Environmental organization 
Program Leader 
NGO RUS 2019 Email 5 Stakeholder 
A6 State-owned gas company 
Senior Vice President 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 9 Stakeholder 
A7 State-owned gas company 
CEO 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 6 Expert 
A8 Private ship engineering company 
CEO 
Commercial FIN 2019 Oral 5 Stakeholder 
A9 Financial research institute 
Senior Adviser 
Governance FIN 2019 Oral 5 Expert 
A10 University 
Doctoral Candidate 
Academic FIN 2019 Oral (Skype) 1 Expert 
A11 University institute 
Program Director 
Academic UK 2018 Oral (Skype) 6 Expert 
 
Archival data sources: 
 
SOURCE SECTOR COUNTRY DATE DATA TYPE TITLE 
Mark Gyetvay (Novatek) Commercial RUS 2018 Video interview Mark Gyetvay of Novatek interviewed at Flame 
Mark Gyetvay (Novatek) Commercial RUS 2018 Video interview Novatek CEO sees no reason for vilifying Russian gas supply 
Christophe de Margerie 
(TOTAL S.A.) 
Commercial INT 2014 Video interview Financial Times: Total -- still upbeat on Russia 
Christophe de Margerie 
(TOTAL S.A.) 
Commercial INT 2014 Video interview TOTAL CEO: Ukraine crisis has no direct impact on Yamal project. 
Jin Qi (Silk Road Fund) Finance CN 2017 Interview 
transcript 
The Belt and Road Initiative: Launching a new paradigm for international 
investment and financing cooperation. An interview with Jin Qi, chairman of 
the Silk Road Fund. 
Dmitry Artyukhov 
(YNAO regional 
government) 
Governance RUS 2018 Conference 
statement 
Personal communication in the Arctic Media World (2018) media congress. 
Salekhard, 10.12.2018. 
Mikhael Krutikhin 
(RusEnergy) 
Consulting RUS 2018 Video interview ESGA Q&A. Guest: Mikhail Krutikhin 
Jin Qi (Silk Road Fund) Commercial CN 2015 Speech 
transcript 
Keynote speech by chairman Jin Qi at the closing seremony of the CBN 
Financial Summit 
Yamal LNG Commercial RUS 2013 Bulletin Yamal LNG receives full LNG project sanction 
Yamal LNG Commercial RUS 2014 Bulletin Binding contract on LNG supply concluded with CNPC 
Novatek Commercial RUS 2019 Report PAO Novatek annual report 2018 
TOTAL S.A. Commercial INT 2018 Strategy Integrating climate into our strategy 
TOTAL S.A. Commercial INT 2019 Report Registration document 2018. Including the annual financial report. 
CNPC Commercial CN 2017 Bulletin First phase of Yamal LNG project becomes operational 
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Xu Wenrong (CNPC) Commercial CN 2016 Speech 
transcript 
Natural gas, realistic choice to green & low carbon future 
CNPC Commercial CN 2017 Report 2017 annual report 
Ministry of Energy of the 
Russian Federation 
Governance RUS 2010 Strategy Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
Governance RUS 2017 Discussion 
transcript 
The Arctic: Territory of dialogue international forum 
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
Governance RUS 2017 Discussion 
transcript 
Excerpts from transcript of the plenary meeting of the St. Petersburg 
International Economic Forum 
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
Governance RUS 2017 Speech 
transcript 
Russian Energy Week forum plenary session 
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
Governance RUS 2018 Discussion 
transcript 
Meeting of the Security Council 
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
Governance RUS 2018 Discussion 
transcript 
Russian Energy Week international forum  
Vladimir Putin (President 
of Russia) 
& Alexander Novak 
(energy minister of the 
Russian Federation) 
Governance RUS 2019 Discussion 
transcript 
Meeting with Energy Minister Alexander Novak 
President of Russia Governance RUS 2016 Bulletin Partnership for global peace and stability. Joint statement during the visit of 
President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Republic of India 
Aker Arctic Technology Commercial FIN 2014 Magazine Arctic passion news #7 (1/2014) 
Seyed Mohammed 
Hossein Adeli 
IGO INT 2017 Discussion 
transcript 
Russian Energy Week forum plenary session 
The Society of Natural 
Gas as a Marine Fuel 
NGO INT 2017 Report Gas as a marine fuel. An introductory guide. 
European Commission Governance EU 2014 Strategy Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. European energy security strategy. 
European Commission Governance EU 2015 Strategy Energy Union Package. Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. A Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward– Looking Climate 
Change Policy. 
European Commission Governance EU 2016 Strategy Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions on an EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage 
CAFF, Association of 
World Reindeer Herders 
& International Centre for 
Reindeer Husbandry 
IGO INT 2006 Report World Reindeer Husbandry: CBMP EALÁT-Monitoring. Expert Network 
Monitoring Plan. Supporting publication to the CAFF Circumpolar Biodiversity 
Monitoring Program – Framework Document. By WRH and ICRH in 
cooperation with CAFF. CAFF CBMP Report No. 10, CAFF International 
Secretariat. Akureyri, Iceland. 
Bellona NGO RUS 2019 Bulletin Yamal LNG project built on a shifting foundation of climate change 
Alexander Klimentyev & 
Alexey Knizhnikov 
(WWF Russia) 
NGO RUS 2017 Report Prospects and opportunities for using LNG for bunkering in the Arctic regions 
of Russia 
WWF UK NGO UK 2018 Bulletin As renewables replace coal, planned gas plants destined to become expensive 
white elephants 
Ria Voorhar & Lauri 
Myllyvirta (Greenpeace 
International) 
NGO INT 2013 Report Point of no return. The massive climate threats we must avoid. 
Greenpeace International, 
Global Wind Energy 
Council, & 
SolarPowerEurope 
NGO INT 2015 Report Energy [r]evolution. A sustainable world energy outlook 2015. 
Heinrich Böll Foundation NGO GER 2014 Report Renewables: The only path to a secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy 
system by 2030. 
Heinrich Böll Foundation 
& Friends of the Earth 
International 
NGO GER 2015 Report Coal atlas. Facts and figures on a fossil fuel. 
Heinrich Böll Foundation NGO GER 2017 Report A change of course. How to build a fair future in a 1.5° world. 
Aurélie Bros & Tatiana 
Mitrova 
Academic FR & RUS 2016 Academic article Yamal LNG: An economic project under political pressure 
 
  
 
 106 
Appendix 2. Research interview framework sheet 
 
KYSYMYKSET KAIKILLE / INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR EVERYBODY 
 
Johdatus / Introduction 
1. Kertoisitko lyhyesti, miten päädyit nykyiseen asiantuntija-/työpositioosi? Miten energiapolitiikka 
on sinä aikana muuttunut? / Can you tell me shortly how you ended up in your position? How has 
energy policy landscape developed during your career? 
 
Hanke ja toimijat / The Yamal LNG project and its actors 
2. Mitkä syyt ja millaiset olosuhteet johtivat Yamal LNG:n kaasuhankkeiden ja Sabettan sataman 
perustamiseen? / What were the factors and circumstances that lead to the establishment of the 
Yamal LNG project and the Sabetta seaport? 
3. Kuvaile Yamal LNG:n toimintaympäristöä. Millä tavoin hanke on koonnut toimijoita yhteen ja 
mikä heitä motivoi osallistumaan? / Describe the operational environment of Yamal LNG. How has 
the project drawn actors together and what are their motives for taking part? 
4. Onko Yamal LNG -hanke edennyt alkuperäisten suunnitelmien mukaan vai onko niitä muutettu 
tai poikettu suunnitelmista? Mistä se johtuu? / Has the Yamal LNG project stuck to its plans, or has 
there been any needs to diverge from the plans during the development of the project? 
5. Millainen rooli Venäjän hallinnolla on ollut Yamal LNG -hankkeessa? / What has been the 
government’s role in the project? 
6. Ketkä hankkeesta eniten hyötyvät ja miten? / Who does the project especially benefit and how? 
 
Energiaturvallisuus / Energy security 
7. Millä keinoin energiaturvallisuutta pyritään varmistamaan Venäjällä ja kaasua Venäjältä tuovissa 
maissa? Entä miten Yamal LNG ja Sabettan satama vaikuttaa energiaturvallisuuteen tässä 
kontekstissa? / If you think about Yamal LNG and the seaport of Sabetta in the context of energy 
security of Russia and those countries that import its product, what kind of impacts Yamal LNG has 
to energy security? 
8. Vaikuttaako ulkomainen rahoitus ja ulkomaisten yritysten osallisuus Yamal LNG:ssä 
energiaturvallisuuteen Venäjällä tai ulkomailla? / Do you think that foreign corporate presence and 
foreign investment in Yamal LNG has impacts to energy security in Russia or internationally? 
9. Miten Yamal LNG:n tuottamaan LNG:hen liittyviä turvallisuuskysymyksiä pyritään 
varmistamaan? / How are security risks associated with Yamal LNG’s product addressed? 
10. Miten tämänhetkisissä energiaturvallisuuden ylläpitämiseen pyrkivissä käytänteissä 
huomioidaan ilmastonmuutos? / How is climate change considered in practices aimed for 
maintaining energy security? 
 
Ilmastonmuutos ja energiatransitio / Climate change and energy transition 
11. Arvioi Venäjän energiaturvallisuutta vahvistamaan pyrkivän politiikan ja kansainvälisen 
ilmasto- ja ympäristöpolitiikan vaikutuksia toisiinsa. / Can you examine the links or relations 
between Russian energy security and international climate and environmental policies and their 
impacts to each other? 
12. Kuvaile Yamal LNG:n suhdetta energiatransitioon ja ilmastopolitiikkaan. / Could you describe 
Yamal LNG’s relation to global energy transition and the politics of climate change? 
13. Miten näet Venäjän kaasumarkkinoiden kehittyvän, mikäli ilmastopolitiikassa edetään kohti 
Pariisin sopimuksen tavoitteita? Mikä LNG:n rooli tulee olemaan, kun energiajärjestelmä 
vähähiilistyy? / If climate policies will progress toward the targets of the Paris Agreement, how are 
the markets of Russian gas going to develop? And what will be the role of LNG in decarbonizing 
energy system? 
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Arvoketju ja -verkko / Value chain and production network 
14. Kuvaile Yamal LNG:n kaasun arvoketjua ja reittiä elinkaarensa aikana. / Can you describe the 
value chain and production network of Yamal LNG’s gas? 
15. Millaista valtaa Venäjä omaa LNG-kaupan kautta? / Could you describe the power that Yamal 
LNG possesses due to its market position? 
 - Voidaanko tätä valtaa käyttää eduksi ympäristöpolitiikan määrittelyssä? / Could this 
 power be used for example in shaping environmental and climate policy? 
16. Kun ajattelet Yamal LNG:n arvoketjua aina hankkeen perustamisesta LNG:n kuluttajiin asti, 
mitkä tahot ovat pyrkineet vastustamaan hanketta tai sen tuotteita? Esimerkiksi onko hanketta 
vastustettu paikallisesti tai Venäjällä, tai vastustetaanko LNG:n käyttöä alueilla, joilla Yamal 
LNG:n kaasua kulutetaan? / If you think about the whole value chain and production network of 
Yamal LNG – all the way since the establishment of the project until the end-use of its product, 
LNG – can you name actors that have resisted the project or its product? 
 
TEEMAKYSYMYKSET / THEMATIC QUESTIONS 
 
Venäjä ja geopolitiikka / Russia and geopolitics 
17. Miten Yamal LNG:n taloudellisiin, sosiaalisiin ja ympäristöllisiin vaikutuksiin on suhtauduttu 
lähialueella ja kansallisella tasolla? / What kind of reception Yamal LNG’s economic, social and 
environmental impacts have got on regional and national levels?  
18. Miten Venäjällä suhtaudutaan pyrkimyksiin vähentää fossiilisen energian kulutusta? / How are 
the reactions in Russia towards the aims to decrease fossil fuel consumption? 
19. Mitä Venäjällä ajatellaan energiatransition kaltaisista muutoksista? / What are Russian thoughts 
on energy transition, that probably will have major impacts in the society? 
20. Mitkä ovat kiinalaisten intressit Yamal LNG:ssä? / What are the Chinese interests in Yamal 
LNG? 
 
Ilmastonmuutos ja energiatransitio / Climate change and energy transition 
21. Mistä mahdollinen energiatransitio saa tai on saanut alkunsa? / What is or was the starting point 
for the energy transition? 
22. Millä tavoin LNG kytkeytyy osaksi Kiinan ja itäisen Aasian energiatransitioon tähtäävää 
politiikkaa? / How LNG links to the energy transition policies of China and other East Asian 
countries? 
23. Millä tavoin LNG kytkeytyy osaksi Euroopan ja länsimaiden energiatransitioon tähtäävää 
politiikkaa? / How LNG links to the energy transition policies of Europe and the western countries? 
 
Energia ja turvallisuus / Energy and security 
24. Miten Yamal LNG eroaa muista energiahankkeista? / What is the difference between the Yamal 
LNG project and other energy projects? 
25. Mistä kiinnostus LNG:tä kohtaan juontuu globaalisti? / What are the reasons behind global 
interests in LNG? 
 
Rahoitus, yritykset ja kaupalliset toimijat / Finance, business and commercial actors 
26. Kuvaile LNG:n ja ilmastorahoituksen välistä yhteyttä. Missä määrin LNG:hen liittyvien 
hankkeiden rahoitusta on perusteltu ilmastotoimina? / Describe the relation of LNG and climate 
finance. In what scale LNG related finance has been argued as climate change mitigation or 
climate friendly? 
27. Millä tavoin Yamal LNG:tä rahoittaneet tahot huomioivat ilmastonmuutokseen ja 
ilmastopolitiikkaan liittyviä riskejä? / How the financers of Yamal LNG consider risks associated 
with climate change and climate policy? 
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28. Miksi Novatek on edistynyt Yamal LNG -hankkeessa niin nopeasti verrattuna Venäjän 
valtionyhtiöiden energiahankkeisiin? / Why Novatek has proceeded so fast if compared to energy 
projects managed by Russian state-owned companies? 
 
LOPUKSI / CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
29. Olisiko teillä vielä jotain lisättävää aiheeseen liittyen? / Do you still have something additional 
related to the subject in your mind? 
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Appendix 3. List of rejected media data sources 
 
DATE SOURCE TITLE DATE SOURCE TITLE 
9.7.2012 2b1st 
Consulting 
Novatek and Total Yamal LNG in good progress - 
EDF reported to join Novatek and Total in Yamal 
LNG 
13.8.2018 Arctic Today Novatek’s Yamal LNG project doubles its production 
capacity ahead of schedule 
17.7.2012 2b1st 
Consulting 
Gazprom and Novatek signed Memorandum on 
Yamal 
21.8.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Next door to Murmansk submarine base could come Arctic 
LNG terminal 
24.7.2013 New York 
Times 
Polar Thaw Opens Shortcut for Russian Natural Gas 22.8.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Big toot for new Russian Arctic railway 
16.5.2014 OE Offshore 
Engineering 
Total taps Technip for Yamal LNG 26.8.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
A convoy is breaking its way through Russian east Arctic 
waters 
8.10.2014 OE Offshore 
Engineering 
Yamgaz selects AG&P for Yamal LNG project 31.8.2018 Reuters Russia's Yamal LNG exports accelerate in time for winter, 
top Sakhalin 
24.12.2014 LNG World 
News 
Miller: Yamal of strategic importance for Russian 
gas industry 
12.9.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Novatek CEO Mikhelson: «We will use Norwegian 
territory» 
9.11.2015 LNG World 
Shipping 
Aker Arctic puts design imprint on all Yamal LNG 
vessels 
12.9.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Novatek teams up with Chinese parter for Arctic shipping 
22.12.2015 The Barents 
Observer 
Railway for Sabetta 14.9.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Here comes the Russian Arctic gas that will fuel Europe 
5.1.2016 The Barents 
Observer 
Petroleum scientists blame reindeer for mysterious 
tundra sinkholes 
17.9.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Deputy Prime Minister supports foreign sailing restrictions 
on Northern Sea Route 
20.9.2016 LNG World 
News 
Report: Yamal LNG unaffected by low oil prices 18.9.2018 LNG World 
Shipping 
Novatek and Rosatom to co-operate on LNG-powered 
Arctic icebreakers 
9.3.2017 The Barents 
Observer 
Gazprom hints it might share Yamal gas with 
Novatek 
19.9.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Novatek: we team up with Tschudi Shipping over 
reloading of LNG in Norwegian waters 
1.10.2017 National 
Geographic 
They Migrate 800 Miles a Year. Now It’s Getting 
Tougher. 
4.10.2018 Arctic Today Global energy bosses send Trump a message: world needs 
Russian gas 
8.12.2017 Tass Putin expects second stage of the Yamal LNG to be 
launched on 2018 
11.10.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Novatek makes big discovery in Gulf of Ob 
8.12.2017 Bloomberg Putin Blesses Multibillion-Dollar Bet on Russia 
Competing in LNG 
15.10.2018 Oilprice.com This Giant Gas Field Is Rising From The Dead 
8.12.2017 Russia 
Today 
Putin opens Russia’s $27bn Arctic LNG plant 16.10.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Another two ice-breaking LNG carriers are on their maiden 
voyage in Arctic waters 
15.2.2017 Eye On The 
Arctic 
Blog: As Yamal LNG launches in Arctic, both 
Russia and China try to claim success 
19.10.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Floating storage for Arctic LNG 
25.8.2017 High North 
News 
Russian Petroleum Production Grows Despite 
Sanctions 
22.10.2018 Oilprice.com Here’s What’s Next For Russian LNG 
31.8.2017 Oilprice.com Russia’s Comeback In The LNG Race 22.10.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Oil company ships out first 20 million tons through Arctic 
waters, says much more is in the pipeline 
17.11.2017 The Barents 
Observer 
Putin nationalizes Arctic petroleum shipments 26.10.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Saudi Aramco wants to buy 30% of Novatek’s Arctic 
LNG-2 
30.11.2017 Arctic Today Novatek’s Yamal LNG to be commissioned and 
begin production 
29.10.2018 LNG World 
Shipping 
Norway transhipments to ease Yamal LNG winter logistics 
challenges 
12.12.2017 Tass Press Review: Putin declares victory over IS and 
what’s wrong with the 'RIC' in BRICS 
14.11.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
New LNG carrier finds way through Russian Arctic route 
to Chinese port 
17.2.2018 Russia 
Today 
Watch first commercial LNG tanker cross Russia's 
Arctic route without icebreaker escort 
(TIMELAPSE) 
15.11.2018 Oilprice.com Russia Says LNG Cargoes From Yamal Arrive In U.S. 
19.2.2018 Oilprice.com Is The Yamal LNG Project Overhyped? 19.11.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Georgy Brusilov is back in Arctic waters 
22.3.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Aiming for boost in Arctic LNG, Novatek builds 
own shipping company 
13.12.2018 Global Risk 
Insights 
Russia is gradually developing its Arctic LNG strategy 
29.6.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Arctic LNG carriers sail into deep ice with course 
for China 
17.1.2019 The Barents 
Observer 
Under the surface of Russia’s Arctic super-region is a 
looming disaster 
9.7.2018 Bloomberg Russia Is Building $320 Million Icebreakers to 
Carve New Arctic Routes 
   
10.7.2018 Arctic Today The first direct shipment of LNG from Russia’s 
Arctic to Asia is nearing delivery 
   
16.7.2018 Oilprice.com Yamal LNG Is Conquering China    
21.7.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
“Yamal LNG among the most competitive projects 
globally” 
   
25.7.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Novatek looks towards Norway for reloading of 
LNG 
   
26.7.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
Yamal LNG good business for European gas hubs    
5.11.2018 Arctic Today Novatek’s Yamal LNG will face logistical 
challenges during the coming winter months 
   
10.8.2018 The Barents 
Observer 
A historic shipment from Sabetta points at global 
advance of Arctic LNG 
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Appendix 4. Research process 
 
I consider that the research process started by writing a research plan in October 2018. During the 
previous summer, extensive reading of research articles considering surrounding themes had 
preconditioned me to develop the research subject. Eventually, I developed the structure of this study 
by iterative writing over the research plan. November 2018 I mostly spent reading relevant research 
literature to later construct the theoretical framework (see section 2. for reference). Before the end of 
the year, I had also made two data collection trips and found nearly all of the invitees to the research 
interviews. However, the holiday season, consisting of both the Christmas season holidays in Finland 
and the New Year season holidays in Russia, greatly delayed conducting the interviews. 
 
I worked almost solely collecting the interview data during January and February of 2019. Later in 
March, as I noticed that technical problems had caused me to lose two interviews, I conducted one 
more interview. In between this period, I collected the archival data, developed a deep understanding 
of the case, transcribed interview data, and coded data using the Atlas.ti software. In the early 2019, 
I also rejected the media data that I had collected, as it did not particularly relate to the themes of 
energy security or energy transition and was mostly reproduction of the public communication of the 
JSC Yamal LNG shareholders. In April, I had coded the 1,702 page data and started to analyze it. 
 
I spent the summer 2019 mostly writing the study. In June, I finished the basic frame analysis, 
presented in section 5.1., which required grouping of codes, since I had over-coded the data (Yin, 
2016). Unfortunately, during the late summer, I had to allocate much of my time to personal 
responsibilities, as I had greatly exceeded the time I reserved for conducting this study. I had 
estimated that it would take six months in total. 
 
Applying the neo-Gramscian approach to the data, which included argument comparison, took much 
more effort than I expected. As a result, I finished section 5.2. in late 2019. During the fall, I 
encountered health issues, which postponed finishing the study to 2020. 
